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Abstract 
 
 
Popper's account of refutation is the linchpin of his famous view that the method of science 
is the method of conjecture and refutation.  This thesis critically examines his account of 
refutation, and in particular the practice he deprecates as avoiding a refutation.  I try to 
explain how he comes to hold the views that he does about these matters; how he seeks to 
make them plausible; how he has influenced others to accept his mistakes, and how some 
of the ideas or responses to Popper of such people are thus similarly mistaken.  I draw 
some distinctions necessary to the provision of an adequate account of the so-called 
practice of avoiding a refutation, and try to rid the debate about this practice of at least one 
red herring.  I analyse one case of 'avoiding' a refutation in detail to show how the 
rationality of scientific practice eludes both Popper and many of his commentators.    
 
Popper's skepticism about contingent knowledge prevents him from providing an 
acceptable account of contingent refutation, and so his method is really the method of 
conjecture and conjecture.  He cannot do without the concepts of knowledge and refutation,  
however, if his account of science is to be plausible or persuasive, and so he equivocates 
between, amongst other things, refutation as disproof and refutation as the weaker notion of 
discorroboration.  I criticise David Stove's account of this matter, in particular to show how 
he misses this point.  An additional advantage Popper would secure from this equivocation 
is that if refutations were mere discorroborations they would be easier to achieve, and 
hence more common in science, than is the case.  On Popper's weak notion of refutation, it 
would be possible to refute true theories since corroboration does not entail truth. 
 
There are two other related doctrines Popper holds about refutation which, if accepted, 
make some refutations seem easier to obtain than is the case.  I call these doctrines 'Strong 
Popperian Falsificationism' (SPF) and 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF).  SPF  is 
the false doctrine that if a prediction from some theory is refuted then that theory is refuted.  
Popper does not always endorse  SPF.  In particular, when confronted with a counter-
example to it, he retreats to WPF, which is the false doctrine that if a prediction from some 
theory is refuted then that theory is prima facie refuted.  WPF , or even  SPF,  can seem 
plausible if one has in mind predictions derived from theories in strong or conclusive tests 
of those theories, which I suggest Popper characteristically does. 
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Popper is disposed to describe any such case of predictive failure which does not lead to 
the refutation of the theory concerned as one in which that refutation has been avoided.  To 
reinforce his portrayal of the refutation, or the attempted refutation, of major scientific 
theories as the rational core of scientific practice, Popper treats the so-called practice of 
avoiding a refutation as untypical of science, and much so-called avoidance he dismisses as 
unscientific or pseudo-scientific.  I argue that his notion of avoiding a refutation is 
incoherent.  Popper is further driven to believe that such avoidance is possible, however, 
because he conflates sentences with propositions and propositions with propositional 
beliefs.  Also, he wishes to avoid being saddled with the relativisim that is a consequence 
of his weak account of refutation as discorroboration.  
 
Popper believes that ad hoc hypotheses are the most important of the unscientific means of 
avoiding a refutation.  I argue that his account of such hypotheses is also incoherent, and 
that several hypotheses thought to be ad hoc in his sense are not.  Such hypotheses appear 
to be so largely because of Popper's use of rhetoric and partly because these hypotheses are 
unacceptable for other reasons.  I conclude that to know that a hypothesis is ad hoc in 
Popper's sense does not illuminate scientific practice.  Popper has also attempted to 
explicate ad hocness in terms of some undesirable, or allegedly undesirable, properties of 
hypotheses or the explanations they would provide.  The first such property is circularity, 
which is undesirable; the second such property is reduction in empirical content, which is 
not.  In the former case I argue that non-circularity is clearly preferable to non-ad hocness 
as a criterion for a satisfactory explanation or explanans, as the case may be, and in the 
latter case  that Popper is barking up the wrong tree. 
 
Some cases of so-called avoidance are obviously not unscientific.  The discovery of 
Neptune from a prediction based on the reasonable belief that there were residual 
perturbations in the motion of Uranus is an important case in point, and one that is much 
discussed in the literature.  The manifest failure of astronomers to account for Uranus's 
motion did not lead to the refutation of Newton's law of gravitiation, yet significant 
scientific progress obviously did result.  Retreating to WPF, Popper claims that Newton's 
law was prima facie refuted.  In general, astronomers have never shared this view, and they 
are correct in not doing so.  I argue that the law of gravitation would have been prima facie 
refuted only if there had been good reason at the time to believe as false what is true, 
namely, that an unknown trans-Uranian planet was the cause of those Uranian residuals.  
Knowledge of the trans-Uranian region was then so slight that it was merely a convenient 
assumption, one which there was little reason to believe was false, that the known 
influences on Uranus's motion were the only such influences.  I conclude that in believing 
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or supposing that it was this assumption that was false, rather than the law of gravitation, 
Leverrier and Adams, the co-predictors of Neptune, were acting rationally and intelligently. 
 
Popper's commentators offer a variety of accounts of the alleged practice of avoiding a 
refutation, and of this case in particular.  I analyse a sample of their accounts to show how 
common is the acceptance of some of Popper's basic mistakes, even amongst those who 
claim to reject his falsificationism, and to display the effects on their accounts of this 
acceptance of his mistakes.  Many commentators recognize that anomalies are typically 
dealt with by changes in the boundary conditions or in other of the auxiliary propositions 
employed.  Where many still go wrong, however, is in retaining the presupposition of WPF 
which encouraged Popper to hold the contradictory view about anomalies in the first place.  
Thus Imre Lakatos and others, for example, have developed a 'siege mentality' about major 
scientific theories;  they see them as under continual threat of refutation from anomalies, 
and so come to believe that dogmatism is essential in science if such theories are to survive 
as they do.  I examine various such doomed attempts to reconcile Popper with the history 
of science.  It is a common failure in this literature to conflate or to fail to see the need to 
distinguish a belief from a supposition, and an epistemic reason from a pragmatic reason.  I 
argue that only if one does draw these distinctions can one give an adequate account of 
how anomalies are rationally dealt with in science. 
 
The other important strand in Popper's thinking about 'avoidance' of refutation which has 
seriously misled some of his commentators is his unfounded belief in the dangers of ad hoc 
hypotheses.  I examine the accounts that a sample of such commentators provide of the 
trans-Uranian planet hypotheses of Leverrier and Adams.  These commentators imply or 
assert what Popper only hints at, namely, that there is something fishy about this 
hypothesis.  I provide a further defence of the rationality of entertaining this hypothesis at 
the time.   
 
I conclude with a few remarks about Popper's dilemma in respect of scientific practice and 
his long standing emphasis on refutations. 
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Introduction 
 
 
What, if anything, characterises scientific method?  Karl Popper believes that scientific 
method is characterised by the refutation of the major or fundamental theories in science, 
and by their replacement with measurably better theories.  This belief underpins his famous 
account of scientific method as the method of conjecture and refutation: 
Assume that we have  deliberately  made  it  our  task  to live in  this unknown world of 
ours; to adjust ourselves to it as well as we can; to take advantage of the opportunities we 
can find in it; and to explain it, . . . as far as possible, with the help of laws and explanatory 
theories.  If we have made this our task, then there is no more rational procedure than the 
method of trial and error - of conjecture and refutation: of boldly proposing theories; of 
trying our best to show that these are erroneous; and of accepting them tentatively if our 
critical efforts are unsuccessful.1 
 
Popper's account of method has been influential though not widely accepted in philosophy 
of science.  To the extent that scientists are influenced by philosophy of science, however, 
his views on method appear to have had more currency amongst them than those of most 
other philosophers working in the area.2  Popper's views on method have been influential 
outside science too.  As a young architecture graduate I found them exciting; and his 
emphasis on problems, conjectures, and criticism altogether refreshing.  I became a 
Popperian.  Given the debate in design circles about design method at the time - the early 
70s - it is not hard to see why this would be likely, if one were to encounter his views.  It 
was often said or implied at the time that design would be rational, or at least much more 
likely to succeed, only if designers would do away with their preconceptions and begin with 
the facts, whatever 'the facts' might be.  A scientific theory, it was assumed, was justified 
because it was logically derived from observation or experiment.  A design, it was believed, 
should be derived in a similar, quasi-logical fashion from the requirements and constraints of 
a supposedly given design task.3  Just how this was to be done was never made clear and the 
movement to 'scientise' design in this fashion has long since collapsed.4  Its techniques or 
methods for refashioning design were often, at best, unhelpful; at worst, they were counter-
productive and debilitating, leaving designers with so little time to design that their efforts 
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could not but be the product of many of the very preconceptions the use of those techniques 
was supposed to displace.  Moreover, the techniques themselves narrowed solution fields in 
ways their authors or disciples often did not understand, further reinforcing preconceptions 
about solution possibilities.  To be told at this time that science really worked by, of all 
things, trial and error; and that its intellectual products, its theories, were justified not by 
where they had come from or by the process they were arrived at but by how well they stood 
up to criticism, was like a breath of fresh air. 
 
So this research began with the ultimate aim of constructing a Popperian model of design 
method.  After looking more closely at Popper, however, it has ended as an exercise in, 
amongst other things, dismantling and rejecting much of his model of scientific method, 
especially the role he attributes to refutation.  This thesis, then, is firstly an attack on 
Popper's account of refutation and, in particular, on his account of the practice he deprecates 
as avoiding a refutation.  Secondly, it is an attempt to retrieve the possibility that scientific 
practice is rational, which is lost on this account.  I try to demonstrate how we should 
account for the so-called practice of avoiding a refutation - which is very common in science 
- and examine the case of the discovery of Neptune in detail to illustrate this account.  
Several of Popper's commentators or those he has influenced have attempted this same 
exercise or parts thereof and I examine a sample of their accounts, chiefly to bring out the 
deleterious influence Popper's ideas about refutation have had on them.  Thirdly, this thesis 
aims to show how much of the plausibility of Popper's account of method relies on his 
rhetoric, in particular on various semantic fallacies.  Popper writes in a simple, seemingly 
lucid way.  But appearances can be deceptive, and many of his commentators have been 
lulled by the exercise of this skill.  In the introduction to The Philosophy of Popper, for 
example, T.E. Burke writes that Popper "is lucid enough to have no need of a self appointed 
interpreter; his own words are by far the best source of information about the content of his 
thought."5 But Popper needs interpretation quite as much as many a more obviously difficult 
writer. 
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Chapter One 
 
Popper on Knowledge and Refutation 
 
 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I analyse Popper's account of what refuting certain contingent propositions 
involves (1.2), and how this implausible account can seem plausible (1.3).  David Stove has 
also discussed these matters in some detail and I criticise some important aspects of his 
analysis and conclusions (1.4). Next, I discuss two false doctrines about the refutation of 
major theories in science which Popper holds. I call these doctrines Strong Popperian 
Falsificationism (1.5) and Weak Popperian Falsificationism (1.6).  The effect of accepting 
each of these doctrines, and the weak notion of refutation generally that Popper holds, is to 
make such refutations seem easier in principle to achieve than is the case.  In turn, this 
makes the method of conjecture and refutation seem more attractive or realistic as an 
account of how science works than is the case.  I conclude that Popper's method is the 
method of conjecture and conjecture (1.7). 
 
 
1.2  Popper's Beliefs:  Knowledge without Truth, Refutation without Falsity 
 
What is it for a proposition to be refuted or falsified? In ordinary English and, in general, in 
philosophical discourse, 'refute' and 'falsify' both mean 'prove to be false', though 'falsify' 
does of course have other meanings.1  A refutation or, in the relevant sense, a falsification is 
both a proof and an act: it is the act of providing a proof that some proposition is a 
falsehood.  I propose, therefore, that some proposition,  p , is refuted or falsified if, and only 
if, someone,  S , shows or demonstrates that there is some other proposition,  q , which  S  
knows such that q   entails  ~p .  Since  p  is refuted only if  p  is false, 'knows' is used here, 
as it is in ordinary English and in philosophical discourse generally, such that  S  knows that  
q  only if  q  (is true).2  It is at this point that Popper parts company with ordinary English, 
and with most philosophers, so a good place to start in understanding his account of 
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refutation in science is with his account of scientific knowledge, or at least with certain 
aspects thereof. 
 
Popper has never accepted the common traditional account of knowledge as justified true 
belief, and at least since Edmund Gettier's short paper, "Is Justified True Belief 
Knowledge?",3 there would be, in this respect, few philosophers with whom he is  any 
longer out of step.  Many now think that justified true belief is not sufficient, or that the 
notion of justification is fundamentally a mistake, and some quarrel with the notion of belief 
(though not for any Gettier-type reason).4  But few would go as far as Popper has done.  He 
replaces justification with corroboration and belief with acceptance, but the crucial shift in 
his thinking is the elimination of truth as a necessary condition for knowledge.5  This shift is 
the product of a half-hearted skepticism on his part.  He shares the skeptic's doubts about 
contingent knowledge, but is unable to make do without it if his portrayal of science is to be 
at all plausible.  So he opts for an account of knowledge which stills those doubts, but which 
raises fresh doubts that what he gives an account of no longer resembles knowledge. 
 
In general, he takes the view that truth is something to which, in effect, knowledge claims 
approximate, or which successive knowledge claims may approach.  This idea or metaphor 
is the basis of the thesis of verisimilitude or truth-likeness.6  The content of the claims he 
typically has in mind here are scientific theories.  Our attention is drawn to the fact that the 
history of science is littered with false theories, many of which were once thought to be 
known to be true.  A case in point is Newton's inverse square law of gravitation.7  Important 
though this historical generality may be, no skeptic such as Popper is entitled to its use and 
in the present context it serves only to obscure the issue, namely, whether one has 
knowledge without truth. 
 
A comparatively recent development in Popper's thought, and one to which he attaches some 
importance, is a distinction he has drawn between what he calls subjective or world two 
knowledge and objective or world three knowledge.8  In general, 'subjective knowledge' and 
'objective knowledge' mean, or rather would mean if 'knowledge' retained its ordinary 
meaning for Popper, what is otherwise meant by 'knowledge' and 'the content of knowledge' 
or 'what is known', respectively.9  According to Popper, the former consists of states of 
mind or dispositions to act, the latter of "problems, theories, and arguments as such".10  
Renaming or alluding to the familiar distinction between the knowledge that  q  and the 
proposition or the fact that  q  in this fashion, however, is both otiose and misleading.  In any 
case, there is no proposal to make truth a requirement for knowledge, so-called, in either 
form, so the distinction is of no consequence here. 
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Popper offers three arguments for why there can be no knowledge, traditionally so called.  
Each argument alleges, amongst other things, some fatal incapacity or limitation of 
experience as a source or ground for knowledge.  
 
The argument to which he seems to attach the least weight turns on an alleged transcendence 
in description.  He says: 
The statement, 'Here is a glass of water' cannot be verified by any observational 
experience. The reason is that the universals which appear in it cannot be correlated with 
any specific sense-experience. (An 'immediate experience' is only once 'immediately 
given'; it is unique.)  By the word 'glass', for example, we denote physical bodies which 
exhibit a certain law-like behaviour, and the same holds for 'water'. Universals cannot be 
reduced to classes of experiences; they cannot be 'constituted'.11 
 
Popper's second argument turns on the ineradicably logical component in justification.  To 
justify is to provide reasons, and reasons involve logical relations.  Such relations exist only 
between statements or propositions, however, so there are none between experience on the 
one hand and any statement of belief or acceptance on the other.  There can be causal 
relations between experience and belief or acceptance, but whilst the former can "motivate" 
the latter it provides no more justification than does "thumping the table".12   
 
Popper's third and most influential argument turns on the fallibility of experience or 
judgement.  Since mistakes are always possible in observation or experiment, however 
skilful or meticulous we may be, we do not or cannot know whatever we may claim to have 
observed or demonstrated is the case.13  
 
Popper settles for a weak form of conventionalism, and acknowledges that he does so, in his 
account of perceptual knowledge.  He holds that any observation statement that is accepted - 
or 'known' - is one which merely "plays the part of 'a true statement of fact'".  (Emphasis 
mine.)14  It is worth noting here that in his account of science the logical form such 
statements may take is restricted to that of a so-called singular existential statement, for 
example, 'There is a brush-tail possum on that branch now.'  These statements fill the role of 
basic statements in his account, and their acceptance (or rejection) as true (or false) is a 
matter for a form of collective decision making or agreement on the part of the members of 
the relevant scientific community.15  
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What are we to make of these arguments or of the conventionalist position they encourage 
Popper to adopt or retain?  
 
His first argument above rests on a mistaken identification of universals, properly so called, 
with their instances.  Suppose that a child is shown a glass and asked, "What is this?"  If she 
replies, "A glass," then she is using a general term (not a universal) to correctly describe an 
instance of a universal.  And there is, I take it, no objection to someone's being able to 
experience an instance of something.  I agree that no universal can be "correlated" with any 
specific sense-experience.  But this is because we do not experience universals; we 
experience their instances, which are so correlated. 
 
It seems likely that this argument of Popper's developed as an analogy or by a confusion 
with the problem of induction,16 that is, with the problem for the claim to know some 
universal generalisation,  (x)(Fx  ⊃  Gx) , that is posed by any unexperienced instance of the 
universal  F , namely, is it also a  G ?  We do not know, and thus any such generalisation 
transcends experience in this way.  Nonetheless, this is not a good analogy, for whatever 
may undermine my ability to know from experience that something is a glass, or that, say, it 
is chipped or spotted, it is not that there can be or is some other thing, of which I have no 
experience, that is also a glass, or that is also chipped or spotted.  Moreover, in using words 
like 'glass' and 'water' correctly why am I committed to the objects so denoted behaving in 
some law-like manner?  A basic statement like 'Here is a glass of water' does not entail any 
law-like generalisation, as Popper would otherwise be the first to point out.  The child who 
describes a conjuring trick she has seen as one in which rabbits were pulled out of an empty 
hat may falsely believe that this was the case.  But she can be right about the existence of the 
rabbits, and if she were wrong that the hat was at one stage empty (of rabbits) then there 
would have been no trick for her to witness.  
 
The problems with Popper's second and third arguments are of a different kind.  Here it is 
not the key premise that is mistaken, but the argument he develops from it. 
 
If one is justified in accepting that  q  only if one is justified in accepting some other 
proposition,  r , which entails  q , then either an infinite regress of would-be justifying 
statements is generated, or one is forced to resort to a circular 'proof', or to 'justifying'  q  by 
means of some proposition which itself is alleged not to be in need of justification.  Popper 
does or would recognize that all of these alternatives are unpalatable.17  But that this is so is 
a reason for naturalising one's epistemology, for supposing that knowledge is something like 
reliably caused (true) belief, not for supposing that beliefs or acceptances about matters of 
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fact can be rational without some basis or ground in experience.  After all, one's desires or 
hallucinations can cause one to accept or agree that something is the case.  Moreover, if one 
zoologist says, "That's a brush-tail possum over there," and another replies, "So it is," how 
does either of them come to know or rationally accept that the other agrees, even about the 
topic of conversation, except on the basis of his or her own experience?18  Without this 
basis, agreement would be capricious or arbitrary.19  In what sense would science even be 
empirical, asks A.J. Ayer, if experience were, epistemically speaking, on a par with blows 
on the table?20  Popper now all but acknowledges the force of such objections to this second 
argument, for in replying to Ayer he agrees that "our experiences are not only motives . . . 
they may even be described as inconclusive reasons."21 (Emphasis mine.) 
 
The inconclusiveness of such reasons, Popper goes on immediately to say in this reply to 
Ayer, derives from our fallibility, which brings us to his third argument.  Now one can be a 
fallibilist without being a skeptic, as Ian Hinckfuss, for example, has shown.22  It is 
necessarily true that if one is mistaken that  q  then one does not know that  q .  But it does 
not follow from the possibility that one is mistaken that  q  that one is mistaken that  q .  So 
one can accept the fallibilist's premise that mistakes are always possible in observation or 
thought without being driven to the skeptical conclusion that one does not or cannot know 
anything.  J.L. Evans has drawn a helpful analogy here between 'know' and other 
achievement verbs like 'win' and 'arrive'.23  I can win a race, for example, though it was 
always possible for me to have lost it;  I can arrive at my destination though I might have 
been waylaid. 
 
Popper's conventionalist solution to reduce perceptual knowledge to mere acceptance or 
agreement is also unacceptable.  As Ayer points out, a robust epistemic notion like 'learning 
from a mistake', a notion central to Popper's methodology, amounts on this view to nothing 
more than deciding not to abide by some previous decision.24  
 
Whatever one may think of Popper's account of perceptual knowledge, or of his defence of 
it, however, the important consequence of the former for his account of refutation is that, as 
Max Deutscher has pointed out, even if some basic statement,  q, is true and entails the 
negation of some universal generalisation,  p , if we do not know or are unable to establish 
that  q  (is true) then we do not know or are unable to establish that  p  is false.  If basic 
statements were unverifiable then universal generalisations would be unfalsifiable, and the 
contrast between the falsifiability and the unverifiability of universal generalisations, which 
the problem of induction otherwise provides, would collapse.25  Not surprisingly, Popper 
resists such conclusions.  He says: 
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The contention that the falsification of a natural law is just as impossible as its verification . 
. . mixes two entirely different levels of analysis . . . .  On the first level, there is a logical 
asymmetry: one singular statement - say about the perihelion of Mercury - can formally 
falsify Kepler's laws; but these cannot be formally verified by any number of singular 
statements. The attempt to minimize this asymmetry can only lead to confusion. On 
another level, we may hesitate to accept any statement, even the simplest observation 
statement.26 
 
But it is Popper who is the source of this confusion, mixing the two "levels of analysis" he is 
supposed to be illustrating.  His use of the word 'formally' blurs this distinction.  Is "formally 
falsifies" a first level, logical notion; or a second level, epistemological one?  Certainly, if he 
is to make the point about a logical asymmetry in respect of universal generalisations then 
"formally falsify" and "formally verified" above mean 'entail the negation of' and 'entailed', 
respectively.  In which case, he fails to show how the falsification of any such 
generalisation, unlike its verification, is secure.  To falsify is not merely to formally falsify, 
that is, to contradict; just as to verify is clearly not merely to entail.  Falsification is an 
epistemological notion, as Popper himself elsewhere acknowledges when, for example, he 
claims (albeit falsely), "We say that a theory is falsified only if we have accepted basic 
statements which contradict it." (Emphasis mine.)27  Deutscher suggests that Popper merely 
"appears to overlook" this point above, but if that were so it is doubtful he would have felt 
the need to invent the expressions 'formally falsify' and 'formally verify'.28 
 
Similarly, it is not to the point to claim, as Popper sometimes does: 
While coherence, or consistency, is no criterion of truth, simply because even 
demonstrably consistent systems may be false in fact, incoherence or inconsistency do 
establish falsity; so if we are lucky, we may discover the falsity of some of our theories.29 
Popper's premises here are all unobjectionable, but his conclusion does not follow from 
them. To point out that a system is (logically) false does not show that some part of it is 
(contingently) false. The conjunction  of 'X is a non-white swan' and 'All swans are white' is 
false, and no inspection of the world is needed to determine that this is so. But if we would 
"discover the falsity" of the latter conjunct, our theory, we must first know or discover from 
experience the truth of the former, or of some other (contingent) proposition with which it is 
inconsistent, and so more than logic and good fortune are needed. 
 
Popper has remained wholly impervious to criticism such as the above.  For example, in the 
recently published Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery (hereinafter, Postscript) 
he says, "If we accept as true the statement 'This swan here is black' [q] then we are bound, 
by logic, to admit that we have refuted the universal theory 'All swans are white'  [p]."30  
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But we are not bound by logic, or by anything else, to make this admission.  Whilever we 
accept  q  we are, or at least can be, bound by logic to reject  p  as false.  But we are not 
obliged to admit that we have refuted  p  for on the above evidence we have not done so. 
 
If we could falsify a proposition,  r , merely by accepting one of its contraries then we could 
verify  r  merely by accepting any proposition which entailed  r , and since every proposition 
entails itself we would have only to accept  r  to verify it.  (Any verificationist who thought 
verification so easy would get short shrift from Popper, and properly so.)  However, just as 
we are bound to reject any universal generalisation that is inconsistent with an accepted 
basic statement, so we are bound to accept any universal generalisation that is entailed by an 
accepted universal generalisation, given a commitment to consistency on our part in both 
cases.31  Popper falsely denies that we are ever (conditionally) bound to accept a universal 
generalisation, because he has in mind that no accepted basic statement, or conjunction of 
accepted basic statements, should so bind us, which is correct.  That we can be as 
conditionally bound to accept some universal generalisations as to reject some, however, 
provides a further objection to Popper's belief that he successfully defends the asymmetry 
between verification and falsification in respect of universal generalisations.  This is because 
anyone who believes, as he does, that we can refute 'All swans are white' by accepting that 
something is a black swan should also believe that we can verify this same proposition by 
accepting that, say, all swans and geese are white, or merely by accepting that all swans are 
white.  The fact that, other things being equal, there is a greater risk in accepting a universal 
generalisation than a basic statement is beside the point here, though it may obscure it. 
 
Popper goes on in Postscript to claim that science would be unworkable if some basic 
statements were not accepted.32  This is true, but it is not, as he also claims, an argument for 
the asymmetry not least because science would equally be unworkable, even on his own 
account, if no universal generalisation was ever accepted, for example, as an explanans or as 
what he calls a "falsifying hypothesis" (see p. 12 below). 
 
In Postscript, Popper continues to skirt the point which Deutscher makes above that 
universal generalisations can be falsified only if basic statements can be known or verified.  
He says: 
Another objection often raised against asymmetry is this: no falsification can be absolutely 
certain, owing to the fact that we can never be quite certain that the basic statements which 
we accept are true. . . . As to the claim that this fact refutes the asymmetry between 
falsification and verification, the situation is really very simple.  Take a basic statement or 
a finite set of basic statements.  It remains forever an open question whether or not the 
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statements are true: if we accept them as true we may have made a mistake.  But no matter 
whether they are true or whether they are false, a universal law may not be derived from 
them.  Even if we knew for sure that they were true, a universal law could still not be 
derived from [verified by?] them. 
 
However, if we assume that they are true, a universal law may be falsified by them.33 
Popper concludes: 
Thus, the logical relation between basic statements and theories [universal generalisations], 
and the uncertainty of basic statements, enforce [reinforce?] rather than cancel each other: 
both operate against verification; and neither operates unilaterally against falsification.34 
 
Since basic statements entail the falsity of some universal generalisations and never the truth 
of such propositions, Popper is right to claim that the logical relations operate against 
verification of universal generalisations.  The entailment does not hold.  If the basic 
statements are uncertain, there is indeed a dual reason to suspect the argument.  But to the 
extent that the basic statements are uncertain, the argument to the falsity of any universal 
generalisation will be weak.  So the uncertainty of basic statements does operate against 
falsification - not unilaterally, it is agreed, but against falsification for all that.  If I apply for 
a job and do not get it there may be some consolation in learning that every other 
unsuccessful applicant missed out for two reasons whereas I missed out only for one.  
Nonetheless, I still did not get the job for that one reason.  Popper comes close in his 
conclusion above to suggesting, if he does not actually do so, however, that uncertainty in 
the basic statements is not a problem for falsification.  Clearly, the two factors concerned do 
not reinforce each other where falsification is concerned, and it is tautologous that if both 
operate against verification then neither operates only or "unilaterally" against falsification. 
 
Popper's concepts of knowledge and refutation, shorn of certain complications and 
distinguished as knowledgep and refutationp, respectively, may be defined in the following 
manner. 
 
Knowledgep:  A scientific community,  C , knowsp that  q , where  q  is either a basic 
statement or a universal generalisation, if, and only if, 
 (i) C  agrees to accept that q  as true. 
And in case  q  is a universal generalisation,35 
 (ii) q  is well corroborated, 
and 
 (iii) (i) because (ii). 
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By 'scientific knowledge', then, Popper means something like 'professional agreement' in the 
case of basic statements, and 'well corroborated professional agreement' in the case of 
universal generalisations.36  The latter may sound more impressive, but corroboration 
ultimately depends upon agreements about basic statements.  (Corroboration would amount 
to confirmation by tests, if Popper's skepticism did not lead him to reject confirmation.)  In 
any event, the important point is that all three conditions for the knowledgep that  q  can be 
satisfied even if  q  is false. 
 
John Watkins has recently sought to defend this position by pointing out that 'knowledge' 
also means 'branch of learning', and that The Oxford English Dictionary does not specify 
that all such learning should be true.  He provides the following example, "Medical 
knowledge in the eighteenth century was very defective and contained much that was 
downright false."37  But even if Watkins's construal of 'learning' is correct, the fact that 
'knowledge' has some other such meaning is beside the point.  It is like pointing out to a 
farmer who remarks that the nearest bore is in the next paddock the fact that the nearest bore 
is in the next room watching television.  In Watkins's example, if we replace 'medical 
knowledge' with the usual name for this branch of learning, namely, 'medicine', this point 
becomes clear. Watkins goes on immediately to address the question of whether or not the 
growth of knowledge is cumulative.  Having made his objection, he thus gives up on 
'knowledge' as meaning 'branch of learning' for it is of no use to him in this inquiry.  If 
someone were to ask whether or not the growth of some branch of learning was cumulative, 
we should first want to know what sort of growth this person had in mind.  Was he or she 
referring, for example, to the number or size of research institutes or schools, the number of 
scientists or other staff they employed, or all of these things?  Clearly, this is not the sort of 
'knowledge' Watkins had in when he framed his question. His concern lies with 
epistemology, not with sociology or history. 
 
Refutationp or Falsificationp.: In principle,  p  is refutedp, where  p  is, for simplicity, a 
universal generalisation,38 if, and only if,  
 (i) C  knowsp that  q , where, strictly speaking,  q  is a well 
corroborated "low level, empirical hypothesis" - a "falsifying hypothesis - and not 
merely the conjunction of "a few stray basic statements",39 
and 
 (ii) ~p  is validly inferred from  q , by some member(s) of  C. 
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It may be that Popper would agree that a proof that  q  entails  ~p  is also required.  In any 
event, he is not consistent as to what is either necessary or sufficient for refutationp, often 
implying less than even these conditions demand, as we shall see.  Also, I have mentioned 
only universal generalisations above.  However, Popper's basic statements - singular 
existential statements - are also falsifiable.  But they are not, as he believes, falsifiable by 
other such statements, which his demarcation criterion requires.40  For example, to falsify 
the singular existential statement, 
 (1) There is a pointer in motion at  k, 
where  k  is some space-time region, one needs to assert or imply that 
 (2) There is no pointer in motion at  k. 
Popper calls (2) "a singular non-existence statement".41  He excludes such statements from 
science, even though they are falsifiable, because they are consistent with any universal 
generalisation.  He holds the curious view that it is necessary for any observation-level 
proposition in science to be such that a universal generalisation can be falsified by means of 
it.42  This is an arbitrary restriction on scientific propositions, and one that is his undoing, 
for one consequence is that no basic statement is inconsistent with any other, as David Stove 
has pointed out.43  Popper tries to get around this problem, or would appear to be doing so, 
by claiming that the singular existential statement, 
 (3) There is a pointer at rest at  k, 
is logically equivalent to the conjunction of (2) and the singular existential statement, 
 (4) There is a pointer at  k.44 
But (3) entails the conjunction of (2) and (4) only if 'k' is so defined that k cannot contain 
any other pointer, in which case (3) is not a singular existential statement, that is, a statement 
which merely asserts the existence of something, for it is logically equivalent to, 
 (5) There is a pointer at rest (and no other pointer) at  k. 
 
For our purposes, however, the important point is that all of the above conditions for 
refutationp can be satisfied, even if  p  is true.  In short, if we can do no more than to 
corroborate and accept the premises of any so-called falsifying argument or refutation then 
we can do no more than to discorroborate and reject the negation of its conclusion.45  So by 
'refute' or 'falsify' Popperians ought to mean, and sometimes do mean, 'discorroborate and 
reject'. 
 
It would be quite a surprise if Popper ever said, "A theory can be both true and falsified."  
But were he to do so he would not, on falsificationp, be contradicting himself.  In defence of 
falsificationp, Alan Musgrave is one of at most a few Popperians who notices or is prepared 
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to acknowledge this meaning shift, and having done so accepts that he is obliged to defend 
it.  He says: 
Arguments to the falsity of particular scientific hypotheses proceed from fallible premises. 
Now since an argument from fallible premises is not a conclusive proof a falsifying 
argument is not a conclusive disproof. In other words, 'falsify' cannot mean 'prove to be 
false'. 
 
Partisans of ordinary English usage will, of course, shudder at this. The best reply to them 
is that most interesting ideas violate ordinary English usage.46 
Since meanings are conventions, 'falsify' can mean 'prove to be false'. It is irrelevant whether 
or not fallibilism is true.  Curiously, what Musgrave thinks 'falsify' does mean he does not 
say.  As with Watkins above he confuses what a word means with what, given that meaning, 
it can be used to help assert.  His problem, however, is that if he were to hold that 
 (1) There are no contingent proofs, including disproofs, 
and  
 (2) 'Falsify' means 'prove to be false', 
he would be forced to conclude that 
 (3) There are no contingent falsifications. 
So (2) is rejected not because those ideas of Popper's to which he is referring are interesting, 
but to avoid accepting (3).  The selective use of 'conclusive' by Musgrave meanwhile 
suggests that a falsificationp is at least some sort of disproof.  Also, suppose that (2) were 
replaced by 
 (2)* 'Verify' means 'prove to be true',  
and (3) by 
 (3)* There are no contingent verifications. 
Would there be any qualms about accepting this argument?  Of course not.  This is one way 
in which a purely rhetorical advantage can be secured for Popper's account of falsification. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that Popper often uses 'refute' and its cognates with  various, often 
conveniently weaker or deviant meanings, and he is by no means alone in doing so.47  
Consider the following sentences, which occur cheek by jowl in Popper: 
 (1)   We can then say that the theory rules out certain possible  
 occurrences, and that it will be falsified if those possible occurrences 
 do in fact occur,48 
 and   
 (2)   We shall take it [the theory] as falsified only if we  
 discover a reproducible effect which refutes the theory.49 
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In (1), 'falsified' means no more than 'false'.  In (2), 'refutes' means no more than 'is 
inconsistent with'.  In a similar vein, Popper talks of "refuting instances" when he means 
only 'counter-instances' or 'logically possible counter-instances'.  An unknown counter-
instance is not (yet) a refuting instance. 
 
 
1.3  Popper's Rhetoric:  Knowledge as Conjecture, Refutation as Discorroboration 
 
How much less powerful would Popper's methodology have seemed, how much less interest 
or attention would it have attracted, if in its exposition 'knowledge' and its cognates had been 
replaced by 'well corroborated belief' and its cognates whenever the latter ought to have 
been used instead of the former?  More significantly, suppose that 'refutation' and its 
cognates had likewise been replaced by, put simply, 'discorroboration' and its cognates 
whenever, once again, the latter ought to have been used instead of the former.  While these 
meaning shifts remain obscure, however, the door is open to equivocation, and to the 
making of inflated or otherwise misleading or false claims.  Thus Popper, and others, choose 
or fall in with a construal of 'knowledge' either as 'knowledge' or as 'well corroborated belief' 
or even 'conjecture', and with a construal of 'refutation' as 'disproof' or as 'discorroboration', 
to suit the circumstance.  Consider the following range of examples. 
 
Take, firstly, 'discovery'.  Having said that he accepts the view that "we should call a state of 
affairs 'real' if, and only if, the statement describing it is true",50  Popper remarks: 
Since I believe that science can make real discoveries I take my stand with Galileo against 
instrumentalism.  I admit that our discoveries are conjectural.  But this is even true of 
geographical explorations.  Columbus's conjectures as to what he had discovered were in 
fact mistaken;  and Peary could only conjecture - on the basis of theories - that he had 
reached the Pole.  But these elements of conjecture do not make their discoveries less real, 
or less significant.51 (Emphasis mine.) 
In the passage above, for every sentence which expresses a proposition about discovery, 
except the one emphasised, 'the discovery that' or 'discovers that' entails 'it is true that'.  
Having thus framed his account with the concept of discovery, properly so called, Popper 
introduces his novel concept of discoveries as conjectures, suggesting as he does so (with 
the expression "I admit that") that the supposedly conjectural character of discoveries is 
really just a common or well known fact about them, something which he is prepared to 
acknowledge or concede.   
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Given that some conjectures are false, it is not surprising that, having conflated these two 
contrary notions of discovery, Popper should then fail to distinguish a false discovery claim 
from a discovery.  If Columbus conjectured that he had discovered a western sea route to 
India, for example, but was "in fact mistaken", then he did not discover any such route.  
Perhaps Popper is misled here by a belief that some other discovery claims concerning this 
expedition were not false.  The case of Peary, on the other hand, is at most a quibble about 
margins of error, and one which, as it happens, did not impress Peary.52  Whatever force 
this case may seem to have derives largely from the failure to construe 'the Pole' as referring 
not to a certain geometrical point (as it often does) but rather to a certain geographical 
region, for it is the latter which an explorer would claim to have reached or discovered. 
 
Turning to refutation, shortly following his remarks about meaning cited above (p. 14), 
Musgrave asks, "What is it to regard a theory as falsified? The answer is, I fear, very simple: 
one regards the theory as false."53  This question of Musgrave's is so framed that his answer 
to it is not only consistent with the theory concerned being true, as Popper's epistemology 
requires, but also correct (or at least partly so) when 'falsified' is taken to mean, as it 
typically will be, 'proven to be false'.  In this way, Popper's account can be made to seem 
plausible.  But if Musgrave were to address some such question as, "According to Popper, 
what is it for a theory to have been falsified?" his answer, which should be no different, 
would reveal the comparative weakness of falsificationp.  It would be clear that, as 
Musgrave sees it, a falsified theory is merely one that is regarded as false. 
 
Popperians typically exploit or succumb to the notion of disproof, as they do with 
knowledge, because it promises a stronger and more plausible theory of method. So Popper 
says that "the method of trial and error is a method of eliminating false theories", omitting to 
point out that, on his account of trial and error, true hypotheses may also be eliminated, for 
true hypotheses can be discorroborated and rejected.54 And Musgrave goes on to assert that 
by 1900 certain observations in astronomy had "shown that something was wrong with 
Newton's theory [of gravitation] - the theory had been falsified". (Emphasis mine.)55  
Clearly, a Popper-English companion dictionary is required, as the following passage from 
Popper further illustrates: 
If we test our conjecture, and succeed in falsifying it, we see very clearly that there was a 
reality - something with which it could clash. 
 
Our falsifications thus indicate the points where we have touched reality, as it were.56 
(Emphasis mine.) 
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Moreover, just prior to the above passage, Popper remarks that a false conjecture is one 
which "contradicts some real state of affairs",57 contradicting his own view that logical 
relations obtain only between statements or propositions.  The function of this deviant use of 
'contradicts' is to draw attention away from that which such a false conjecture does 
contradict, namely, some true statement describing that state of affairs.  And it is just such 
true statements, or rather our knowledge of them, which would "indicate the points where 
we have touched reality". 
 
Equivocation enables people to adopt different stances on the same issue.  Take, for 
example, the testing of theories.  Ayer once asked, drawing attention to Popper's 
(unacknowledged) commitment to induction, "Why should a hypothesis which has failed the 
test be discarded unless this shows it to be unreliable;  that is, except on the assumption that 
having failed once it is likely to fail again?"58  Popper retorts, "Answer:  because if it has 
failed the test, it is false," temporarily suspending his skepticism about empirical procedures 
and invoking the notion of disproof.59 
 
On the other hand, when disproof is specifically attacked Popper retreats to a covert defence 
of discorroboration, or something even weaker still.  Some philosophers, notably Pierre 
Duhem60 and W.V. Quine,61 have argued that individual theories do not fail any test since 
only (complex) theoretical systems can be tested, and so only such systems fail.  Popper has 
replied chiefly by arguing at cross purposes with them, asserting what they do not or would 
not deny.  What is "inexplicable" on their account, he suggests, is the fact that "we are 
reasonably successful . . . in attributing our refutations to definite portions of the theoretical 
maze".62  But what is to count as a successful attribution?  It may be nothing more, 
apparently, than "sheer guesswork" or an "inkling" as to "what has gone wrong with our 
system".63  But Duhem and Quine were not denying that we can guess that some such 
portions are false or that such guesses may be consistent with whatever else we accept or 
confirm, so there is nothing for them to explain.  They were pointing out that, amongst other 
things, a successful disproof of any portion of such a system is dependent upon knowing that 
the remainder is true, and this point is not in dispute. 
 
Inconsistent skepticism, however, is a two edged sword.  If presuppositions of knowledge or 
disproof can be used to provide a veneer of plausibility for Popper's account, they can 
equally be turned to the opposite effect at the hands of any similarly inconsistent but hostile 
skeptic.  Thus Alan Chalmers, for example, concludes that no scientific theory can be 
falsified.  His various arguments for this conclusion are self defeating, however, because 
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they presuppose that there are cognitive achievements of just the above kinds, but these his 
conclusion denies. 
 
Chalmers describes an episode in the history of astronomy in the following manner: 
Tycho Brahe claimed to have refuted the Copernician theory a few decades after the first 
publication of that theory.  If the earth orbits the sun, Brahe argued, then the direction in 
which a fixed star is observed from earth should vary during the course of the year as the 
earth moves from one side of the sun to the other.  But when Brahe tried to detect this 
predicted parallax with his instruments, which were the most accurate and sensitive ones in 
existence at the time, he failed.  This led Brahe to conclude that the Copernican theory was 
false.  With hindsight, it can be appreciated that it was not the Copernican theory that was 
responsible for the faulty prediction, but one of Brahe's auxiliary assumptions.  Brahe's 
estimate of the distance of the fixed stars was many times too small.  When his estimate is 
replaced by a more realistic one, the predicted parallax turns out to be too small to be 
detectable by Brahe's instruments.64 
Chalmers claims that this account illustrates that no theory can be "conclusively falsified" - 
for the Duhem-Quine reason that "the possibility that some part of the complex test situation 
other than the theory under test is responsible for an erroneous prediction [such as Brahe's] 
cannot be ruled out."65  But his account, if correct, does not illustrate that there are 
propositions of some privileged kind, the falsity of which, if they are false, cannot be 
discovered.  Rather, it illustrates that we sometimes do discover which proposition in "the 
complex test situation" is false.  Moreover, his account provides no reason for supposing 
that if this false proposition were a major theory, rather than some auxiliary assumption, we 
should be unable to discover its falsity. 
 
A further reason for believing that theories cannot be falsified, Chalmers claims, is that "the 
observation statements that form the basis for the falsification may themselves prove to be 
false in the light of later developments".66 (Emphasis mine.)  This objection, once again, 
presupposes that there are falsifications of just the sort he objects to.  He again turns to the 
Copernican theory in an attempt to illustrate his claim: 
Knowledge available at the time of Copernicus did not permit a legitimate criticism of the 
observation that the apparent sizes of Mars and Venus remain roughly constant, so that 
Copernicus's theory, taken literally, could be deemed falsified by that observation.  One 
hundred years later, the falsification could be revoked because of new developments in 
optics.67 
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Since an observation statement is proved to be false only if there is some other observation 
statement that is known to be true, the latter observation statement is not one that will itself 
be falsified by any later development as it is true.  So his objection collapses.  The self-
defeating nature of Chalmers's argument is partially obscured by his use of 'revoked', which 
is a proxy for 'falsified', and by his use of 'deemed', which performs a similar rhetorical 
function above to that of 'regard' in Musgrave's account (see p. 16 above). 
 
'Falsifiability' is likewise not univocal for Popper.  He says, for example, that "falsifiability 
is untouched by the problems that may affect empirical falsifications".  It is a "purely logical 
criterion".68  But this is to attribute another and weaker meaning to 'falsifiability' from its 
usual or conventional meaning of 'able to be falsified' or 'may be subject to falsification'.  If, 
say, the fallibility of contingent knowledge were a problem for any alleged falsification of  q 
, for example, then that would be a problem for the alleged falsifiability of  q  as well.  If 
falsifiability were purely a logical matter, a falsifiability criterion would be merely an 
inconsistency criterion.  And every proposition would satisfy this criterion since every 
proposition is inconsistent with some proposition.  If  q  is falsifiable this is not merely 
because it is inconsistent with some proposition, but because at least one such proposition is 
or would be knowable.  If there are "problems" with knowing any such proposition then 
these are problems for the falsifiability of  q.  So Popper does not stick to his novel meaning 
of 'falsifiability' - any more than he sticks to his novel meaning of 'falsification' - for he does 
not believe that the falsifiability criterion is merely an inconsistency criterion.  If he did 
believe this then universal generalisations would be potential falsifiers no less than basic 
statements. 
 
Consider, for example, Popper's treatment of existential generalisations, what he calls 
"strictly existential statements", for example, 'A fire-breathing animal exists'.  Popper 
correctly asserts that no such proposition is falsifiable, for the reason that "we cannot search 
the whole world in order to establish that something does not exist, has never existed, and 
will never exist."69  In other words, we cannot verify the antecedent of any counter-
argument for an existential generalisation because that antecedent will contain a universal 
generalisation - in the above case, 'There is no fire-breathing animal'.  But a universal 
generalisation can be well corroborated and accepted, so existential generalisations can 
certainly be falsifiedp.  I take it, for example, that zoologists generally believe, and with 
good reason, that there are no fire-breathing animals.  Thus they can falsifyp 'A fire-
breathing animal exists', and would proceed to do so should they take seriously any 
medievalist going about the place asserting the existence of such creatures.  Since Popper 
has made quite an issue of the unfalsifiability of existential generalisations, 70 this is an 
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important case of his reliance on the notions he would reject, namely, falsifiability as 
disprovability and falsification as disproof. 
 
 
1.4  Stove on Rhetoric, Refutation, and Popper 
 
In Part One of his book Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists, David Stove reaches 
some general conclusions about Popper's accounts of knowledge and refutation, and about 
the place of rhetoric in its presentation, which are similar to my own.71  Stove's analysis, 
however, is defective in at least two significant respects, the first of which is his analysis of 
language and rhetoric, the second is his analysis of refutation, and both have implications for 
his account of Popper.72  I shall begin with the former. 
 
Stove claims to have discovered two so-called literary devices in Popper's writings, as well 
as in those of Imre Lakatos, Thomas Kuhn, and Paul Feyerabend.  The first of these devices 
Stove calls "neutralising a [cognitive] success word",73 and the second "sabotaging a logical 
expression".74  What Stove is attempting to explain, however, is the operation of a certain 
rhetorical or sophistical device in their arguments.  The means for this device can be 
supplied by, but they are not identical with, such literary devices or conceits as he does 
indeed (sometimes) identify in their sentences.  By failing to draw these distinctions, Stove's 
account leads to such absurd consequences as that many well formed sentences, such as 
'Most logicians would suppose that  P  entails  Q', are intrinsically misleading or deceptive. 
 
Let us begin with the device of neutralisation.  Consider the following two sentences: 
 (1) We know that the pointer reads zero, 
and 
 (2) We 'know' that the pointer reads zero. 
(2) is vague.  It might mean: 
 (3) We believe or agree that the pointer reads zero, 
or 
 (4) We think that we know that the pointer reads zero, 
or 
 (5) So far as we can tell, the pointer reads zero. 
And so on.  The effect of enclosing the cognitive success word 'know' in quotation marks in 
(2) is to deplete or neutralise some or all of the cognitive success meaning of that word, and, 
in turn, of (2).  But there is more, for (2) lends itself to equivocation between (1) and (3), (1) 
and (4), (1) and (5), and so on.  Sentences of the form of (2) are thus attractive to those who 
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are intent upon providing a plausible account of our knowledge of pointer readings but 
whose skepticism is such that they can consistently assert only such propositions as are 
expressed by sentences of the forms of (3), (4), (5), and the like.  And as Stove drily 
observes, Lakatos "raises storms" of such quotation marks to this end, whilst Feyerabend 
just "keeps up a steady drizzle" of them.75  Popper, on the other hand, rarely bothers with 
this device when he uses a word with a deviant meaning, as we have seen.  (Stove calls 
Popper's practice of not using such marks, "bald neutralising".)76 
 
One can make use of a sentence like (2), however, without committing any fallacy of  
equivocation.  (Stove notices this at one point but overlooks its implications for his 
analysis.)77  Consider the following two sentences, which are analogous to (2): 
 (6) The blacks were granted certain 'freedoms', 
and 
 (7) Marxist writers 'explain' Darwin as though he were 
 some simple, mechanical toy. 
 
Clearly, the author of (6) can mean, and be understood to mean, that the so-called freedoms 
the blacks were granted were not genuine.  The author of (7) is David Stove.78  By 'explain' 
he most likely means 'explain away'.  But even if there is some vagueness about (7), as there 
is about (2), there is no equivocation; it is clear that Stove rejects such explanations. 
 
A device like neutralisation is a means of doing something to a sentence like (1), namely, of 
weakening its meaning.  On the other hand, a rhetorical or sophistical device, of the kind for 
which such neutralisation may be useful, is a means of doing something with a sentence, like 
(2), namely, of persuading or tending to persuade others to believe or accept some 
proposition by irrational means, in this case, by equivocation.  It is sophistry if the author 
intends to so persuade others.79  The sophistical device to which Stove alludes is therefore 
that of insinuation.  Sentences of the form of (2) allow the half-hearted skeptic to insinuate 
what he or she cannot consistently assert, namely, that there can be knowledge, or something 
resembling knowledge, of pointer readings. 
 
Stove firmly believes that all four authors in his sights are sophists.  Whether or not this is 
so, however, is not easy to decide from their philosophical writings alone.  In any case, the 
question is chiefly one of biographical interest for we can assess the merits of their 
respective arguments, and determine the role that rhetoric plays in  making them persuasive, 
without holding any opinion about whether the various fallacies committed by these authors 
are deliberate or not. 
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If we turn to Stove's account of his second device, sabotaging a logical expression, the 
consequences of conflating this distinction between a literary device and a rhetorical device 
- a conflation signalled by his choice of the pejorative term 'sabotage' - are apparent. 
Stove considers the following two statements: 
 (A)  P  entails  Q, 
and 
 (B)  P  entails  Q, according to most logicians, ancient, medieval, 
  and modern.80 
He (correctly) classifies (A) as a logical statement because it implies something about a 
logical relation, in particular, that  P  entails  Q.  (B), however, is classified as "ghost-
logical" by him for whilst it does not imply anything about any logical relation it "makes the 
strongest possible suggestion" of doing so, in particular, of also implying that  P  entails  
Q.81  The "sabotage of a logical expression", Stove asserts, "is a literary device for 
appearing to make a logical statement, without actually doing so".82 
 
What Stove has uncovered here, is another means of insinuation.  In stating (B), someone 
can be insinuating that  P  entails  Q , and it is thus reasonable to describe that person as 
having sabotaged a logical relation.  The literary device upon which such sophistry depends, 
however, consists merely in attaching the weak cognitive attitude modifier 'according to 
most logicians, ancient, medieval, and modern'83 to the sentence, 
 (8) P  entails  Q, 
to form the sentence, 
 (9) P  entails  Q, according to most logicians, ancient, medieval, 
  and modern. 
 
Now no logical word or expression is "sabotaged" in (9), for 'entails' has the same meaning 
in both (8) and (9).  (Likewise, 'falsified' retains its ordinary meaning when Musgrave or 
Chalmers employs the weak cognitive attitude modifier 'regard' or 'deemed' to a similar end, 
as we examined earlier - pp. 16 and 19, respectively).  In addition, Stove talks of words 
having implications (in addition to meanings),84 and accepting this falsehood would only 
encourage one to believe that a logical word  is somehow sabotaged above. 
 
The failure to distinguish the literary device of employing a weak cognitive attitude  
modifier from the sophistry of insinuation, for which this device can be useful, leads Stove 
to overlook two points.  Firstly, such modifiers can equally be used with cognitive success 
words, as indeed logical words can equally be neutralised with quotation marks.85  
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Secondly, and more importantly, he overlooks that if in uttering (9) I am claiming that a 
certain belief remains common amongst logicians, I need not also be hinting or insinuating 
that this belief is true. 
 
Stove next addresses a third statement: 
 (C)  Some people think that  P  entails  Q.86 
(C) is like (B) - and unlike (A) - in not being a logical statement.  Conversely, according to 
Stove, (C) is unlike (B) - and like (A) - in not being a ghost-logical statement.  (C) is a 
"plain historical" statement, he says, one that "does not pretend to be anything else".87 
(Emphasis mine.)  Plainly, however, (B) is an historical statement, no less than (C).88  Stove 
presumably thinks otherwise, and believes that only (B) is ghost-logical, because someone 
would be much more likely, other things being equal, to draw the conclusion that  P  entails  
Q  from (B) rather than from (C).  This is because some suppressed premises are more 
plausible than others.  It is more plausible to suppose that "most logicians" will be right 
about the logical relation between  P  and Q  than will "some people".  Nonetheless, a 
radical logician or a muddle-headed logic student would not be insinuating that  P  entails  Q 
, for example, if that person, having stated (B), immediately added, 
 (D) But all these logicians are wrong;  P  does not entail  Q. 
Equally, someone stating (C) can add, 
 (E) But there is almost nothing that some people have not once  
  thought was true. 
Such a person can be thereby hinting or insinuating that  P  does not entail  Q , which would 
also be (if it were stated) a logical statement. 
 
The key point here is that such things as suggesting, hinting, pretending or insinuating are 
properties of acts, not of statements.  This point is partially obscured by the fact that, in 
ordinary English, 'statement' means not only 'that which is stated' but also 'act of stating', and 
the same goes for 'suggestion', 'insinuation', and the like.  Replace 'statement' with 
'proposition' in Stove's analysis, however, and the effect of this influence is plain. 
 
The second defective aspect of Stove's account that is of relevance here is his analysis of 
refutation.  At first, he indicates that he would subscribe to a view of refutation that is at 
least very similar to my own.  He says that to describe a Government Minister as having 
refuted some allegations that he had misled Parliament is to "ascribe to him a certain 
cognitive achievement:  that of showing the allegations to be false".89  From this point on, 
however, there are problems with his account, and it is as well to begin by looking more 
closely at 'refutation'. 
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Continuing with Stove's symbols to fit in with his text, recall that I have proposed that some 
proposition,  Q , is refuted if, and only if, someone,  S , shows that there is some other 
proposition,  P ,  that  S  knows such that  P  entails  ~Q.  'Refute' and its cognates are thus 
complex epistemic words.  They are, at least: 
 (i) truth-value words, since necessarily if  S  refutes  Q,  Q  is 
  false, 
 (ii) logical words, since necessarily if  S  refutes  Q,  S  knows  
  some  P  such that  P  entails   ~Q . 
and 
 (iii) cognitive success words, since necessarily if  S  refutes  Q ,   
  S  knows that  Q  is false. 
There are various other cognitive achievements involved in constructing a proof.  In this 
case, for example,  S  needs to validly infer  ~Q  from  P.  But more is needed, for  S  may 
have merely guessed correctly that this inference is valid.  S  would need to show that  ~Q  
can be arrived at by a series of recognizably valid inferences from  P.  Furthermore, in 
science or in other social practices,  S  would need to substantiate the knowledge claim that  
P, or at least to know that this can be done, in order to rule out cases where  S  has forgotten 
how he or she came by this knowledge.  (There are also some institutional requirements on 
refutation in such practices, for example, a refutation would need to find expression in some 
institutionalised act, such as giving a seminar or publishing a paper.) 
 
To return to Stove, he does not mention what I have called truth-value words, by which I 
mean words with such truth-value meanings as 'truth', 'fact', 'probability', and 'falsehood' 
possess.  'Refuted' is such a word, as I have suggested, because  'Q is refuted' means, in part,  
'Q is false'.  When Stove encounters 'truth'90 and 'fact',91 however, he misclassifies them as 
cognitive success words.  But there can be truths or facts of which we are all ignorant.  The 
success word in 'I saw the truth at last' is 'saw' not 'truth'.  The proposition that  Q  is false 
does not imply anything about the cognitive attitude of anyone towards  Q. 
 
Secondly, Stove seems to believe that 'refute' and its cognates are sometimes not even 
logical words.92  To this end, he contrasts the statement, 
 (F) Q  is refuted, 
with 
 (G) Q  is refuted by  P. 
'Refuted', he says, is a logical word when it is used to state (G), but not when it is used to 
state (F).  It would be wrong, however, to suppose that (F) does not imply that there is an 
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entailment at hand between the negation of  Q  and some known proposition (such as  P ) 
merely because no reference is made to any such proposition in (F).  Consider an analogous 
case:  'amused' does not change its meaning from  
 (10) I was amused, 
to 
 (11) I was amused by the allegations against the Minister, 
merely because both terms in the dyadic relation 'was amused by' are spelt out in (11) but 
not in (10).  If I assert only that I was amused I nonetheless imply that something amused 
me. 
 
Thirdly, having at first recognized that 'refute' is a cognitive success word, Stove switches, 
for no apparent reason, to classifying it and its cognates exclusively as failure words.93  
Now it is true that, for example, the Minister's refutation will expose some measure of 
cognitive failure on the part of anyone who happens to believe those allegations, since they 
are false.  But the refutation itself is clearly not a cognitive failure, nor is it in any way 
dependant upon such failure for the Minister can refute the allegations even if no one 
believes them. 
 
A further error in Stove's analysis is one we have already encountered in Popper's.  Both 
philosophers write not only of someone refuting or falsifying a proposition, but of one 
proposition refuting or falsifying another.94  There would be no harm in this practice if the 
latter expression were merely shorthand for the former and was understood as such by all 
concerned.  Overlook the point, however, that propositions, unlike persons, do not have 
cognitive attitudes or draw inferences, which the latter expression makes much more likely, 
and we risk confining our attention to only those properties which propositions have, namely 
truth values and logical relations, in constructing our view of refutation.  Thus it can appear 
to be sufficient that  Q  is refuted merely if for some proposition,  P , 
 P  is true, 
and 
 P  -->  ~Q 
Let us call this view of refutation, 'refutations' or 'falsifications'.  Thus Stove writes, "P's 
falsifying  Q  cannot itself . . . cause abandonment of belief in  Q".95  But  Q  is falsified 
only if at least one person has abandoned the belief that  Q.  Refutations is an otiose notion 
for, necessarily, if  Q  is false then  Q  is falsifieds since it is a logical truth that for any false 
proposition,  Q , there is some true proposition,  ~Q , which entails  ~Q.  Moreover, since on 
any coherent view of falsification,  Q  is falsified only if  Q  is falsifiable it follows that a 
proposition cannot be both false and unfalsifiables.  All existential generalisations, however, 
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are unfalsifiable, in the normal sense of that word, yet some of them will be false.  
Presumably, for example, 'A fire breathing animal exists' is false. 
 
With the above points in mind, consider the following argument which opens Stove's 
account of the sabotaging of logical expressions, in particular, of 'refutation'.  He begins by 
pointing out that the logical relation of inconsistency is like a "frictionless pipe" along which 
knowledge can "travel without loss".  So that if  P  is inconsistent with  Q  then someone 
who admits your claim to know that  P  cannot consistently deny your claim to know that  Q  
is false".96  (This is not right, for you may not know, but have merely guessed, that  P  is 
inconsistent with  Q.)  Stove continues: 
Suppose I first say that  Q  has been refuted, and then say that it is the truth of  P  which 
refutes  Q, or is the refutation (or a refutation) of  Q.  In the first remark "refuted" is a 
failure-word, implying the falsity of  Q;  in the second, the cognate words are logical ones, 
since in virtue of them my remark implies that  P  is inconsistent with  Q.  But now 
suppose that in my first remark I was neutralising the failure-word, taking out its 
implication of falsity.  Then, to be consistent, I clearly must do something, to the logical 
expression in my second remark, which is like neutralising a failure-word.  Having 
admitted the truth of  P, I will not be able to continue, as I began, avoiding the implication 
that  Q  is false, if I allow my logical statement to retain the implication that  P  is 
inconsistent with  Q.97 
He concludes that a writer "who often took the implication of falsity out of 'refuted' but 
never took the implication of inconsistency out of 'refutation', would be in a position 
hopelessly exposed to criticism.  Our authors have not been so careless."98 
 
This conclusion is false, as I have shown in 1.3 above.  If I deny that 
 ( S  knows that  P )  -->  P 
then I can deny that 
 ( S  refutes  Q )  -->  ~Q 
whilst continuing to assert that   
 P  -->  ~Q 
without contradicting myself.  In general, this is Popper's approach, as we have seen. 
 
Why then does Stove get this wrong?  How can he later quote Popper's remark that "a few 
basic statements contradicting a theory will scarcely induce us to reject it as falsified" as an 
example of sabotaging the logical relation of inconsistency?99  I suggest the following 
explanation.  Stove begins above by setting out something approaching an adequate view of 
refutation, even though he misclassifies 'refute' as a failure word in his "first remark".  His 
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conclusion, however, is squarely based on refutations, a view which surfaces in his "second 
remark" and takes hold.  Now since 'refutation', in the sense of 'refutations', is not even a 
cognitive attitude word, the saboteur's most promising line of attack is lost.  A second line of 
attack would be on 'refutation' qua truth-value word.  The saboteur could write, "It is the 
'truth' of  P  which refutes  Q."  Stove elsewhere remarks, however, that 'truth' is such that it 
"does not lend itself to being neutralised", so presumably he does not consider this 
possibility here.100  He is thus led to the false conclusion that the saboteur's only option is 
to attack 'refutation' qua logical word. 
 
Stove is further encouraged to form this general conclusion because Popper's account of the 
refutation of a certain class of proposition, namely, unrestricted probability statements, does 
provide him with evidence for it.  As Stove points out,101  Popper's bind in respect of such 
statements is that they are not inconsistent with any basic statement, yet it would be 
implausible to exclude them from science, as his demarcation criterion would otherwise 
demand.  So Popper claims that by adopting a methodological rule or convention - a 
privilege he resolutely withholds from the verificationist, who is in a similar bind here - 
unrestricted probability statements can be made falsifiable or regarded as falsified by the 
relevant basic statements.  And this practice is one of suggesting or insinuating that a logical 
relation exists where none does.102  Stove describes it as Popper's "most influential" act of 
sabotage, however, and this is not correct.  (Even Stove does not believe the relevant 
passages in Popper have been widely read or discussed.)103  Clearly, it is Popper's account 
of the refutation of universal generalisations which people typically have in mind when 
discussing his work, and he sabotages such refutations by removing the implication of 
cognitive success not the implication of inconsistency, as we have seen.  Indeed, it is by 
stressing the latter implication that Popper has diverted much attention both from the 
unpalatable consequences of his skepticism about such cognitive success and from the 
sabotage it leads him to commit by equivocating between refutation as disproof and 
refutation as discorroboration. 
 
 
1.5  Strong Popperian Falsificationism (SPF) 
 
The easier refutation or falsification seems, or is made to seem, the stronger any supposedly 
falsificationist methodology will seem. 
 
As we have seen in 1.2 above, one means by which Popper makes refutation seem easy is by 
relaxing the conditions he demands for knowledge.  A second means of achieving this end, 
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at least in respect of certain refutations, is to deny, gloss over, or otherwise ignore some of 
the premises required to construct such refutations, or to take it for granted that the required 
premises are known or at least are well corroborated.  In this section, and the next, I discuss 
this aspect of his falsificationism. 
 
The sort of refutation Popper deals with in this fashion is that which is central to his 
methodology, namely, the refutation of universal generalisations or scientific theories, 
especially important or fundamental scientific theories.  And the set of premises he rejects or 
sweeps under the carpet is what I shall call the set of auxiliary propositions.  This set is 
required, in the first instance, to deduce any existentially affirmative prediction from a 
universal generalisation and, in turn, to construct a deductively valid counter-argument for 
that generalisation from the negation of the prediction so deduced.   
 
The logical form of such a counter-argument, a statement of which is not easily come by in 
Popper,104 can be set out as follows: 
 T : universal generalisation, or theory; 
 A : set of auxiliary propositions, typically consisting of  
   statements of initial conditions and boundary conditions, and  
   perhaps other universal generalisations;    
 P : prediction; 
and 
 O : observation statement, made to test or determine the truth  
   value of  P. 
Now, if 
 (1)  (T & A)  -->  P 
 (2)  O 
and 
 (3)  O  -->  ~P 
then 
 (4) ~P (2), (3);  Modus Ponens. 
and 
 (5) ~(T & A) (1), (4);  Modus Tollens. 
So if 
 (6) A 
then 
 (7) ~T (5); De Morgan's Law.  (6); Disjunctive 
    Syllogism   
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In short, the counter-argument for  T  is 
 (~P & A)  -->  ~T 
or 
 (O & A)  -->  ~T  
 
Popper espouses two false doctrines concerning the role of the auxiliary propositions, the 
acceptance of either of which makes the refutation of scientific theories look easy. The first 
of these doctrines I call Strong Popperian Falsificationism (SPF); the second, related 
doctrine I call Weak Popperian Falsificationism (WPF).  WPF is discussed in 1.6 below. 
 
SPF  is the false doctrine that if  P  is refuted then  T  is refuted.  It is yet another means by 
which Popper would sidestep the Duhem-Quine problem.  SPF  can be found not only in his 
early writings;105 the following is a relatively recent and characteristic remark by him 
which illustrates his continuing commitment to  SPF: 
Einstein was looking for crucial experiments whose agreement with his predictions would 
by no means establish his theory; while a disagreement, as he was the first to stress, would 
show his theory to be untenable.106 
When circumstances dictate otherwise, however, it is equally characteristic of Popper to 
deny  SPF.  Thus, in a subsequent discussion of one of the very experiments he refers to 
above, he affirms and then denies  SPF  in saying: 
There were certain possible results [of Eddington's eclipse experiment] which, it was 
agreed in advance, would refute Einstein's theory - for example, a result indicating a zero 
deflection of the light rays.  But there were, no doubt, also results which would have led 
first to a scrutiny of the experimental arrangement, and perhaps even to the overthrow of 
some of the more speculative auxiliary hypotheses.107 
 
Popper's sporadic assertions of  SPF  often go unnoticed or unmentioned though some 
philosophers, notably J.O. Wisdom, make a point of denying that he displays any 
inconsistency of the kind in evidence above.108  Alternatively, some, like Musgrave, do 
notice one or other instance of  SPF  in Popper but treat it as a trivial oversight or aberration 
on his part.109  As one would expect, neither Wisdom nor Musgrave endorses  SPF, since 
once the doctrine is exposed to scrutiny it is obvious that it is false.  But  SPF  can be 
disentangled from the confused responses of some of Popper's critics.  Kuhn, for example, 
claims that scientists do not "treat anomalies as counter-instances" of their theories, even 
though "in the vocabulary of philosophy of science that is what they are".110  Now 
scientists would be correct in not treating an anomaly as a counter-instance.  An anomaly is 
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a discrepancy between  P  and  O , and such a discrepancy can arise from an error in  O ,  A , 
or in the inference from T &A  to  P , as it can from having found some counter-instance of  
T.  Kuhn is simply wrong about the semantics of the philosophy of science, even if there 
remains a deal of loose, and consequently misleading, talk about counter-instances.111 
 
Following Kuhn's lead, Lakatos extravagantly claims that all theories are beset with 
"undigested anomalies" at every stage of their scientific career, concluding that "all theories, 
in this sense, are born refuted and die refuted".112  Since Lakatos employs the modifier 'in 
this sense', we should probably interpret his claim not as an expression of  SPF , a doctrine 
he elsewhere rejects,113 but as one in which 'refuted' is used in some deviant sense, 
probably best translated as 'at least weakly discorroborated'.  But it is not hard to see how 
someone who engages in such equivocation is likely to give at least a passable impression of 
believing   SPF.  Thus, W.H. Newton-Smith, for example, clearly indicates in his critique of 
Popper in The Rationality of Science that he rejects  SPF.  He remarks, for example, that "the 
fact that we recognize the need to ignore anomalies where some extraneous factors have 
intervened makes theories particularly resistant to easy falsification".114  Yet almost in the 
next breath, he bluntly announces,  "All theories are born falsified."  So much, one might 
think, for the difficulties of falsification.  But Newton-Smith is merely engaged in 
equivocation, for his next sentence reads, "No theory has ever been totally free of 
anomalies."115 
 
John Watkins, on the other hand, rejects the 'born refuted' thesis.  Nonetheless, he too is 
similarly confused.  He says: 
Taken at its face value, this thesis, if correct, would wreck our theory [of method] 
according to which it is more rational to adopt that theory, where there is one, that is better 
corroborated than its rivals, it being a necessary condition for its being better corroborated 
than them that it be unrefuted.116 
Taken at face value, however, the 'born refuted' thesis is a fatuous claim.  Clearly, all 
theories are not born refuted - some theories are true, and some false theories emerge before 
the conditions are ripe for their disproof.  But even for those like Watkins for whom 'refuted' 
officially means 'well discorroborated', and does so above (if it does not mean 'disproved'), 
the corresponding thesis needs only to be understood to be dismissed.  Why on earth should 
anyone believe that there is some well corroborated counter-argument which greets, or 
which can be immediately assembled for, every theory that is formulated?  Watkins misses 
this point because he too equivocates.  He acknowledges Lakatos's implicit definition of 
'refuted' as 'weakly discorroborated' for immediately after the passage quoted above he notes 
that for Lakatos a theory is refuted merely when there is some "evidence conflicting with 
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it".117  But he does not contest this use of 'refuted', and slides from talk of conflicting 
evidence to that of "refuting evidence".118  What Watkins does contest, and at some length, 
is the view that all or even most scientific theories are confronted with some counter-
evidence at birth.119  This may not be a worthless exercise, but it is not one that is relevant 
to the concern he voices above for his theory of method.  For even if it were true that there 
has been no theory for which some counter-evidence does not date from the time that theory 
was first put forward, one theory can still be better supported by the total body of available 
evidence (including counter-evidence) at any time than any of its rivals.120   
 
Since Watkins does seem to realise how easy it is for a theory to be refuted on Lakatos's 
view above, it is only the tug of the stronger meanings of 'refuted' which both prevents him 
from recognizing that the 'born refuted' thesis poses no threat (or at least no novel threat) to 
his account and that sends him off on an historical tangent to defend this account.  If all 
theories were, per impossible, born refuted, or even if they were all born strongly 
discorroborated (and stayed that way), Watkins would have something to worry about, as 
would the rest of us. 
 
Popper offers two defences of  SPF.  The first is an argument from crucial experiments, 
directed against Duhem; the second is an argument from what he calls crude tests, 
formulated in response to criticisms by Hilary Putnam and Imre Lakatos. 
 
Taking Popper's first argument, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that he has not read or 
understood Duhem, or else that he felt it necessary to construct a straw man.  Duhem's 
modest and plainly expressed response to the Duhem-Quine problem asserts no more than 
Popper himself is entitled to assert, though significantly less that Popper would like to.  I 
concentrate on logical matters below, however, rather than these historical ones.121 
 
In Conjectures and Refutations (hereinafter Conjectures), Popper asserts that Duhemian 
skepticism about the refutation of theories "overlooks the fact" that in a crucial experiment 
"we decide between two systems which differ only over the two theories which are at 
stake".122  Whilst this is a fact about crucial experiments, it provides no cure for such 
skepticism.  Let  T1   and  T2  be Popper's two theories;  T1 & A  and  T2 & A  Popper's two 
systems (though he thinks of  A  here as "background knowledge");  and let  P1  and  P2  be 
the predictions derived from each system, respectively.  That is, 
 (1) (T1  &  A)  -->  P1 
and 
 (2) (T2  &  A)  -->  P2 
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Now, even if 
 (3)    ~P1 
and 
 (4) P2 
it does not follow, as others have pointed out,123 that 
 (5) ~T1 
(5) is not a consequence of (1) and (3), which are the only relevant givens.  Given  (1), (2), 
(3), and (4), anyone who rejects  T1  and accepts  T2  may be rejecting what is true and 
accepting what is false. 
 
Popper continues that Duhemian skepticism "further overlooks the fact that we do not assert 
the refutation of the theory as such [T1], but of the theory together with that background 
knowledge [A]; parts of which, if other crucial experiments can be designed, may indeed one 
day be rejected as responsible for the failure".124  Since the Duhem-Quine problem arises 
only if we do assert that  T1 & A  is false, however, Duhem cannot have overlooked this 
point.  Moreover, fancy Popper suggesting that we refrain from asserting that theories are 
refuted; and were we to do so, of course, there would be no disagreement with Duhem.  
Also, if Popper would back away from claiming that the false conjunct(s) of a refuted 
system can be prised from that system in one experiment, crucial or otherwise, he cannot 
consistently suppose that a second, or any subsequent, experiment will do the trick.125 
 
I turn now to Popper's argument from so-called crude tests.  Putnam points out that, for two 
hundred years or so, Newton's law of gravitation was unfalsifiable because at that stage no 
counter-argument could have been formulated in which the auxiliary propositions were 
known or knowable.  He concludes that such theories are not, as Popper believes, "strongly 
falsifiable".126  But Putnam is using 'falsifiable' here in a different sense from Popper.  
Popper's requirement for strongly falsifiable theories is a purely logical requirement 
(whatever one may think of this use of the word 'falsifiable').  Falsifiability is measured by 
the size of the class of potential or logically possible falsifiers, not the class of discoverable 
falsifiers.  Since any statement of a law of nature or a true universal generalisation is 
unfalsifiable as a matter of fact, a requirement that a theory be falsifiable in Putnam's sense 
would indeed be undesirable. 
 
Lakatos makes the stronger claim that a good scientific theory is, in principle, 
unfalsifiable.127  Like Popper, Lakatos is a skeptic about contingent knowledge, and for 
much the same reasons.128  And at least on this occasion, he takes his skepticism seriously.  
He considers the case of a planet which deviates from its predicted course, though his 
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argument follows a familiar one.  He contends that, even if we could know that this planet 
had so deviated, it is always possible that some undiscovered cause would explain this 
deviation.  This is so even if the search for such a cause has been, for all practical purposes, 
exhaustive.129  Lakatos points out that, at least for many disagreements between prediction 
and observation, that is, given 
 (T & A)  -->  ~O 
we can cobble together some new set of auxiliary propositions,  A' , such that 
 (T & A')  -->  O 
If we are unable to corroborate  A' , we can try  A"  such that, once again, agreement 
with observations is achieved: 
 (T & A")  -->  O 
If we are unable to corroborate  A" , then we can try  A"' . . . and so on.  Lakatos concludes 
with a flourish that "exactly the most admired of scientific theories simply fail to forbid any 
observable state of affairs".130  But a skeptical premise will not support this conclusion.  To 
profess ignorance about the world, as Lakatos does, gives one no reason to believe that it is 
one way rather than any other.  In particular, if we are ignorant about the sum of the relevant 
forces on any planet, this ignorance is no reason to believe that the path that would be 
predicted for some planet, on a set of true auxiliary propositions, would not also be one from 
which the observed path would deviate.  So where has Lakatos gone wrong, and what is he 
on about?   
 
The premise that it is always possible that some unknown force sensibly perturbs a planet's 
motion is consistent with there being no such force.  So the original set of auxiliary 
propositions,  A , may be true.  If  A  is true and the planet does deviate from its validly 
predicted path, then a state of affairs has been observed which T  would "forbid", namely, 
that described by  O & A , whether or not Lakatos is right in denying that we can ever come 
to know that this is so. 
 
Now the set of logically possible states of affairs that Lakatos has in mind does contain 
many members that are not forbidden or physically impossible on  T , namely,  those  
described  by  O & A' ,  O & A" , and so on.  Thus Lakatos would be right in thinking that  T  
does not forbid  O ; he is right in thinking that what I call  SPF  is false,131  for another way 
of putting  SPF  is  'T  forbids  O'.  In all probability, then,  SPF  is the real object of 
Lakatos's attack.  But he overgeneralises and fails to see that T does forbid  O & A  (as well 
as  ~O & A' ,  ~O & A"  and so on).  What Lakatos ought to have said, which is true, is that 
exactly the most admired of scientific theories simply fail to forbid any observable state of 
affairs such as Popper has in mind, for example, 'The light ray deflected 15o in grazing the 
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sun.'  The key point here can be put more simply, however, for it does not depend upon 
distinguishing law-like from accidental conditionals:  it is that  T  is consistent with  O,  but 
not with  O & A.132 
 
Popper responds to both Putnam's and Lakatos's doubts about auxiliary propositions 
principally with  SPF, for on  SPF  there are no auxiliary propositions that one is required to 
know.  Thus he asserts that  "Newton's theory can be refuted without the use of initial 
conditions";133  and he offers the following cases as examples of "crude tests" from which, 
supposedly, the failure of that theory would be manifest: 
There are an infinity of possibilities, and the realization of any of them would simply refute 
Newton's theory.  In fact, almost any statement about a physical body which we can make - 
say, about the cup of tea before me, that it begins to dance (and say, in addition, without 
spilling the tea) - would contradict Newtonian theory.  This theory would equally be 
contradicted if the apples from one of my, or Newton's, apple trees were to rise up from the 
ground (without there being a whirlwind about), and begin to dance round [sic] the 
branches of the apple tree from which they had fallen, or if the moon were to go off at a 
tangent; and if all this were to happen, perhaps, without any other very obvious changes in 
our environment.134  (Emphasis mine.) 
This choice of bizarre, though logically possible, events is intended to highlight what 
Putnam seems to have overlooked and Lakatos falsely denies, namely, that there are 
infinitely many potential falsifiers of the theory.  For all that, it is obviously not an 
immediate inference from, for example, 'My cup of tea began to dance' to the negation of 
either Newton's laws of motion or his law of gravitation.135  No contradiction is involved in 
accepting this observation statement and in not rejecting anything of Newtonian mechanics, 
even should the behaviour of my cup of tea be non-Newtonian. 
 
Popper once remarked that when he wrote Logik der Forschung he thought that "it was plain 
enough that from Newton's theory alone, without initial conditions, nothing of the nature of 
an observation statement can be deducible".136  So it is not clear how he can swallow the 
contradiction that whilst  T  does not entail  ~O ,  O  does (supposedly) entail  ~T , that 
whilst 'My cup of tea sat still' is not deducible from Newton's theory alone, 'My cup of tea 
began to dance' is inconsistent with that theory. It is clear, however, how Popper would 
persuade others to do so, for he prefaces his replies to both Putnam and Lakatos with the 
following remark: 
I feel obliged to say again, before I proceed to examine their arguments, that Newtonian 
theory is a falsifiable theory just as "All swans are white" is a falsifiable theory.  That is, it 
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is falsifiable in the simple logical sense of being logically incompatible with some basic 
statements.  It has potential falsifiers.137 
There is an important asymmetry, however, between the stock examples of a universal 
generalisation, such as 'All swans are white', and scientific theories like Newton's laws of 
motion or his law of gravitation.  It is that none of the latter, unlike the former, is "logically 
incompatible" with any basic statement. 
 
A basic statement is, for Popper, not only a singular existential statement; it is also an 
observation statement, and one of a rather elementary sort: 
I have called simple descriptive statements, describing easily observable states of physical 
bodies, 'basic statements', and I asserted that in cases in which tests are needed, it is these 
basic statements which we try to compare with the 'facts' and that we choose these 
statements, and these facts, because they are most easily comparable, and intersubjectively 
most easily testable.138 
 
Now there are singular existential statements that are inconsistent with Newton's law of 
gravitation, for example:  
There is a pair of bodies at  k  gravitationally attracted to one another as the 
square root of the product of their masses and inversely as the cube of their 
separation. 
This statement is a potential falsifier of the law but it is not an observation statement, much 
less a basic statement.  Moreover, in order to know that the pair of bodies it refers to are so 
attracted, their movements over some period of time would need to be recorded, and for this 
a statement of initial conditions, amongst other things, is required. 
 
On the other hand, stock universal generalisations, such as 'All swans are white', 
characteristically contain only observable predicates - what we may call 'basic predicates' - 
and the same goes, in general, for their potential falsifiers.139  Furthermore, if  T  is a 
universal generalisation which contains only basic predicates (call it a 'basic universal 
generalisation'), it is easy to obscure the role of  A  in the counter-argument for  T.  This is 
because it is natural and convenient to express any potential falsifier of a basic universal 
generalisation in a sentence which gives no  indication  of  the  logical  form  of  that  
potential  falsifier qua antecedent in   
 (O & A)  -->  ~T   
For example, suppose that someone sets out to test whether all dogs are carnivorous by 
training his puppy, Artichoke, to eat only cereals and vegetables.  Thus we have, 
 T : All dogs are carnivorous, 
 A :  Artichoke is a dog, 
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 P :  Artichoke is carnivorous, 
and  
 O : Artichoke is vegetarian. 
The potential falsifier, 'Artichoke is a vegetarian dog', can be expressed by the cumbersome 
sentence,  
 (1)  Artichoke is vegetarian and Artichoke is a dog, 
or, more naturally, of course, by the sentence, 
 (2)  Artichoke is a vegetarian dog. 
(2) conceals, however, what (1) does not, namely, the logical form of the antecedent  
 in 
 (O & A)  -->  ~T 
In his reply to Putnam, Popper offers a third argument for his belief that no statement of 
initial conditions is required to falsify any theory.  This argument does not commit the 
fallacy of  SPF,  but it does depend for its plausibility on a further and misleading use of 
basic universal generalisations. 
 
Putnam cites Newton's law of gravitation as one amongst many important theories from 
which no "basic sentence" or prediction can be derived without the assistance of some 
auxiliary proposition(s), and he offers two reasons for thinking this theory exemplifies his 
point.  He notes, firstly, that there may be forces other than gravity at work on any body.140  
This is true, but the point is not generalisable.  Newton's second law of motion, for example, 
concerns the sum of the forces on any body yet no prediction about, say, the position or rate 
of acceleration of any body follows immediately from this law, any more than it does from 
the law of gravitation.  Secondly, Putnam points out that gravitational forces are not 
"directly measurable".141 This misses the point, for even if these forces were directly 
measurable, and we had a value for some such force, nothing would follow about any of the 
observable properties of either of the bodies so acted upon.  Moreover, this value would 
figure as an auxiliary proposition in the derivation of any prediction which employed it. 
 
In any event, Popper ignores Putnam's reasons and generalises the claim they are intended to 
support, taking him to be asserting something about all theories or universal 
generalisations.142  This move allows Popper to blur the focus of the dispute, as he fixes 
once again on basic universal generalisations.  He does so because such propositions 
immediately entail existential denials which can be falsified by basic statements.143  For 
example, 
 All dogs are carnivorous 
entails  
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 There is no non-carnivorous dog in my back yard now, 
which can be falsified by  
 Artichoke is a vegetarian dog in my back yard now. 
So  Popper concludes that Putnam has simply overlooked that "a certain unusual kind of 
negative prediction can be derived from any theory", though he shies away from illustrating 
this claim with other than a basic universal generalisation.144  Popper concedes that "in 
almost all cases" auxiliary propositions are employed in prediction making, which is to 
concede that in almost all cases his argument cuts no ice.145  Moreover, this argument is in 
any case a desperate move for Popper, for in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (hereinafter 
Logic) he excludes from science any statement with the logical form of a "negative 
prediction" because no such statement is a potential falsifier of any universal generalisation, 
as we have seen (p. 13).146  Furthermore, no existential denial which follows immediately 
from the law of gravitation, for example,  
There is no pair of bodies at  k  gravitationally attracted to one another as 
the square root of the product of their masses and inversely as the cube of 
their separation, 
can be falsified by a basic statement. To falsify this so-called negative prediction one needs 
to assert its negation, which statement is not, as I pointed out above (p. 35), an observation 
statement, much less a basic statement. 
 
It is not surprising that Popper should continually caution that his negative predictions are 
"unusual".  Firstly, they are arbitrary consequences of the theories from which they are 
derived.  For example, why  k ?  Why the square root of the product of the masses 
concerned? and so on.  Secondly, the so-called negative predictions derivable from a theory 
such as the law of gravitation are as abstract as the theory itself.  But whether predictions 
are made for evidence gathering or action guiding purposes, the practitioner aims to descend 
from such theoretical heights, drawing consequences from the theory that are testable by 
observation (however indirect the making of the relevant observations may be). 
 
Finally, even if one could accept Popper's account of negative predictions, the making of 
any such prediction would still not provide the short cut to a refutation that he supposes. To 
falsify the basic universal generalisation, 'All dogs are carnivorous', we need to know above 
that Artichoke is a dog and that he is not carnivorous, whether our inquiry is conducted with 
a positive or a negative prediction.  To falsify the law of gravitation above we need to know, 
amongst other things, the gravitational force between that pair of bodies at  k , and this 
presupposes a propositional knowledge of various states of affairs (not to mention a 
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knowledge of scientific techniques and equipment) that is no less extensive or sophisticated 
than would be required to falsify the law in the usual manner. 
 
 
1.6  Weak Popperian Falsificationism  (WPF) 
 
WPF  is the false doctrine that if  P  is refuted then  T  is prima facie refuted or apparently 
refuted or threatened with refutation.  It is the doctrine that if  P  is refuted then  T  is 
refutedp.  When Lakatos and others say that all theories are born refuted they mean no more 
than that all theories are born refutedp. 
 
Popper typically retreats to  WPF  when confronted with a counter-example to  SPF.  In the 
literature, a classic case of this retreat occurs in his account of the oft discussed, anomalous 
perturbations in the motion of Uranus which troubled astronomers for much of the first half 
of the nineteenth century.  This anomaly did not lead to the refutation of the law of 
gravitation for its cause was the unknown trans-Uranian planet, Neptune.  So Popperians, 
and others, assert or imply that the anomaly of Uranus's motion was a prima facie or an 
apparent refutation of the law.  (I discuss this case and its implications in detail in Chapters 3 
and 4 below.) 
 
Now, on Popper's account of refutation, there can be no such thing as a prima facie or an 
apparent refutation, as I shall explain in 2.1 below, but let us set this point aside for now and 
take  WPF  to be some such claim as that  P  is refuted only if there is a strong or at least 
moderately well corroborated counter-argument for  T , or some prima facie good reason to 
disbelieve or reject  T , or even perhaps that there is only more reason to disbelieve  T  than  
A.  None of these claims, however, is true.  If  P  is refuted then we know, or can readily 
come to know, only that just one of the following is true:  ~T & A ,  T & ~A , or  ~T & ~A.  
But we have no reason, prima facie or otherwise, to prefer one of these possibilities to any 
other.  This is Duhem's lesson.  T  is thus no more threatened with refutation by the fact that  
P  is false than is  A.   
 
Consider a simple analogy.  Suppose that a teacher leaves a class of two students, Newton 
and Offsider, for a few seconds. She fails to notice upon her return that in the interim her 
chair has been rigged up for a practical joke.  If we allow that she knows that no one other 
than either or both of these students had sufficient opportunity to play this joke then she 
knows that one or both of them is responsible for doing so.  But it would be irrational for her 
also to conclude even that there was more reason to suspect Newton rather than Offsider (or 
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the pair of them in cahoots).  Clearly, to come to any such conclusion rationally she requires 
some evidence which distinguishes between these three possibilities, all equi-probable on 
the above evidence.  She requires evidence that, for example, Newton has a talent or an 
inclination for playing such tricks whereas Offsider does not.  Correspondingly, to justify a 
preference for the argument, 
 (~P & A)  -->  ~T 
over 
 (~P & T)  -->  ~A 
- the latter being rarely formulated or even alluded to in the literature - we need to know 
what is the prior support for each of  T  and  A , or, in Popperian terms, what is the prior 
corroboration of each.  If the prior support or corroboration of  T  is high compared with that 
of  A , then the latter argument will be strong by comparison with the former, and vice versa. 
 
Most, if not all, of the above points are rather obvious; so how has  WPF  come to seem 
plausible to Popper, and others?  Well, anyone who finds  SPF  plausible will likely find  
WPF  so, since  SPF  entails  WPF.  But the main reason for the plausibility of this doctrine 
lies, I suggest, in a certain aspect of Popper's idiosyncratic view of scientific practice. 
 
Popper's general beliefs about what is interesting and fundamental in science were formed, 
so he tells us, shortly after the First World War, when he was just seventeen.147  
Characteristically, these beliefs have remained unchanged.  At the time, relativistic 
mechanics was new and a serious rival to that long standing paragon of science, Newtonian 
mechanics.  Most importantly, various crucial experiments had been proposed or conducted 
between them, notably Eddington's famous eclipse experiment of 1919.  Popper was struck 
by the fact that this feature of physics, or the physical sciences generally, was in his 
experience nowhere in evidence when boasts about the scientific status of popular social 
theories, such as those of Marx or Freud, were made, as apparently they often were.148  
Popper has overgeneralised from this youthful encounter, however, in the beliefs he holds 
about the nature and occurrence of tests or testing in science.  He does not bother to 
distinguish hypothetico-deductive reasoning generally from testing149 and, more 
importantly, he tends to treat all tests as if they were epistemically and methodologically 
similar to the eclipse experiment, or to what he believes or assumes to be the case about this 
experiment. But there are two dissimilarities of importance here.  Before discussing them, 
however, some general remarks about tests are in order. 
 
The primary scientific purpose of conducting a test is to gather evidence, favourable or 
otherwise, for some proposition, or conjunction of propositions, which I shall call the test 
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candidate,  X.  In order to derive some test prediction,  P , from  X , let  X  be conjoined with 
some proposition(s),  Y , such that  
 (X & Y)  -->  P 
Intuitively, a test of  X  is stronger (that is, it provides more support or counter-support for  X 
, as the case may be) if there is more reason to believe that, other things being equal,  
 (i) The determination of the truth value of  P  is correct, 
or  
 (ii) Y  is true. 
Clearly, the test provides more reason to believe that  X  is false if there is more reason to 
believe that (i) and (ii) are true, that is, if there is more reason to believe that the antecedent,  
~P & Y , of the counter-argument for  X  is true.  Moreover, a test is strong only if there is 
good reason to believe that  ~P & Y  is true. 
 
Let us return to Popper.  Firstly, he has what we may call a 'litmus test' in mind as a model 
of hypothetico-deductive reasoning in science.  A litmus test is a strong test of X , one that 
has been designed as such.  Thus Popper says, for example, that "We consciously test, as a 
rule, a certain chosen  hypothesis, treating the rest of the theories involved as more or less 
unproblematic - as a kind of 'background knowledge'."150 (Emphasis mine.)  Now it is one 
thing to emphasise the value or importance of strong tests, as Popper often does, quite 
another to overlook that, unlike what at least he takes to be the case about the eclipse 
experiment,151  some tests are weak or inconclusive.  In discussing how we should respond 
to the refutation of a test prediction, however, Popper says, for example, that we need 
"special reasons" if we are not to accept that (what he thinks of as) the test candidate is 
false.152  Any such case "must be exceptional", he tells us, otherwise "no test would count 
as a real test".153  But the point is, rather, only that any such test would not be a strong or 
conclusive test.   
 
Moreover, practitioners may not begin with a proposition they wish to test but rather with, 
for example, some puzzling fact they want explained.  So they begin not with part of the 
antecedent, choosing instances of  Y  to maximise support (or counter-support) for  X  but 
rather with a consequent which is known.  In the latter case, there is no corresponding 
freedom of choice in respect of either the antecedent or the consequent.  They want that 
antecedent which explains the puzzling fact in question and no other.154  So the antecedent 
is not designed to test any of its constituent parts and it may not do so, or at least it may do 
so only very weakly, even if it is that antecedent the practitioners are looking for. 
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Secondly, Popper's continual emphasis on theory testing leads him to assume that, as in the 
case of the eclipse experiment,  T  is always the test candidate.  But some tests are tests of an 
initial condition or a boundary condition, that is,  X  is one of the propositions in  A.  (The 
common notational practice in philosophy of science of picking out in the set of premises 
from which  P  is derived that premise which is the most scientifically or historically 
important, and bundling the remainder of this set under the rubric 'auxiliary', can thus be 
misleading.)  If an astronomer tests the claim of a colleague to have discovered an asteroid, 
or an engineer road tests a prototype of a new car, or a physicist attempts to explain why a 
projectile overshot its target, the test candidate is not Newton's laws of motion or his law of 
gravitation.  This is not to say, however, as some philosophers have done,155 that the laws 
are not tested in such cases - though such tests would be very weak for the laws are very 
well supported in such applications, especially by comparison with the relevant test 
candidates.  There are reliable methods, for example, for calculating the position of an 
asteroid and for conducting a search for it.  So a failure to find the alleged body would 
provide a poor reason for rejecting the law of gravitation, but a good reason for rejecting the 
discovery claim.  This would especially be so if, say, the astronomer who made this claim 
was known to be unduly optimistic in such matters or to have been using inferior 
instruments.  Similarly, in the other two cases above, the engineer's ideas about some of the 
prototype's performance characteristics may be highly speculative, as may the explanation 
the physicist formulates for the projectile's deviation.  These practitioners do not need 
"special reasons" for not believing or supposing that, if their predictions are unfulfilled in 
such cases, they have prima facie falsified Newton's laws. 
 
I conclude that there is a suppressed premise in  WPF, one which makes its conclusion 
plausible to Popper and others, namely, that every test is a strong test in which  T  is the test 
candidate.  With the addition of this false premise, Popper's argument becomes valid for,  
necessarily, if  P  is refuted in a strong test of  T  there is a strong counter-argument for  T.  
Similarly, given the suppressed premise, 'This test is a conclusive test of  T' , if  P  is refuted 
in such a test so too is  T  - as  SPF  would have it. Whenever any proposition in  A  is not 
well supported, however, as the various cases above illustrate, there is not even a prima facie 
or an apparent refutation of  T. 
 
 
1.7  Conjecture and Conjecture 
 
Are  SPF  and  WPF  Popper's only responses to the Duhem-Quine problem, apart from 
obfuscation?  No, he is inconsistent.  In Logic, for example, he says that "it  cannot be 
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asserted of any one statement of the system [T & A] that it is, or is not, specifically upset by 
the falsification" of  P.  This is because, via modus tollens, "we falsify the whole system  (the 
theory plus the initial conditions)."156  Where, then, is the method of conjecture and 
refutation, the method of conjecturing and refuting theories, instances of  T ?  In "Replies to 
My Critics" (hereinafter "Replies"), Popper can only add: 
Attributing the blame for a falsification to a certain subsystem [of  T & A ] is a typical 
hypothesis, a conjecture like any other, though perhaps hardly more than a vague suspicion 
if no definite alternative suggestion is being made.  And the same applies the other way 
round: the decision that a certain subsystem is not to be blamed for the falsification is 
likewise a typical conjecture.  The attribution or nonattribution of responsibility for failure 
is conjectural, like everything in science; and what matters is the proposal of a new 
alternative and competing conjectural system that is able to pass the falsifying test.157 
On the above account, there are no refutations of theories.  Popper's method is the method of 
conjecture and conjecture.  All refutations would be conjectures if Popper were right in 
thinking that all knowledge is conjectural, a conclusion that more than one of his 
commentators has reached.158  If the antecedent of every counter- argument that  p  is but a 
conjecture, so is any alleged refutation of  p.  Furthermore, on the above account, Popper's 
advice to practitioners faced with predictive failure is, "Try replacing either  T  or  A  or 
both."  This is better advice than that which either  SPF  or  WPF  can provide, but that does 
not prevent it from being trivial. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Popper on 'Avoidance' of Refutation 
 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Popper is inclined to describe any case of predictive failure which does not lead to the 
refutation of the theory from which that prediction was derived as one in which a refutation 
has been avoided or evaded, or in which the theory concerned has been rescued from or 
immunized against a refutation.  To reinforce his portrayal of the practice of refuting or of 
attempting to refute major theories as the rational core of science, Popper depicts the so-
called practice of avoiding such refutations as the exception to the rule, and much of what 
he calls avoidance he dismisses as unscientific or pseudo-scientific.1   It should already be 
clear from my remarks about tests in 1.6 that I do not agree with this judgement of 
Popper's. 
 
In this chapter I shall criticise Popper's notion of avoidance of refutation.  I conclude that his 
writings on this notion are incoherent.  Popper, and others, are driven to believe that 
refutations can be avoided or theories protected from refutations because they conflate 
sentences with propositions, or propositions with beliefs (and often both).  Moreover, I shall 
argue that relativism is a consequence of Popper's notion of refutation, and his desire not to 
be saddled with this consequence also pushes him to claim that refutations can be avoided.  
This desire is further evidence that Popper would like to endorse the view that refutations 
are disproofs (2.2).  Ad hoc hypotheses, according to Popper and several others, are the most 
important of the means of avoiding a refutation.  I shall argue, however, that many 
hypotheses that are thought to comply with Popper's definition of an ad hoc hypothesis do 
not do so.  It appears otherwise to those who think so largely because of Popper's use of 
rhetoric.  Moreover, the desire of such people to make Popper's view plausible leads them to 
describe as ad hoc some hypotheses that for other reasons are unacceptable.  I conclude that 
to know that a hypothesis is ad hoc in Popper's sense does not illuminate scientific practice; 
worse still, because his account of such hypotheses is incoherent one can be misled into 
thinking that many a hypothesis is ad hoc, or otherwise vaguely undesirable, when this is not 
so (2.3).  Lastly, Popper has attempted to explicate ad hocness in terms of certain 
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undesirable, or allegedly undesirable, properties of hypotheses or the explanations they 
would provide.  The first such property is circularity, which is undesirable; the second such 
property is reduction in empirical content, which is not undesirable.  In the former case, I 
argue that non-circularity is clearly preferable to non-ad hocness as a criterion for a 
satisfactory explanation or explanans, as the case may be (2.4).  In the latter case, I argue 
that Popper and others are barking up the wrong tree (2.5).  
 
 
2.2  The Logic and Rhetoric of Avoidance 
 
Can a theory avoid a refutation as, say, someone might avoid a missile which is headed in 
that person's direction?  Someone,  S , avoids a missile,  M , only if  S  might have been hit 
by  M  and  S  is not hit by  M.  But it is necessarily false either that a true theory might have 
been refuted or that a false theory is not refuted by any refutation of it that is produced.  It 
follows that no theory, true or false, can avoid any refutation.  If there can be no refutation 
of any true theory there can be no refutation that any true theory avoids or is rescued from.  
On the other hand, if a false theory is not refuted by some counter-argument for it then that 
argument is not, whatever else it may be, a refutation of that theory.  Unlike missiles, which 
sometimes do miss their targets, those things which are proofs do not, else they would not be 
proofs. 
 
It might be said, however, that in being true a theory is spared or avoids the possibility of 
refutation altogether.  But this is a different point from that which Popper would make, 
which is that particular refutations can be avoided.  Alternatively, someone might remark of 
a false theory that it had avoided a refutation on some occasion when the point is that but for 
some untoward event, such as a malfunction in a necessary piece of the experimental 
apparatus, a refutation of that theory would have been produced on that occasion.  This point 
may be of some historical interest, but it has no epistemic significance.  We know that the 
refutation would have been so produced only if we know that the theory in question has 
since been refuted by means of such an experiment.  Similarly, if some apparent counter-
example should turn out not to be genuine no refutation is thereby avoided, though the 
appearance of one has been dispelled. 
 
Whether or not a theory can avoid a refutationp , however, is another question, and one 
which, amongst other things, I shall address below. 
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There are two logically distinct procedures by which, on Popper's account, a refutation (or 
refutationp) can be avoided.  I shall call these procedures 'rejecting the antecedent' and 
'rejecting the consequent', and begin by discussing the latter for it is the less important of the 
two. 
 
My criticism of rejecting the consequent stands or falls whichever concept of refutation - 
discorroboration or disproof - is employed, for this criticism is a logical one and there is no 
logical difference between these two concepts. So I shall, for simplicity, not distinguish 
refutation from refutationp in discussing this procedure.  Also, for simplicity, let  R  stand 
for the antecedent in  
  (O & A)  -->  ~T   
Thus, 
 R  -->  ~T 
Now to avoid the refutation of  T  via  R  we can, according to Popper, formulate a new 
theory,  T' , such that 
 R  -/->  ~T' 
and, for the sake of plausibility, typically,  
 T  -->  T' 
We then accept  T'. 
 
But if  T  is refuted by  R  how has  T 's refutation been avoided by this procedure?  The fact 
that  R  does not entail  ~T'  does not alter the fact that  R  does  entail  ~T.  Moreover, if we 
know or continue to accept  R  we ought to reject  T.  It may be that by rejecting  T  for  T'  
we  avoid believing something which is contrary to fact, but that is a separate matter.  And in 
any case what would be rationally undesirable about having one fewer counter-example to 
our beliefs?  Popper's objection here is partly that we should not retreat to believing or 
accepting  T' , for  T'  has, or is thought to have, less empirical content than  T.  But this too 
is a separate matter, and one that I shall deal with in 2.5 below. 
 
Consider this case of rejecting the consequent which Popper offers: 
The case of Marxism is interesting.  As I pointed out in my Open Society, one may regard 
Marx's theory as refuted by events that occurred during the Russian Revolution. . . . The 
reinterpretation of Marx's theory of revolution to evade this falsification immunized it 
against further attacks, transforming it into the vulgar-Marxist (or socioanalytic) theory 
which tells us [only] that the "economic motive" and the class struggle pervade social life.2 
By allowing himself some flexibility here as to the referent of 'Marx's theory of revolution', 
Popper fosters the impression that since so-called vulgar-Marxism,  T' , is not refuted by our 
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knowledge of certain events during the Russian Revolution,  R , then Marx's original theory 
of revolution,  T , is itself somehow no longer refuted.  The referential equivocation on 
which this impression depends occurs in the last sentence above.  Popper's claim concerning 
immunity from further attacks which he expresses there would be true only if the first 
instance of 'it' in that sentence referred to  T' , but the sentence as a whole makes sense only 
if 'it' in both instances refers to  T.  
 
The effect of this equivocation is enhanced by the metaphor of immunization - a metaphor, 
incidentally, that is redolent of induction.  If I immunize my cat against feline enteritis, for 
example, I make this animal safe from a disease to which it is otherwise vulnerable.  This 
process of immunization, however, is one of bringing about certain changes in the properties 
of one and the same cat; it is not one of finding some cat which is not so vulnerable and 
substituting it for one which is.  Like the avoidance and rescue metaphors, the immunization 
metaphor makes the false suggestion that  T  and  T'  are identical, and this encourages us to 
believe that  T  is not, after all, refuted by  R  since  T'  is not.  To further encourage this 
belief, Popper disingenuously avoids stating or implying above that Marx's theory was 
refuted by the events of the Russian Revolution.  This is in striking contrast to what he 
actually believes, for in a footnote to the very passage of The Open Society and its Enemies 
to which he refers above he describes these events as a "striking refutation" of that theory.3  
But not only does Popper believe that this theory was so refuted, his vulgar-Marxists must 
do so too else why would they set about reinterpreting Marx?  The avoidance Popper has in 
mind here is rather that by reinterpreting Marx vulgar-Marxists avoid admitting that Marx 
was wrong, but this is only a matter for the historians.  Clearly, even if Marx is reinterpreted 
such that certain events are not a counter-example to his reinterpreted position, this is 
irrelevant to whether or not those events are a counter-example to his original position, or to 
what Popper takes to be that position. 
 
The belief that refutation can be avoided in this manner is not, however, an idiosyncratic one 
of Popper's.  It is common in the literature to be told that a theory can avoid or evade a 
refutation through being added to, or watered down, or otherwise modified.4  Larry Laudan, 
for example, states: 
Whenever a theory encounters a refuting instance, it is possible to modify the interpretative 
rules associated with the theory so as to disarm the "refuting" data.  If, for instance, we 
have a theory,  T , that "all planets move in ellipses" and then discover a satellite of the sun,  
S , which moves in a circle, we can always modify  the interpretative rules governing the 
term "planet" so as to exclude  S , thus preserving our theory intact and eliminating any 
appearance of refutation.5 
  
  
 
57 
But even if  S  were a counter example to  T -  it is not since a circle is a special case of an 
ellipse - changing Laudan's interpretive rules would not "disarm the 'refuting' data".  If 
'planet' now meant, say, 'satellite of a sun with a mass greater than the mass of  S', it is no 
longer  T  that we assert when we write or utter with assertive intent the sentence, 'All 
planets move in ellipses,' for we are now asserting not that all satellites of the sun move in 
ellipses but that all satellites of the Sun heavier than   S  do so, which is a new proposition,  
T'.  What is preserved intact by Laudan's move?  It is not  T  for a proposition is not, to use 
Laudan's expression, "cognitively threatened" by refuting data, though the corresponding 
belief may be, as it is above.  However, nor do we preserve the belief that  T ; for of course 
with the discovery of  S  we no longer believe that  T  (unless we allow ourselves to 
equivocate, as Laudan does, between  T  and  T' , in which case our beliefs in this regard will 
be confused).  What is preserved by Laudan's move is the belief, or at least the commitment 
to believe, that one of  T 's entailments, namely that which we now call  T' , is true. 
 
Popper and Lauden conflate sentences with propositions above, so they do not notice that 
different propositions can be expressed by the same sentence.  Thus, for  example, Popper 
says: 
A biologist offers the conjecture that all swans are white.  When black swans are 
discovered in Australia, he says that it is not refuted.  He insists that these black swans are 
a new kind of bird since it is part of the defining property of a swan that it is white.  In 
other words, he can escape the refutation, though I think that he is likely to learn more if he 
admits that he was wrong.6 
If 'swan' means, in part, 'white' for this biologist then, in uttering the sentence 'All swans are 
white', he is asserting an analyticity, which fact clearly needs to be pointed out to him.  No 
refutation of the contingent proposition that all swans are white is avoided by assigning a 
novel meaning to the word 'swan' such that in uttering the sentence, 'All swans are white,' a 
logical truth is expressed.  The fact that the same sentence can be used to express a truth as it 
can a falsehood is what leads Popper and this biologist to believe that a refutation has been 
avoided above. 
 
One final point here:  if we were to 'add' some hypothesis,  H , to  T  in the hope of thereby 
avoiding a refutation of  T , as we are often advised to do, we would be even more 
disappointed, for if  T  is refuted it is a simple matter to refute the conjunction of  T  and  H  
since 
~T   -->  ~(T & H) 
 
Turning now to rejecting the antecedent, given again that 
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R  -->  ~T 
we can formulate some proposition, or conjunction of propositions,  R' , such that 
R'  -/->  ~T 
and 
R'  -->  ~R 
If we accept  R'  we should reject  R.  If we do so, then we no longer have the reason for 
rejecting  T  which accepting  R  originally supplied.  So Popper believes that T 's refutation 
has thereby been avoided. 
 
Reviving the distinction between the two concepts of refutation we are concerned with, it is 
clear that the refutation of  T  cannot be avoided by this procedure.  If we know that  R, as 
we would need to if we are to refute  T , we can immediately refute  R'   since 
R  -->  ~R' 
We are thus being asked above to reject what we know in favour of something that we can 
recognise is false. 
 
But what if  T  is merely refutedp?  Consider the following case which Popper discusses:  
There are what one might call "unsophisticated" theories like "All swans are white" or the 
geocentric "All stars other than planets move in circles".  Kepler's laws may be included 
(though they are in many senses highly sophisticated).  These theories are falsifiable, 
though falsifications can, of course, be evaded:  immunization is always possible .  But the 
evasion would usually be dishonest:  it would consist, say, in denying that a black swan 
was a swan, or that it was black;  or that a non-Keplerian planet was a planet.7 
But what is the cognitive significance of such denials?  Consider a case in which I know or 
believe that I am harbouring a fugitive.  If I were to deny that this is so, say, to my 
neighbours or to whoever is in pursuit of this person, this denial would make no difference 
to my cognitive attitude to the proposition that I am harbouring that fugitive, for I would still 
know or believe that I was doing so.  Indeed, it is in part because I know or believe this fact 
that I would deny it. 
 
Notice that Popper's intuition would prompt him to agree with my analysis of this case, for 
he admits that the denials he contemplates would "usually be dishonest".  This admission 
shows that he too does not believe that such denials make any difference to the cognitive 
attitudes to what is denied by those who utter them for,   necessarily, someone dishonestly 
denies that  p  only if that person knows or believes that  p.  Also, notice that in criticising 
someone who denied that "a black swan was a swan", Popper is not implying that this 
person's mistake is that he or she has asserted a logical falsehood.  Rather, Popper means 
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that this person is denying that something which everyone else concerned knows or can 
recognize is a black swan is even a swan.  Popper is correct in thinking that any observer 
who would utter such denials is, if not incompetent or distracted, then dishonest.  But this 
only shows that he cannot swallow his conventionalist account of 'seeing that'.  As Ayer 
would point out, Popper cannot distinguish a case of dishonesty from one in which the 
practitioner freely decides not to accept the decision of his or her colleagues that the wet and 
feathery thing in front of them is a swan.8 
 
On Popper's conventionalist account of basic knowledge, then, if  R'  is a basic statement, as 
it is in this case, we have merely to agree that  R'  (and to infer that  ~R  from  R' ) in order to 
refutep  R , and thus to unrefutep  T.  So the question arises: 
 Refutationp:  where is thy sting?   
Introducing corroboration does not help, for even if  R  is well corroborated and accepted by 
a scientific community,  C , at some time, t0 ,  R'  can still be well corroborated and accepted 
by  C  at some later time, t1.  Corroboration is only a measure of performance in tests, and  R  
may perform well in tests to  t0  but poorly to  t1..  As Popper says: 
We can never simply say of a statement that it is as such, or in itself, 'corroborated' (in the 
way in which we may say that it is 'true').  We can only say that it is corroborated with 
respect to some system of basic statements - a system accepted up to a particular point in 
time.  'The corroboration which a theory has received up to yesterday' is logically not 
identical with 'the corroboration which a theory has received up to today'.  Thus we must 
attach a subscript, as it were, to every appraisal of corroboration - a subscript characterising 
the system of basic statements to which the corroboration relates (for example, by the date 
of its acceptance). 
 
Corroboration is therefore not a 'truth value';  that is, it cannot be placed on a par with the 
concepts 'true' and 'false' (which are free from temporal subscripts); for to one and the same 
statement there may be any number of different corroboration values.9 (Latter emphasis 
mine.)  
 
Thus  T  can be unrefutedp at  t1  because  C  then  knowsp that  ~R.  It is also possible, of 
course, that at some time after  t1 , R  may again be well corroborated, and so reaccepted by  
C.  If so, then the hapless  T  would, once again, be refutedp by  R.  But it is not true that  T  
avoided being refutedp, either at  t0  or at  t1.  If any theory is ever refutedp,  T  is refutedp  at  
t0.  How  T  fares in any test after  t0  makes no difference to how  T  fared, or to how it was 
agreed that  T  fared, in any test before  t0.  R  may be poorly corroborated by the research 
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done after  t0  but this does not alter the fact that  R  was well corroborated by the research 
done before  t0.  C  may reject  R  at  t1, but  C  did accept  R  at  t0.   
 
To return to Popper's simple case of rejecting the antecedent, the avoidance which disturbs 
him there is merely that the person who utters the dishonest denial thereby avoids admitting, 
if not revealing, something that he or she knows or believes to be the case.  This is an 
instance of the same kind of avoidance that vulgar-Marxists allegedly indulge.  Moreover, 
what is possible to immunize or protect is not a proposition but a belief, though Popper's 
case does not illustrate even how this can be achieved.  But suppose that I habitually refuse 
or find some excuse not to examine any counter-argument that is produced for one of my pet 
theories such that the strength of my belief that this theory is true is preserved intact by this 
avoidance behaviour.  I have thereby successfully immunized or protected this belief from 
such arguments by my dogmatism.  I have done nothing, however, to immunize or protect 
what I believe from refutation, even in Popper's diminished sense.  Someone with a more 
open mind than I possess, who took the trouble to examine one or other of these counter-
arguments, may discover that one or other of them is indeed sufficient to refute my pet 
theory, and proceed to do so.  Whether or not I am moved by any such disproof is beside the 
point. 
 
The premise that such protective behaviour or dogmatism is always possible is a variation on 
the theme that mistakes are always possible, which I examined earlier (p. 8).  This premise 
likewise fails to support the skeptical conclusion drawn from it, namely, that no belief - or 
theory, if the two are conflated - can be refuted, though Quine, for example, seems to believe 
otherwise.10  Popper naturally resists such skepticism when it is directed against refutation, 
even though it is an argument of the same kind which takes him from fallibilism to 
skepticism about knowledge.  Quine says that "any statement can be held true come what 
may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system".11  But it does not 
follow that because we can thus behave dogmatically that we cannot or do not behave 
otherwise, so this premise of Quine's does not support his skepticism about refutation. 
 
Quine, however, goes further.  From the premise: 
Any statement can be held true come what may, 
he concludes: 
It becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently 
on experience, and analytic statements, which hold come what may.12  
But even if synthetic statements, or what we like to call synthetic statements, were things of 
the sort that one could protect from experience, it does not follow that they would be no 
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different from statements which had no need for such protection in the first place.  In any 
case, there is a slide in Quine's argument from, 'These statements are claimed or believed 
true' to 'These statements are true' which his argument largely depends upon for its 
plausibility, and which is obscured by the presence of a meaning shift from 'held' to 'hold'.  
'Held' means 'claimed' or perhaps 'believed', whereas 'hold' means 'obtain' or 'are true'.  
Moreover, if 'held' does mean 'believed' above, and this is at least its typical or central 
meaning, then there are many statements that most people could not hold true come what 
does.  For example, if I mistake a shadow for my cat then, necessarily, once I look again and 
see that it is a shadow or I remember that my cat is dead, I do not continue to believe that the 
shadow I thought was my cat is my cat. 
 
Whereas Quine would collapse the analytic/synthetic distinction, Harold Brown, for 
example, thinks that we need to distinguish a third category of proposition to accommodate 
at least some of the synthetic propositions which, as Quine would put it, have been held true 
come what may.13  Following Kuhn, the propositions Brown has in mind are what he calls 
'paradigmatic propositions',14 such as Newton's laws of motion or his law of gravitation.  Is 
Brown's new category of proposition a discovery, or a superfluity?  He points out that 
Newton's laws are not analytic because counter-instances to them are logically possible.  
"On the other hand", says Brown, "such propositions are not ordinary empirical 
propositions, exactly because they are protected from straightforward empirical 
refutation".15  Whilst he holds back here from claiming that a new category of proposition is 
needed, he soon takes the plunge, declaring that paradigmatic propositions "constitute an 
epistemically distinct class in that they do not fit the traditional division of all propositions 
into a priori [sic] and empirical".16 
 
As with Quine, however, it is merely Brown's conflation of the belief that  p  with  p  that 
has led him to the conclusion that a new class of proposition is called for.  Is there some 
problem, then, with the retention of so-called paradigmatic beliefs in the face of counter-
evidence or counter-arguments which needs to be addressed?  Let me just say this for now.  
If I know that I know that  p  there is no dogmatism, no protection racket, involved in my 
holding  p  true come what may.  Even if I know only that my belief that  p  is well supported 
there need be no dogmatism in my holding  p  true come much of what may.  Since 
propositions are generally counted as paradigmatic only when they are well supported, there 
need be nothing unusual, much less irrational, therefore, in the longevity of such beliefs.  
Popper's epistemology, however, makes the refutation of major theories in science seem so 
easy that the longevity of the corresponding beliefs requires explanation.  Has Brown been 
misled, therefore, into thinking that such theories (since he conflates them with beliefs) must 
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somehow be protected if the stings from the swarm of would-be refutations Popper has led 
him to expect prove to be anything but fatal?  We shall see, in the following chapters.  
 
With the removal of truth from the conditions he thinks necessary for knowledge, Popper 
becomes a relativist about knowledge, and hence about refutation.  Someone is a relativist 
about knowledge, an epistemic relativist, who believes or implies that a proposition that is 
known by one person can be inconsistent with a proposition that is known by someone else, 
or by the same person.  Epistemic relativists do not usually believe that this is true of every 
two inconsistent propositions which figure in our  beliefs, or which could do so.  Rather, 
they are motivated to count as knowledge those strong or important beliefs that are held by 
the members of a society or social group, or by numerous individuals at one time, and a 
consequence of this is that some of the beliefs they call knowledge will be mutually 
inconsistent.  (As things go, of course, many such beliefs will be.) 
 
A typical belief of an epistemic relativist is, for example, that whilst white nutritionists know 
that bad diets cause much sickness in Aboriginal communities, the Aborigines themselves 
know that such sickness is caused by bad spirts.17  Popper would reject this sort of cultural 
relativism outright, and in a way that would make him appear not to be a relativist for he 
would side squarely with the nutritionists.  (He would also probably count only the 
nutritionists' beliefs here as 'appropriately formed' in his terms, for only they are supposedly 
the product of a critical attitude.)18  Moreover, Popper is not, as he often emphasises, a 
relativist about truth values, for he does not believe that the truth value of a proposition is 
relative to, say, cognitive attitudes or times, as indeed he makes clear above (p. 59).19  For 
all that, he is a relativist about knowledge because, on his account,  C  can know that  ~R  at  
t1  even though  C  knew that  R  at  t0.  For Popper,  T  can be unrefuted at t1  even though  
T  was refuted at  t0.  Thus, scientific knowledge is (non-trivially) relative to times.  Popper 
makes much of the fact that successive theories in the evolution of a scientific discipline - 
for example, mechanical theories in physics - are mutually inconsistent, and he does not balk 
at describing such theories as scientific knowledge.20 
 
Since  T  can be refutedp at  t0  and unrefutedp at  t1 , it is only Popper's desire for the 
plausibility of a non-relativist position that prevents him from recognizing, much less 
pointing out, that on his unappealing account a refutation is, metaphorically speaking, 
something which can be defeated, quashed, or overturned, or from which a theory can be 
revived or resurrected.  The metaphors of avoidance and immunization, however, offer the 
compensation of suggesting that the theory concerned was not in any sense refuted, which 
talk of defeated refutations or resurrected theories would not do.  And since there is no 
  
  
 
63 
requirement to undo what has not been done, Popper can thus give the impression that he is 
in agreement with the non-relativist on the point, which is a crucial one, that we cannot or do 
not unrefute any theory. 
 
In addition to his use of the faulty metaphors of avoidance and immunization which obscure 
his relativism, Popper exploits, if sometimes unthinkingly, such resources of language as 
weak cognitive attitude modifiers, modal auxiliaries, and tenses to the same end.  Consider 
again the sentence: 
(1) As I pointed out in my Open Society, one may regard Marx's theory as 
refuted by events that occurred during the Russian Revolution,21 
and this sentence which occurs close by (1): 
(2) The observed motion of Uranus might have been regarded as a falsification 
of Newton's theory.22 
Firstly, the use of the weak cognitive attitude modifier 'regard as' ensures that such 
propositions as are expressed by sentences like (1) and (2) do not imply that the theories 
concerned are or were in any sense refuted.  So not only is Popper's task of explaining how a 
refutation was avoided made easier if he refrains from implying that there was one to avoid, 
but, once again, he will appear to be opposed to relativism if he does not concede that on his 
account those concerned were in some sense engaged in unrefuting a theory.  This is 
obviously so in the case of Marx's theory above since he has elsewhere described the events 
of the Russian Revolution as a "striking refutation" of that theory.23  It is less obvious in the 
case of Newton's theory above because Popper does not describe as a refutation any 
argument that he would otherwise do so but for the fact that it has since been defeated.  (By 
'defeated' I mean that the argument is, if not demonstrably unsound, at least rejected on 
reasonable grounds.)  Now the fact that an argument has been defeated is a good reason for 
not describing that argument as a refutation, but it is not one that is available to Popper.  
Even if we overlook his commitment to SPF, which does waver, he nowhere implies that the 
counter-argument for Newton's theory from the deviant motion of Uranus was not well 
corroborated.24  The important point is that Popper only counts as refutations those 
arguments which, in his estimation at least, are undefeated refutationsp, and the  job of the 
weak cognitive attitude modifier in this context is to give the appearance of relieving him of 
the commitment to counting defeated  refutationsp amongst their number and so disguise his 
relativism. 
 
Secondly, the use of a modal auxiliary such as 'may' in (1) and 'might' in (2) ensures that 
such propositions as are expressed by sentences like (1) and (2) do not imply that the 
theories concerned are or ought to be in any sense even regarded as refuted.  The rhetorical 
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purpose of removing this implication is to make it easier still for the reader to come to 
regard the theories concerned as in some sense unrefuted. 
 
But more is needed for suppose that, in place of (1), Popper had written: 
(1')  As I pointed out in my Open Society, one might have regarded 
Marx's theory as refuted by events that occurred during the 
Russian Revolution,  
or, in place of (2): 
(2') The observed motion of Uranus may be regarded as a 
falsification of Newton's theory. 
The reader would be more likely in each case to twig that there was something odd about 
Popper's view of refutation - in short, that he was a relativist.  (1') would be likely to jog the 
reader to ask:  "But should Marx's theory not still be regarded as so refuted?"  Once that 
happens, how is Popper to convince the reader to regard the theory as in any sense unrefuted 
by the actions of those vulgar-Marxists?  (2') invites one of two disagreeable responses, 
depending on how 'may' is construed.  One such response would be, "I agree that one may 
[can] regard Newton's theory so but as this would be a mistake  - the theory was not refuted - 
why are we not being advised against doing so?"  The other such response (which 'might' or 
'can' would not evoke) would be, "One may not [is not entitled to] regard the theory as 
refuted, since it was not refuted."  But however 'may' is construed, once the reader grasps 
that there is no refutation of Newton's theory in this case, the claim about immunization 
loses its foothold.  So Popper switches to the past tense in (2) and the mistake of regarding 
this theory as refuted does not then appear to be one that he is committed to making or is 
urging upon us, for that we do not now regard a theory as refuted by some argument is 
consistent with our having done so.  
 
If 'may' in (1) and 'might' in (2) were each replaced with, say, 'should', as Popper ought to do 
to remain consistent with his epistemology, it would be difficult to convince the reader in 
either case that the theory concerned had avoided a refutation. 
 
Popper is a relativist who doesn't want to be a relativist, as his use of language above 
reveals.  It is one thing, however, to obscure one's relativism in this manner, it is another to 
claim a distinction in doing so which no skeptic such as himself is entitled to.  I have in 
mind the distinction between a refutation and an apparent refutation.  The notion of an 
apparent refutation is one that Popper, and others, invoke when it is a defeated refutationp 
they have in mind but want to avoid the appearance of relativism.  So they describe the 
counter-argument for Newton's theory cited above as an apparent refutation or a prima facie 
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refutation of that theory.25  When they do so, however, they are invoking the notion of 
refutation as disproof. 
 
Let us consider the following simple case.  Suppose that a group of professional 
ornithologists agree that there is a tawny frogmouth at a certain spot in a nearby tree,  p , but 
later discover, to their chagrin, that what they had thought was a frogmouth is in fact an 
extraordinarily shaped branch.  In relation to this alleged sighting, the group reports: 
 "We were wrong, though it did appear as though we were right." 
This report presupposes a distinction between 'knowing that' and 'apparently knowing that'.  
These ornithologists are distinguishing, or claiming to distinguish, between knowing that  ~p  
and having apparently known that  p.  They are conceding that they did not know that  p , 
though they would be correct in believing that they did knowp that  p.  A Popperian member 
of this group, however, with a taste for consistency, could only report: 
"It appears that we were wrong, though it did appear as though we were 
right." 
To defend the distinction his colleagues have drawn this ornithologist would have to 
relinquish Popper's belief that knowledge is conjectural or provisional.  Popperians believe, 
in other words, that we have at best only apparent knowledge, and so the above distinction 
lies beyond their grasp (whether or not they are right in thinking it lies beyond everybody 
else's too).  When Popperians talk about knowledge they do not mean that their well 
corroborated agreements only appear to be so, they mean that such agreements appear to be 
true. 
 
Thus Popper cannot distinguish a refutation from an apparent refutation, a point which 
Musgrave inadvertantly concedes when, with just such cases as the case of the mistaken 
ornithologists in mind, he asks: 
Can fallible falsifications, falsifications which are not disproofs, play the significant role in 
science which falsificationists attribute to them?  Or to put it another way: what should 
scientists do when confronted with a clash between a theory and some apparently 
respectable counterevidence?26 (Emphasis mine.) 
Musgrave believes that the questions he asks above reveal "what we might call the problem 
of  falsification."27  What these questions reveal, however, is the problem of falsificationp.  
Musgrave goes on to say, for example, that he thinks that "it is a perfectly rational policy, 
when faced with a clash between a scientific hypothesis and some apparently respectable 
evidence, to try to explain away the evidence."28  (Emphasis mine.)  In other words, it is 
perfectly rational on Popper's account of refutation to try to defeat a refutation, to try to 
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unrefute a refuted proposition.  What price a work entitled, Conjectures and Apparent 
Refutations? 
 
 
2.3  The Logic and Rhetoric of Ad Hoc Hypotheses 
 
An ad hoc hypothesis, according to Popper, is one of the rationally undesirable or 
unscientific means of avoiding a refutation, and it is the means he has most often attacked.  
The problem of ad hoc hypotheses or ad hocness is, or has been, a relatively popular topic in 
the philosophy of science generally. I shall argue, however, that in so far as Popper has had 
anything to do with this popularity it is undeserved.  His ideas concerning ad hoc hypotheses 
are incoherent.  
 
What is an ad hoc hypothesis?  Recall that in rejecting the antecedent, 
R'  -->  ~R 
where  R  is shorthand for  (O & A).  Now  R'  can take various forms, for example, 
O' 
where  O'  is a new test observation statement (obtained by repeating the test observation, or 
the entire test).  Alternatively,  R'  may consist of  
A' 
where  A'  is a revised or wholly new set of auxiliary propositions; or, of course,   
O' & A' 
Alternatively,  R'  may comprise some proposition which contradicts one of  R 's 
presuppositions, for example, the presupposition that the test was conducted by a sober or 
clear sighted practitioner.  Any instance of  R' , however, must contain at least one 
proposition which is inconsistent with at least one proposition in  R , or that is a 
presupposition of  R.  Now in Popper's scheme, as he describes it in "Replies", an instance of 
such a proposition in  R'  is one of two logically different kinds, namely, an auxiliary 
hypothesis and an ad hoc hypothesis.29   Popper cites the familiar trans-Uranian planet 
hypothesis, introduced to remove the anomaly in Uranus's motion, as an instance of the 
former kind, and says, "I call a conjecture 'ad hoc' if it is introduced (like this one) to explain 
a particular difficulty, but if (in contrast to this one) it cannot be tested independently."30  
Clearly, the hypothesis of an unknown planet is not ad hoc in this sense for it has potential 
falsifiers or testable consequences independently of any disturbances that such a planet 
would cause in the motion of a neighbouring planet.  (The proposition in  R  this hypothesis 
contradicts, of which more later, is that Uranus's sensible perturbations are caused solely by 
the planets then known.) 
  
  
 
67 
In rejecting the consequent,  T'  would be ad hoc in the above sense if 
(T' & A)  -->  O 
and  T'  was not independently testable of  O.  Note that in this case, as opposed to those we 
examined in 2.2 above, 
T  -->  ~T' 
where  T , the reader will recall, is the original theory for which  O  is anomalous. 
 
Popper's attitude to both ad hoc and auxiliary hypotheses is negative because both would 
remove the empirical challenges which confront major theories.  But since, ex hypothesi, ad 
hoc hypotheses alone fail to leave themselves open to challenges of just the same kind they 
alone are proscribed.  This move is, as Musgrave points out, a strengthening of the 
demarcation criterion, for Popper is asking in such cases not merely for testability, but for 
independent testability.31  Musgrave also claims that "generations of scientists have been 
suspicious of ad hoc explanations" and that "Popper gives their suspicion a very strong 
rationale".32   We shall see. 
 
The problem of ad hoc hypotheses is, in the first instance (and not just with Popper), a 
problem of language.  The literal meaning of 'ad hoc' in English is 'for this or the particular 
purpose'.33  The expression is ordinarily used to describe something that is designed or 
adopted only so as to satisfy some narrow or limited requirement, or set of requirements.  I 
shall call this ordinary English use of 'ad hoc', 'ad hocoe'.  An ad hocoe measure is not a 
revolutionary initiative but a conservative response;  it is not a major innovation but a minor 
addition or modification to some established thing.  Such a measure is typically justified on 
the ground of expediency rather than by any appeal to basic principles or general 
considerations (though one may have a principle that certain cases should be dealt with in an 
ad hoc fashion).  The distinction between a measure that is ad hocoe and one that is not, 
however, is clearly very much like the bald/hairy distinction. That is to say, the boundary is 
not well-defined. 
 
'Ad hoc' is often used pejoratively in ordinary discourse, in which case it also means, 
'arbitrary', 'fabricated', 'makeshift', 'stop-gap', or the like, and anyone resorting to such 
measures would be thought of as muddling on, tinkering with something that should be 
overhauled or scrapped, or engaged in what my old physics teacher used to call ' jiggery-
pokery'. 
 
Reviewing the use of 'ad hoc' by scientists, Gerald Holton concludes that a hypothesis will 
be described as ad hoc by them, irrespective of any of its "logical properties", if it is 
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specifically created to account for some "bothersome result or feature" of a theory.34  Used 
pejoratively, and he maintains that it need not be, 'ad hoc'  also means 'artificial', 'cooked up', 
'contrived', 'implausible', 'unreasonable' 'unnecessary', 'ugly', and so on.35  On Holton's 
account, then, the use of this term in scientific discourse shows no discernible or interesting 
difference from ordinary English. 
 
Popper's use of 'ad hoc' in 'ad hoc hypothesis', which I shall call ad hocp, clearly retains its 
ordinary English meaning, and since he disapproves of ad hocp hypotheses we can 
reasonably anticipate some of the pejorative shades of meaning that are often part of the 
ordinary use of that expression.  For example, Popper says that "it is well known that ad hoc 
hypotheses are disliked by scientists:  they are, at best, stop-gaps, not real aims".36  The 
difference between 'ad hocp' and 'ad hocoe' (apart from the latter having referents other than 
propositions) is that 'ad hocp' also means 'not independently testable'.  On the face of it, then, 
one is entitled to be cautious, if not skeptical, of Musgrave's (unsubstantiated) claim that 
Popper has explicated something which has worried "generations of scientists".  Holton, for 
example, does not believe that scientists are "likely to be much helped" by Popper's 
criterion.37  In any event, the best that can be said for Popper's novel use of an ordinary 
English expression is that it is unfortunate, for two reasons.  Firstly, since a hypothesis can 
be ad hocoe without being ad hocp, as is any auxiliary hypothesis on his definition of 
'auxiliary hypothesis' above, this novel use of 'ad hoc' simply invites equivocation if, as is 
the case, Popper draws no distinction between its two senses.  Secondly, the meaning of 'ad 
hocp' is a mixture of the psychological and the logical which, in theory at least, Popper 
usually and correctly insists upon separating.  To describe a hypothesis as ad hoc, in 
Popper's sense, is to describe both the purpose of that hypothesis (to remove some anomaly), 
and to pick out one of its logical properties (non-independent testability). 
 
It is possible of course to use 'ad hoc' to mean 'ad hocp' without bearing false witness against 
any hypothesis, committing any fallacy, or even failing to make one's meaning plain.  (If this 
were not so, for example, I could not succeed in this criticism of Popper.)  But it is not very 
likely that someone would avoid these pitfalls if that person continued to use 'ad hoc' in the 
ordinary sense in contexts where the two are easily confused but without distinguishing 
between them. Those who champion Popper's analysis of ad hoc hypotheses often fare badly 
in this regard, as we shall see, and we can understand why it is likely they would do so by 
inspecting the following sample of Popper's writings:  
(1) It is always possible to find some way of evading falsification, for example, 
by introducing ad hoc an auxiliary hypothesis or by changing ad hoc a 
definition.38 
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(2) I also realized that we must not exclude all immunizations, not even all 
which introduced ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses.  For example the observed 
motion of Uranus might have been regarded as a falsification of Newton's 
theory.  Instead the auxiliary hypothesis of an outer planet was introduced ad 
hoc, thus immunizing the theory.39 
 
(3) Suppose we were to produce an unbroken sequence of explanatory theories 
each of which would explain all the explicanda in its field, including the 
experiments which refuted its predecessors; each would also be 
independently testable by predicted new effects; yet each would be at once 
refuted when these predictions were put to the test. . . . 
 
I assert that, in this case, we should feel that we were producing a sequence 
of theories which, in spite of their increasing degree of testability, were ad 
hoc, and that we were not getting any nearer to the truth.  And indeed, this 
feeling may well be justified:  this whole sequence of theories might easily 
be ad hoc.  For if it is admitted that a theory may be ad hoc [emphasis mine] 
if it is not independently testable by experiments of a new kind but merely 
explains all the explicanda, including the experiments which refuted its 
predecessors, then it is clear that the mere fact that the theory is also 
independently testable cannot as such ensure that it is not ad hoc.  This 
becomes clear if we consider that it is always possible, by a trivial stratagem, 
to make an ad hoc theory independently testable, if we do not also require 
that it should pass the independent tests in question:  we merely have to 
connect it (conjunctively) in some way or other with any testable but not yet 
tested fantastic ad hoc prediction which may occur to us (or to some science 
fiction writer). 
 
[This requirement] . . . is needed in order to eliminate trivial and other ad hoc 
theories.40 
 
Both instances of 'ad hoc' in (1) mean 'ad hocoe' not 'ad hocp', as anyone alive to this 
distinction or who pays attention to the syntax of (1) will recognise.  The first instance of 'ad 
hoc' in (2), however, is ambiguous, until one reads the remainder of the quotation when it 
becomes clear that, once again, both instances mean 'ad hocoe'.  But Popper equivocates in 
(3). In the third sentence of the second paragraph in (3), the first instance of 'ad hoc' 
(emphasised) is 'ad hocp' whilst the second is 'ad hocoe' - as are all the remaining instances 
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in (3).  Popper backs away from acknowledging this meaning shift with the weak 
circumlocution "for if it is admitted that a theory may be 'ad hoc'", when he means or would 
otherwise say, simply, "a theory is 'ad hoc'".  But his point is that some hypotheses that are 
not ad hocp will yet strike us as ad hoc,  in some vague ordinary pejorative sense of that 
word.  If 'ad hocp hypothesis''is supposed to explicate 'ad hoc hypothesis', as that term is 
understood in philosophical or scientific discourse, however, then Popper fails to notice or 
acknowledge that he is in the business of putting forward counter-examples to his own 
explication.  The first case in (3) is that of a series of theories in which each theory satisfies 
the narrow or limited requirement of entailing (not explaining) the relevant known facts, but 
the wider requirement of explaining all the relevant facts is one that it fails to satisfy by 
failing at its first attempt in a novel application.  A succession of such theories, each one 
doing little if anything it was not designed to do, would lead to the criticism that such 
theories or theorising was contrived, arbitrary, artificial, or the like.  In the second case in 
(3), Popper recognizes that the particular requirement that a hypothesis,  H , be 
independently testable can always be met by cooking up (as with grue-like predicates) some 
artificial hypothesis,  H & p ,  where  p  is any contingent proposition we please not entailed 
by  H.  Again, any such arbitrary hypothesis would very likely be described as ad hoc; but it 
is worth noting that it would still be so described even if it were to pass the independent test 
in question, that is, if  p  were found to be true. 
 
In the light of the above inspection of Popper's use of 'ad hoc', consider the following 
accounts of his position - one by Gerard Radnitzky, the other by Alan Musgrave, both of 
whom believe there is great merit in it. 
 
In a long defence of Popper's methodology, Radnitzky claims that "the prohibition of 
immunization methods plays an important role in research" and that, on a wider stage, it is 
"indispensable in combating the pollution of the intellectual environment".41  For all that, 
Radnitzky is stymied by Popper's semantics.  He says that "introducing an additional 
hypothesis ad hoc is illegitimate" if, amongst other things, "this is done to preserve the 
theory from falsification".42  Yet almost in the next breath he acknowledges that "the as yet 
unsolved difficulty consists in defining 'ad hoc' objectively - to speak of the intention of the 
researcher [as Radnitzky has just done] would be to lapse back into psychologism".43  Just 
so.  He also says, falling under the spell Popper weaves in such passages as (1) and (2) 
above: 
A falsifiable theory can always be rescued from a falsification by adding ad hoc 
hypotheses.  From this it follows that a general method, a policy, is scientific if and only if 
auxiliary hypotheses are not introduced ad hoc or, if such an introduction is expressly 
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declared to be a temporary, purely heuristic measure, then the method is scientific if and 
only if these hypotheses are retained only if they lose their ad hoc character.  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
Everything hinges upon whether or not the potential explanation can be processed into an 
authentic explanation, i.e., whether or not the new component originally introduced ad hoc 
into the explanans REMAINS ad hoc.44 
 
When Radnitzky talks of a hypothesis introduced ad hoc which remains ad hoc, he means a 
hypothesis introduced for a particular purpose which is used only for that purpose.  He 
considers the case in which, given 
(T & A)  -->  ~O 
A'  is formulated such that 
(T & A')  -->  O 
T & A' , says Radnitzky, only potentially explains  O ; it is ad hoc and will remain so "until  
A'  has been corroborated, until there is independent evidence for  A'  ".45  An ad hocp  
hypothesis, however, cannot acquire any independent evidence.  Radnitzky has simply failed 
to distinguish Popper's ad hoc hypotheses from Popper's auxiliary hypotheses because he is 
misled by the fact that both are ad hocoe..  It is also not true, as Radnitzky believes, that 
everything hinges upon obtaining independent evidence for A'.  The sighting of Neptune, for 
example, provided independent evidence for the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis and helped 
demonstrate that Uranus's perturbations were not due entirely to already known causes, but 
Uranus could have had worse residual perturbations once the effects of Neptune were 
included in the calculations.46  
 
Let us turn now to Musgrave's account, he says: 
Popper has noticed that some explanations of apparent refutations are far too easy. A 
Newtonian could easily render his theory completely immune from criticism with the 
following explanation:  "Any experimenter who claims to have refuted Newton is a liar 
who has fabricated his results out of envy of Newton's great achievement."  It is also too 
easy to say:  "Any experimenter who claims to have refuted Newton has simply betrayed 
his scientific incompetence."  The trouble with these explanations is that the only evidence 
produced in support of the idea that the Newtonian critic is a liar, or is incompetent, is that 
he has criticized Newton.  In other words, such explanations are not independently testable 
- they are ad hoc.  To exclude them, Popper . . . introduces the rule that if we try to explain 
away a refutation as erroneous, we must do so in an independently testable fashion.47 
 
It should be equally obvious, however, that the would-be explanations favoured by 
Musgrave's dogmatic or reactionary Newtonian are also independently testable.  If they were 
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not there would be no prospect of identifying any such unreliable practitioner.  My dishonest 
claim to have calibrated some instrument, for example, or my poor attempt at doing so, may 
explain both why a subsequent reading made with it disagrees with a predicted value and 
why, say, the next person to use that instrument, much to her annoyance, is forced to 
recalibrate it.  The latter fact would provide independent evidence of my unreliability in this 
regard.  Since Musgrave later asserts that Newton's theory was refuted he must suppose that 
at least one critic was both honest and competent, and that the claims of this reactionary 
Newtonian are therefore false.48  Nor can he believe, of course, that Newton's theory was 
rendered "completely immune from criticism" by such claims, though the corresponding 
belief of his reactionary physicist is another matter.  Musgrave thinks that it is "perhaps 
worth noting" that sometimes experimenters are at fault, but that "the rule against ad 
hocness only means that when the idiosyncracies . . . of an experimenter is invoked [sic], 
other evidence must be produced apart from the fact that he has reached unwelcome 
results".49  But a non-ad hocness rule implies only that such evidence should be producible, 
not that it should be produced (though that too would be desirable).  Musgrave conflates, as 
Radnitzky probably does, the mere absence of independent evidence with the logical 
impossibility of obtaining any.  Finally, it is ironic that Popper should be credited with 
having noticed that some "explanations of apparent refutations are far too easy".  He is the 
one who is responsible for the false impression that all refutations are easy, and hence that 
such explanations - which are refutations of  R - are easy.  It is Popper who gets Musgrave 
into this bind, not the one who points the way out of it. 
 
Popper rarely supplies, much less discusses, what he considers are instances of ad hocp 
hypotheses.  He once claimed that the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction hypothesis was ad 
hocp, but later accepted Adolf Grünbaum's criticism that it was not,50 (though it has been 
widely regarded by scientists and philosophers as in some sense ad hoc.)51  Popper then 
suggested, however, that perhaps this hypothesis illustrates "degrees of ad hocness".52  But 
this is a false comparative; there can be degrees of independence, but no degrees of non-
independence.  Nothing can be more, or less, not independently  F-able of anything else.  
Either a theory is not independently testable, or it is.  I shall later discuss some of Popper's 
other suggestions for ad hocp hypotheses, but consider first the following cases which 
Chalmers and Musgrave propose and discuss.  All are ad hocoe; none is ad hocp. 
 
Chalmers suggests that the hypothesis of the negative weight of phlogiston may be ad hoc.53  
Since phlogiston was believed to be released from any substance undergoing combustion or 
calcination, weight increase of the residue is anomalous for this hypothesis and the notion of 
the negative weight of phlogiston was introduced to explain such results.54  But even if 
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phlogiston chemists had been able to give a plausible explanation of how something can 
have negative weight, this hypothesis faced straightforward counter-examples.  For example, 
some substances, notably wood, decrease in weight upon combustion.   
 
Moreover, it is a fundamental mistake in the approach Chalmers takes to the problem of 
evidential support, that he assumes that  p  is evidence for  q  only if  p  is a logical 
consequence of  q.  For if, conversely,  q  is a logical consequence of  p  and one has good 
evidence (or counter-evidence) that  p  then one has good evidence (or counter-evidence) 
that  q.   Thus, once Antoine Lavoisier had provided good evidence that phlogiston did not 
exist there was good evidence that phlogiston did not have negative weight.55   
 
Chalmers later strengthens the non-ad hocness criterion, as Popper sometimes does, though 
he does not notice that he does so.  He remarks that the negative weight hypothesis would be 
ad hoc if "it led to no new tests".56  By "new tests" Chalmers presumably means at least 
tests of a different sort from weighing substances before and after combustion.  But it is not 
necessary to have a test of a different sort for any hypothesis if one of the usual sort will do, 
as it will here.  In the case we considered earlier, Chalmers would presumably not think that 
we should entertain the suggestion that my calibration of the instrument in question was 
unreliable only if someone can come up with a different test for this suggestion from 
whatever is the routine method for checking the calibration of that instrument.  
 
A second case proposed by Chalmers is the following: 
Having carefully observed the moon through his newly invented telescope, Galileo was 
able to report that the moon was not a smooth sphere but that its surface abounded in 
mountains and craters.  His Aristotelian adversary had to admit that things did appear that 
way when he repeated the observations for himself.  But the observations threatened a 
notion fundamental for many Aristotelians, namely, that all celestial bodies are perfect 
spheres.  Galileo's rival defended his theory in the face of the apparent falsification in a 
way that was blatantly ad hoc.  He suggested that there was an invisible substance on the 
moon, filling the craters and covering the mountains in such a way that the moon's shape 
was perfectly spherical.  When Galileo inquired how the presence of the invisible substance 
might be detected, the reply was that there was no way in which it could be detected.  
There is no doubt, then, that the modified theory led to no new testable consequences and 
would be quite unacceptable to a falsificationist.  An exasperated Galileo was able to show 
up the inadequacy of his rival's position in a characteristically witty way.  He announced 
that he was prepared to admit that the invisible undetectable substance existed on the 
moon, but insisted that it was not distributed in the way suggested by his rival but in fact 
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was piled up on top of the mountains so that they were many times higher than they 
appeared through the telescope.  Galileo was able to outmanouvre his rival in the fruitless 
game of the invention of ad hoc devices for the protection of theories.57 
 
Since Chalmers claims above only that the Aristotelian's hypothesis has "no new testable 
consequences" he believes or at least allows that it does have some testable consequence.  
But what can this consequence be, for he also thinks that the stuff Galileo's critic imagines 
as existing is undetectable?  The failure of the Aristotelian's hypothesis, as Chalmers 
describes it, is not that, as it were, it grips the world at one (convenient) point and no other; 
its failure is that it does not grip at all.  Bearing in mind that this hypothesis supplies no 
information about this would-be lunar stuff except that it is undetectable, what possible state 
of affairs can one describe that is not consistent with this suggestion?  None.  
 
Chalmers's account of this lunar hypothesis, however, is historically inaccurate.  Galileo's 
Aristotelian critic was Lodovico della Colombe and he claimed that the moon was encased 
in a smooth transparent crystal, a claim which does make for an independently testable, 
albeit fanciful, hypothesis.58  One could go mountain climbing on Galileo's moon but not on 
Colombe's.  Interestingly, Galileo too overstated the case against Colombe's hypothesis, with 
a logical criticism similar to that of a modern Popperian.  He remarked that this hypothesis 
"proposed nothing more than simple non-contradiction", which is false.59  Colombe's 
hypothesis is no less contingent than, say, the canard that the moon is made of green cheese.  
Both of these hypotheses were refuted with the first lunar landing, if not before.60 
 
What cognitive attitude, then, should a practitioner adopt towards a hypothesis such as 
Colombe's?  As Galileo's acerbic reply indicates, the distribution of crystal that Colombe 
postulated was improbable in the extreme.  It would be less so if some weight were given to 
Aristotle's belief that the moon was perfectly spherical,  but this belief was itself supported 
only by (naked eye) observations of the sharpness of the moon's crescents, and in any case 
Colombe's hypothesis presupposes the efficacy of Galileo's telescopic observations of the 
lunar mountains and craters.  Moreover, there was no evidence in the first place of the 
existence of this crystal.  So there is no reason to believe Colombe's hypothesis.  It is but one 
of an infinite number of such merely possible truths, and so poses no special problem.  Is 
one to believe all such propositions?  Clearly it would not be rational to do so, not least 
because many such possibilities are mutually inconsistent, or physically impossible. 
 
The two cases Chalmers offers above are both instances of rejecting the antecedent.  In the 
former case, the belief in the existence of phlogiston is preserved at the expense of one of 
the presuppositions of the counter-argument for it, namely, that weight is 'positive'.  In the 
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latter case, the belief that the moon is perfectly spherical is preserved by rejecting the 
presupposition that Galileo's observations provide sufficient information to conclude that the 
lunar surface is irregular.  Let us turn now to a case of rejecting the consequent. 
 
Late in the nineteenth century, Asaph Hall made a minute adjustment to the inverse square 
relation between force and distance in Newton's law of gravitation.  He did so in order to 
accommodate the recalcitrant advance of Mercury's perihelion and without generating any 
anomaly where the original law did not do so, and he succeeded on both counts.61  
Musgrave describes Hall's modified 'law' - the Newton-Hall theory, as I shall call it - as 
"artificial and ad hoc" on one occasion,62 and as "dangerously ad hoc" on another.63  In so 
doing, however, Musgrave smuggles a new referent for 'not independently testable' into his 
analysis, for in this case 'not independently testable' does not refer to the relation between an 
explanans and its explanandum but to the relation between two explananses, namely,  T'  
and  T,  which have a common explanandum, O.  Clearly, any such modified 'law' is 
independently testable of the case of Mercury's advancing perihelion. 
 
Was the Newton-Hall theory ad hoc, then, on Musgrave's novel definition of 'ad hoc', which 
I shall distinguish as 'ad hocm'?  Whilst there was no crucial test of the two theories which 
could have been conducted at the time, so far as I am aware, that does not make the theory 
ad hocm for clearly it has (numerous) potential falsifiers which Newton's law does not, and 
vice versa.  It is a matter of how the world happens to be whether or not any test is a 
practical possibility.  Some current research in physics, for example, is attempting to detect 
similarly minute discrepancies in the inverse square law.64  In any event, the Newton-Hall 
theory so closely shadows the original that it will fail in any application where the latter is 
relatively wide of the mark as in, for example, the bending of light in strong gravitational 
fields.  So the period of grace for Hall's modification was short for the first attempt to detect 
this phenomenon was made by Eddington in 1919, and with some success.65   
 
Musgrave is fickle in his opposition to Hall's modification to Newton's law.  Elsewhere, 
when his purpose is to criticise Lakatos for believing that scientists treated the law of 
gravitation as dogma, he says that "the list of those who contemplated such modifications 
adds up to quite a distinguished galaxy", though curiously Hall does not figure amongst 
them.66  And he asks, "What if their modifications to the law of gravity had been 
successful?"67  Quite so; Hall's modification was (temporarily) successful, at least in the 
way Musgrave's question presupposes.  And is this "distinguished galaxy" amongst 
Musgrave's "generations of scientists" suspicious of such modifications?   
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Again, whilst the Newton-Hall theory can now be rejected, what cognitive attitude should 
one have adopted to it at the time?  Musgrave quotes Simon Newcomb as arguing in 1910 
that the only plausible explanation available for the anomaly in Mercury's orbit was some 
modification to the law of gravitation, and that he favoured Hall's as the simplest. Musgrave 
does not criticise Newcomb for holding this view.  But one need not in any case believe that 
the Newton-Hall theory is true.  One can truly and rationally believe that it is instrumentally 
superior to its rivals, and use it accordingly, without also believing that there is a 
gravitational force between any two masses corresponding to the value given by this theory.  
Moreover, there is a conceptual problem with the latter belief.  There were, for example, 
accepted law-like generalisations of the same inverse square type for the luminance at a 
distance from a point source of light, similarly for the quantity of radiant heat from a point 
source or for the strength of an electrical or magnetic field. And if one conceives of gravity 
as something emanating from masses one would expect the gravitational force to accord 
with a law of this type, for the surface areas of uni-centred spheres increase with the square 
of their radii.  "The inverse square law of force", wrote Laplace, "is that of all the 
emanations which come from a centre like that of light".68 
 
Like Musgrave, I take Popper's independent testability criterion to be a refinement of his 
original testability or falsifiability criterion, and therefore to be a purely logical criterion.  A 
theory is testable or falsifiable in this sense if and only if it has at least one potential falsifier, 
that is, at least one contrary which describes a logically possible state of affairs.  This is 
clearly a special or technical sense of 'testable' - let us call it the logical sense of the term - 
for one could construe 'testable', as presumably many scientists do (or would do), in various 
stronger and partly pragmatic senses, of which there are basically two.  A theory might 
reasonably be defined as testable only if it is physically possible to observe the state of 
affairs, or at least some trace thereof, described by a potential falsifier; or, more strongly 
still, as testable only if it is practically possible to observe such a state of affairs, or some 
trace thereof.  Let us call these latter senses of 'testable' its physical and practical senses, 
respectively.  Thus, when a hypothesis is described as 'ad hoc' the author may have in mind 
not that an independent test is logically impossible but merely that one is physically 
impossible, or that one is practically impossible. 
 
Now many contingent claims are not physically testable, for example, the claim that some 
event occurred when no trace of that event remains.  But it would be a mistake to erect a 
demarcation criterion on this basis, for it would be consistent with such a criterion that we 
may have to entertain 'unscientific' theories in order to try to gather evidence to see whether 
or not those theories are 'unscientific'.  That is, scientists may have to entertain unscientific 
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theories, which is queer.  (There is no problem of belief or acceptance here for we are 
certainly not required to believe or accept any such theory when there is no evidence for it.)  
A practical testability criterion would be worse still.  As well as inheriting the above mistake 
it would contribute one of its own, for if there were some such trace but we had no way of 
detecting it (and perhaps little prospect of doing so) we would be dissuaded from the attempt 
by this criterion.  But what manner of Popperian is it who would circumscribe the adventure 
of science in this fashion? 
 
The basis of both Chalmers's dismissal of Colombe's hypothesis and Musgrave's of the 
Newton-Hall theory as ad hocp, however, is a demand that the independent consequences of 
these hypotheses should be practically testable.  I conjecture that these philosophers are 
attracted to this weak construal of 'untestable' in a bid to find some hypothesis to illustrate 
the alleged importance of Popper's rule against ad hocness.  Popper too has favoured this 
construal, as it happens, on the very occasion in "Replies" where he distinguishes an ad hoc 
from an auxiliary hypothesis.  The act of doing so makes him dimly aware of this popular 
piece of semantic elasticity in his terms for he suggests, to begin with, that the distinction 
between such hypotheses is "a little vague".69  He later redefines 'ad hoc hypotheses' as "at 
the time untestable auxiliary hypotheses".70 (Emphasis mine.)  In between, he provides the 
following example of a hypothesis that is ad hoc in this novel sense: 
[Wolfgang] Pauli introduced the hypothesis of the neutrino quite consciously as an ad hoc 
hypothesis [to explain the energy loss, assuming the conservation laws are true, in beta-
decay].  He had originally no hope that one day independent evidence would be found;  at 
the time this seemed practically impossible.  So we have an example here of an ad hoc 
hypothesis which, with the growth of knowledge, did shed its ad hoc character.  And we 
have a warning here not to pronounce too severe an edict against ad hoc hypotheses:  they 
may become testable after all, as may also happen to a metaphysical hypothesis.  But in 
general, our criterion of testability warns us against ad hoc hypotheses; and Pauli was at 
first far from happy about the neutrino which would in all likelihood have been abandoned 
in the end, had not new methods provided independent tests for its existence.71 
Popper's criterion of (logical) testability warns us against no such thing, however, for a 
hypothesis can be testable in the logical sense without being testable in the practical sense, 
and he is well aware of this distinction.  In Conjectures, for example, he says:  
"Einstein's theory of gravitation clearly satisfied the criterion of falsifiability.  Even if our 
measuring instruments at the time did not allow us to pronounce on the results of the tests 
with complete assurance, there was clearly a possibility of refuting the theory."72 
  
  
 
78 
Pauli's conjecture, which led to an important discovery, highlights the weakness in the 
demand for practical testability that Chalmers and Musgrave make, and which is obscured 
by their choice of hypotheses that now seem wildly implausible or are known to be false. 
 
It may seem odd that Popper should champion conjectures as part of the life-blood of 
science yet remain unenthusiastic about conjectures as to what novel things (a trans-Uranian 
planet) or novel sorts of things (the neutrino) the universe contains.  It may seem equally 
odd that he should insist that it is of no consequence how or why a conjecture is generated 
yet continually badger us about dealing with, or at least attempting to deal with, anomalies 
in, as Musgrave puts it, this "perfectly reasonable" fashion.  The truth is that in spite of his 
rhetoric Popper is simply biased against some conjectures, and some refutations, in science.  
Whilst he eulogizes the practice of conjecturing and refuting major theories, he grudgingly 
tolerates the same practice in relation to auxiliary propositions.  He also misrepresents the 
latter practice so that we seem to be faced with a choice between two radically different 
kinds of practice, in essence, between accepting a refutation and avoiding one.  Since there 
is no a priori reason, however, to suppose that predictive failure will lead to the refutation 
and replacement of instances of  T  rather than  A , the contrast he draws between the 
desirability or the probability of success in attempting the former compared with the latter 
collapses.  I shall examine this matter in more detail in the next chapter, but for now 
consider the way in which Popper's selective use of the notion of immunization and the word 
'ad hoc' help to paint this contrast. 
 
Take, once again, his account of the introduction of the hypothesis of a planet exterior to 
Uranus: 
We must not exclude all immunisations, not even all which introduced ad hoc auxiliary 
hypotheses.  For example the observed motion of Uranus might have been regarded as a 
falsification of Newton's theory.  Instead the auxiliary hypothesis of an outer planet was 
introduced ad hoc, thus immunising the theory.73 
But the argument can just as easily go the other way.  Suppose that this Uranian anomaly 
had caused some scientist to invent a new mechanical theory to replace Newton's.  One 
could then say, with equal justice: 
We must not exclude all immunisations, not even all which have introduced ad hoc 
theories.  For example, the observed motion of Uranus might have been regarded as a 
falsification of the set of auxiliary propositions.  Instead a new mechanical theory was 
introduced ad hoc, thus immunising this set. 
Notice too that by the expression 'not even all' in his first sentence above, Popper implies 
that most hypotheses which are introduced for some particular explanatory purpose are 
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destined to be excluded from science.  For this implication to seem at all plausible one needs 
to equivocate about 'ad hoc', slipping from 'ad hocoe'  to  'ad hocp', as one is encouraged to 
do, not least by the placement of 'ad hoc' in that first sentence.  (As we have seen, it cannot 
be determined from this sentence alone whether 'ad hoc' leans on 'introduced' or on 
'hypotheses'.) 
 
But Popper goes further.  Having claimed that the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis 
immunized Newton's theory, he immediately adds, "This turned out to be fortunate;  for the 
auxiliary hypothesis was a testable one, even if difficult to test, and it stood up to tests 
successfully."  Again, it is only by equivocating between 'ad hocoe' and 'ad hocp' that anyone 
would believe it is "fortunate" when auxiliary hypotheses turn out to be testable.  But to then 
try to prop up this belief with the suggestion that the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis was 
"difficult to test" is sheer humbug.  Leaving aside the fact that this suggestion concerns a 
practical matter and not a logical one, it took the astronomers who tested this hypothesis and 
discovered Neptune only a few hours of routine work on each of two successive evenings to 
do so, such was the accuracy of the data they were supplied with, and the quality of their 
telescope.74 
 
Charles Sanders Peirce called the "form of inference" by which hypotheses such as those of 
the neutrino or of a novel planet come to be formulated or entertained, 'abduction' or 
'retroduction'.  Peirce set out abduction (though using different symbols) as follows: 
The surprising fact,  F , is observed;   
But if  H  were true,  F  would be a matter of course.   
Hence, there is reason to suspect that  H  is true.75 
The form of this inference, however, is that of a deductively valid argument with the 
suppressed premise that any observed consequence of  H  that is surprising, such as  F , is a 
reason to suspect that  H  is true.  Peirce contrasted abduction or retroduction with 
deduction, however, so he failed to grasp this point, as have several of his commentators.76  
Pierce also contrasted abduction with induction though when he did so he meant by 
'abduction' (in the above symbols) 'act of inferring  H  from  F', and others have followed or 
tolerated this usage of logical terms as well.77  But the inference from  F  to  H  is an 
inductive one. 
 
Nonetheless, Peirce, and later N.R. Hanson in particular78, did appreciate that as a form or 
pattern of argument so-called abduction, as set out by Peirce above, is both important and 
common in scientific inquiry, as it is in everyday life.  The fact that   H  is ad hoc in the 
ordinary sense, or that there is no independent evidence for  H , should not deter us, as 
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Peirce and Hanson recognized, from entertaining  H  (though  of course other considerations 
may do so).  We cannot always or even often be so fortunate in our inquiries as to have 
independent evidence for our conjectures already to hand. 
 
Unlike Peirce and Hanson, however, Popper and many of his students do not accept the 
suppressed premise in Peirce's abductive schema, and hence do not accept Peirce's 
conclusion (at least in theory). They do not believe that  F  is evidence for, or corroborates,  
H , for the simple reason that  H  was devised to explain  F.  As Gerard Radnitzky and 
Gunnar Andersson put it: "a fact cannot be used twice" - once to construct a theory and then 
to support it.79  Popper came to this radical view of positive evidence, so he tells us, because 
he was dismayed at the many people he encountered in his youth who would interpret 
seemingly any relevant case of human behaviour to fit snugly with their entrenched social or 
psychological beliefs, counting every such case as yet more evidence for those beliefs.80  
Popper concluded, or rather decreed, that an explanandum is evidence for an explanans only 
if it was not or could not have been known to the person who formulated that explanans at 
the time he or she did so.  In effect, positive evidence or corroboration can be had only from 
consciously designed tests, for only then is the explanandum not known in advance.  In fact 
Popper went further, claiming that a test prediction should also be unlikely in the light of the 
existing background knowledge, and thus should provide a crucial test between the novel 
theory and the relevant portion of that background knowledge.81 
 
The agile dogmatists from Popper's youth demonstrated, amongst other things, the 
considerable freedom of choice of possible truths with which to flesh out a pet theory into an 
explanans that fits the facts, whatever the facts may be.  This is the point, indeed the only 
point, of Lakatos's deviant planet story, and Popper is rightly skeptical that our ability to 
formulate such explananses is anything like as impressive an achievement as philosophers 
like Lakatos and Quine seem to think it is.  What is intellectually shoddy about the practice 
Popper describes, however, is that alternative explanations are not considered by those 
concerned, and that such people look no further for evidence to support their acceptance of 
the explanans in question than the particular explanandum they want explained.  But neither 
of these deficiencies need drive us to a radical theory of positive evidence like Popper's or, 
for that matter, to Lakatosian skepticism or Quinean dogmatism. 
 
It is surely contrary to almost everyone's intuitions, and Popperians are importantly no 
exception here, to believe that  F  is evidence for  H  only if  H  was not formulated to 
explain  F.  This is pure psychologism.  Suppose there are two facts,  F1  and  F2 , of which 
only  F1  is known at  t0.  H  is formulated to explain  F1 , and is tested by predicting that  F2  
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obtains.  But what if, of the two facts in question, only  F2  had been known at  t0 ?  H  
might then have been formulated to explain  F2  and tested by predicting that  F1  obtained.  
If  F2  is a reason for believing that  H  in the former case, why not in the latter?  
Conversely, if  F1  is a reason for believing that  H  in the latter case, why not in the former?  
 
Why do we typically entertain or test such hypotheses if not because we think we already 
have some evidence or reason to believe that they are true (or to accept them as true, if 
Popper prefers)?  How is rational action possible on Popper's theory of evidence?  It is one 
thing to recognize that, for example, Leverrier did not have sufficient evidence for the 
existence of the trans-Uranian planet he postulated because it would remove Uranus's 
existing residuals, quite another to pretend that he had no  evidence at all for this postulate 
prior to having it tested at the telescope.  In unguarded moments, Popperians do not persist 
with this counter-intuitive requirement for evidence.  For example, recall Musgrave's remark 
(p. 71 above) that the "only evidence" produced for the hypothesis that those who claim to 
have refuted Newton are liars or cheats is that they have criticized Newton.  But it is the fact 
that such people criticised Newton that led to the formulation of this hypothesis.  Moreover, 
Popperians often talk of the need for independent evidence in such cases, having forgotten 
that on their account there is no other kind of evidence that one can have. And Musgrave 
says: 
Scientists themselves regard genuine confirmations of, say, Relativity Theory as very 
difficult to come by indeed - which suggests that by genuine confirming evidence for a new 
theory they mean evidence which is not also explained by existing theories.82 
 
If scientists do think that this is so then they are badly mistaken, but I think Musgrave has 
misread the situation.  In general, a theory would not be counted as a rival or replacement 
candidate for another if it did not make at least a reasonable fist of duplicating the success of 
the theory it would replace.  If Relativity Theory did not yield Newtonian Mechanics as an 
approximation, for example, would it have been in the race to replace the latter?  There is no 
point in looking for new confirmations for such a theory unless one is assured that it is 
confirmed by the evidence which confirms the theory it would replace.  The situation 
Musgrave has in mind is one in which the scientists concerned are looking only for evidence 
that will discriminate between the two (or more) theories in question, so we need to be 
careful how we interpret their remarks about the difficulties of obtaining evidence for one of 
them.  Someone may say, "Evidence which confirms Relativity Theory is hard to come by" 
but mean, and be understood to mean in this situation, "Evidence which confirms Relativity 
Theory alone is hard to come by." 
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If some scientists do believe, as Musgrave suggests, that Relativity Theory is confirmed or 
supported only by such phenomena as the bending of light in strong gravitational fields or 
the redshift of spectral lines, whereas Newtonian Mechanics captures the support of 
observations of falling apples, the movements of the planets,  the tides, and so on, then these 
scientists believe that the two theories are incommensurable in respect of the positive 
support each can command.  This is scarcely a palatable consequence, not least for 
Popperians. 
 
Popper's concept of an ad hoc hypothesis is the same as, or very similar to, that of several 
other philosophers of science.  For example, Carl Hempel in his Philosophy of Natural 
Science gives an account of ad hoc hypotheses and their alleged dangers that is along the 
same lines as Popper's.83  Grover Maxwell reports that a hypothesis is "often said to be ad 
hoc with respect to a certain fact, if and only if it explains the fact in question and no 
others".84  David Miller in Dictionary of History of Science defines 'ad hoc hypotheses' as 
those which are "designed for a specific purpose, that accomplish nothing else".85  W.V. 
Quine and J.S. Ullian claim that "the vice of an ad hoc hypothesis" is that (in the worst case) 
it "covers only the observations it was invented to account for, so that it is totally useless in 
prediction".86 
 
Technical definitions of 'ad hoc hypothesis', such as those provided or implied above, have 
in common not merely that they retain the ordinary pejorative meaning of 'ad hoc' but also 
that the technical component in each of them is itself shaped by this ordinary meaning.  If 
their authors grasped this point they would be unlikely to hold many of the views they do 
about so-called ad hoc hypotheses.  Take Maxwell's suggestion that many people believe 
there are hypotheses which explain only that which they were intended to explain.  Miller 
does not preclude the possibility that he believes there are such hypotheses, and nor perhaps 
do Quine and Ullian.  Anyone who holds this belief, however, has a very queer view indeed 
of the relations between outcomes and intentions. 
 
To see why it appears otherwise to such people, however, and how they arrive at the notion 
of such a hypothesis, consider the following three propositions: 
(1) The hypothesis,  H , is designed or intended only to explain the 
alleged fact, or set of alleged facts,  F, 
(2) H  is not intended to explain anything other than  F, 
and 
(3) H  is not able to explain anything other than  F. 
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If (3) is conflated with (2) then (3) will seem entirely plausible, since (2) follows 
immediately from (1) and (1) is obviously true for many instances of  H.  There are many 
instances of ad hocoe hypotheses. 
 
But (3) is false.  If  H  explains  F , then  H  will explain many other facts besides  F.  It is 
simply irrelevant that whoever formulated  H  had no intention that  H  should do so.  If I 
conjecture that a friend's car has broken down because she is late for an appointment, for 
example, I may have in mind only to explain why she is late.  But whatever my purposes or 
intentions, if this conjecture is true and does explain why she is late it will explain other 
facts besides such as, for example, how she came to know a mechanic in a part of town she 
rarely visits or why she had fresh grease stains on her sleeve when she finally did arrive for 
our appointment. 
 
The concept of an ad hoc hypothesis which Maxwell describes above is stronger than 
Popper's, but this does not affect the points I have just made.  To form his concept of an ad 
hoc hypothesis, Popper slides not from (2) to (3) but from, 
(2) 'H  is not intended to have any testable consequence other than 
F  (and its testable consequences),  
which likewise follows immediately from (1) above, to 
(3) 'H  does not have any testable consequence other than  F  (and 
its testable consequences).  
Necessarily,  H  is not independently testable of  F  just when (3)' is true. 
 
The reason Popperians continually make false assessments of the extent of the testable 
consequences of the hypotheses Popper has led them to disapprove of as ad hoc  is that they 
equivocate between (2)' and (3)'.  This equivocation also explains why they mistakenly 
believe that ad hocp hypotheses are numerous or troublesome.  But given that  H  entails  F , 
(3)' is true only if  H  is at least logically equivalent to  F, which shows how meagre in fact 
is the class of genuinely ad hocp hypotheses.  A hypothesis is ad hocp only if it is logically 
equivalent to its explanandum.  The mere fact that Popper and others continue to employ the 
term 'hypothesis' in this context, however, is a further indication that they have a larger or 
different class of proposition in mind, for hypotheses are generally supposed to transcend 
observation statements or their explanandums . 
 
Maxwell concludes that we are justified in dismissing a would-be explanatory hypothesis as 
ad hoc only when it is logically equivalent to its explanandum.  This is a sensible 
conclusion, if one believes there is some value in distinguishing  propositions as ad hoc.87  
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It suggests, however, that Maxwell's concept of an ad hoc hypothesis is not that which he 
says is common but in fact the same as Popper's.  In any event, having drawn this 
conclusion, Maxwell is thus "extremely wary" when the charge 'ad hoc' is levelled at any 
hypothesis, and justifiably so.  He cites the neutrino hypothesis as a paradigm of a 
hypothesis that is "intuitively labelled" as ad hoc but which eventually "opened up an 
extensive and exciting new area of inquiry, neutrino astronomy".88  In reply, Popper says 
that he does not "greatly disagree" with Maxwell on these matter.89  If so, then why the fuss 
about ad hoc hypotheses? 
 
Those who slide from the psychological claim in (2) or (2)' to the logical claim in (3) or (3)' 
above do so only because they disapprove of  H , or rather they disapprove of the motive, or 
the alleged motive, of the author of  H , and this slide appears to deliver a reasonable 
objection to  H  itself.  Such people thus end up believing in hypotheses with bizarre 
explanatory powers because they find the alleged motive of the authors of those hypotheses 
distasteful.  The motive they find distasteful is of course that someone should want to save 
one of his or her cherished beliefs from a counter-argument when they happen to think that 
this belief ought to be relinquished.  No doubt many people are prone to believing or 
mouthing bad arguments, if not to irrationality, when one of their cherished beliefs is 
threatened, but the remedy for bad arguments is not more of the same.  It is both 
unavoidable and desirable that people should often want to undermine counter-arguments to 
their own beliefs, for many beliefs are well supported or known to be true.  And to suppose 
that if people have this desire it must vitiate or taint their attempts at undermining such 
arguments would be to commit the ad hominem fallacy.  Thus Larry Laudan is certainly 
correct in saying: 
What seems to lie behind many discussions of ad hocness is a conviction - often present 
but rarely defended - that there is something suspicious about any change in a theory which 
is motivated by the desire to remove an anomaly.  The presumption is that if we know what 
the anomaly is, it is little more than child's play to produce some face-saving change in the 
theory which turns the anomaly into a positive instance.  I doubt that where "real" science 
is concerned, this task is such an easy one.90  
 
Hempel concludes his analysis by asserting that "there is, in fact, no precise criterion for ad 
hoc hypotheses", a conclusion which merely reflects the fact that if people identify with a 
threatened belief they will be much less likely than they otherwise would to count any 
saving hypothesis as ad hoc, whatever its logical properties.91 Likewise, Popper argues that 
the distinction between an ad hocp hypothesis and an auxiliary hypothesis is "a little vague" 
when he comes to consider, as we have seen, the successful neutrino hypothesis.92  Hempel 
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goes on to say, however, that "some guidance" can at least be had in this matter.  The first 
question we should ask, he suggests, is whether or not the hypothesis concerned has been 
proposed "just for the sake of saving some current conception against adverse evidence".93  
It is this question that we need to remove from the agenda if hypotheses are to be assessed 
objectively. 
 
 
2.4  Ad hocness and Circularity 
 
I turn now to Popper's attempts to explicate ad hocness in terms of certain undesirable, or 
allegedly undesirable, properties of propositions or the explanations they would provide. 
 
Popper has attempted to distinguish a hypothesis that is ad hocp from one that is logically 
equivalent to its explanandum, though he does not mention this fact in his reply to Maxwell 
cited above.  In "The Aim of Science", Popper says that he intends there, amongst other 
things, to "elucidate his use of the expression 'independent', with its opposites, ad hoc, and 
(in extreme cases) 'circular'".94  In this section, I shall examine his attempt at doing so.  
Popper states: 
Let a be an explicandum, known to be true.  Since a trivially follows from a itself, we 
could always offer a  as an explanation of itself.  But this would be highly unsatisfactory, 
even though we should know in this case that the explicans  is true, and that the 
explicandum follows from it.  Thus we must exclude explanations of this kind because of 
their circularity. 
 
Yet the kind of circularity I have here in mind is a matter of degree.  Consider the 
following dialogue:  'Why is the sea so rough today?' - 'Because Neptune is very angry' - 
'By what evidence can you support your statement that Neptune is very angry?' - 'Oh, don't 
you see how very rough the sea is?  And is it not always rough when Neptune is angry?'  
This explanation is found unsatisfactory because (just as in the case of the fully circular 
explanation) the only evidence for the explicans is the explicandum itself.  The feeling that 
this kind of almost circular or ad hoc explanation is highly unsatisfactory, and the 
corresponding requirement that explanations of this kind should be avoided are, I believe, 
among the main motive forces of the development of science: . . . 
 
In order that the explicans should not be ad hoc, it must be rich in content:  it must have a 
variety of testable consequences, and among them, especially, testable consequences which 
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are different from the explicandum.  It is these different testable consequences which I have 
in mind when I speak of independent tests, or of independent  evidence.95 
 
Before considering the novel aspects of this argument, notice that Popper's alleged example 
of a hypothesis or explanans (his explicans) that is ad hocp fails in the same way that several 
of those we examined above do.  The rough sea,  r , is the only evidence that is considered 
for the hypothesis that  r   is caused by Neptune's anger, N , but it does not follow that  N   is 
ad hocp.  Moreover,  N  is not ad hocp for it rules out any state of affairs in which the sea is 
only partly rough, and hence partly smooth, since Neptune cannot be both angry and placid 
at one and the same time.  It would not be difficult, of course, to formulate some modified 
hypothesis to accommodate such a state of affairs;  for example, one that allows that 
Neptune can be angry with one fishing village but not another would do the job.  But what 
would then have to be shown is that any such modified hypothesis was itself neither open to 
a similar objection nor untestable.  Alternatively, one can appeal to simplicity and take the 
razor to this supernatural baggage. 
 
But to our present concern: why does Popper believe that the explanation of  r  which  N   
would provide is "almost circular"?  If I suggest that a scatter of broken china about the 
kitchen is explained by Narelle's recent fit of anger, no circularity, or near circularity, is 
involved.  In Popper's dialogue above,  N  can be replaced with any explanans,  including 
the correct one, and he would still be obliged to conclude that the explanation it would 
provide of  r  was "almost circular".  So it is the structure of this dialogue that has led 
Popper astray and that we need to examine more closely. 
 
If Popper's dialogue appears to display a circularity, or near circularity, of some kind, and it 
does so not just to Popper, this is I suggest because it appears to resemble a circular proof, or 
rather a circular proof claim.  Newton-Smith, for example, describes the argument in this 
dialogue as "a justification which runs in a circle", and this is false.96 
 
A circular proof claim, in its simplest form, is an argument in which one proposition, p , is 
offered in support of a second proposition,  q , when q  has already been offered in support 
of  p , or clearly depends upon that support.  But no such circularity occurs above.  The 
question, "Why is the sea so rough today?" is not a request for evidence but for an 
explanation, and it is treated as such by both participants in the dialogue.  The only occasion 
on which evidence is solicited or offered above is in response to the question, "By what 
evidence can you support your statement that Neptune is very angry?"  In short,  r  is offered 
as evidence of  N , but  N  is not offered as evidence of r.97  We can assume that both 
participants can see for themselves that the sea is rough. 
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Moreover, the latter question is both otiose and misleading.  It comes at a point in the 
dialogue when both participants have already committed themselves to one answer to it, 
namely,  r  (even though a Popperian would be otherwise unlikely, as we have seen, to 
accept  r  as evidence of  N ).  So this question needs to be reframed, if as a request for 
evidence for  N  then as a request for evidence other than  r .  In which case,  r  would be an 
obviously unacceptable answer, and would not give rise to any appearance of circularity in 
the dialogue.  Even so, it should have been obvious to the explainer in Popper's dialogue that 
his or her interlocuter believed, and rightly so, at least that  r  was not sufficient evidence for  
N.  The point is that if the explainer is aware of this belief it is unhelpful to respond to a 
request for evidence for  N  with, as happens above, an assertion which obviously entails  r. 
 
Now whilst a proof claim is circular just when what needs supporting is called upon, at some 
stage in the argument, to do the supporting, a would-be explanation is circular just when 
what needs explaining is called upon to do the explaining.  (We call such arguments 
'circular' because, as it were, we set off seeking support for, or an explanation of,  some 
proposition,  p , only to end up where we started, offering  p  as the support, or as the basis 
of the explanation, we were seeking.)  Popper's case of 
    a   -->  a   
is a circular 'explanation' in its simplest logical form.  This argument is sound and known to 
be so but, clearly, though we may know that something is the case and argue validly that if it 
is the case then it is the case, this does not explain how or why it is the case.  Knowing that 
an explanans is true and that it entails the explanandum  (Popper's explicandum) is thus not 
sufficient for explanation. 
 
A circular 'explanation' is defective because if what needs explaining could provide that 
explanation there would not be this need.  If such would-be explanations were acceptable the 
job of looking for explanations, which we have all experienced in every day life if not in 
science, would disappear.  We would have only to know that something was the case in 
order to explain it.  In short, what we find puzzling or do not understand will not itself 
relieve our puzzlement or enlighten us, otherwise we would not be puzzled or ignorant in the 
first place.  Moreover, when a causal explanation is called for, as it is in Popper's case above 
of the rough sea, a would-be explanation that is circular has the counter-intuitive 
consequence that events or states of affairs can be self-caused. 
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Popper, however, fails to grasp why a circular 'explanation' is defective.  He seems to 
believe it is because the evidence for the explanans is inadequate, and this is a mistake.  
Consider again 
   a  -- >  a     
Clearly,  it would be rational to doubt the explanans in this case only if one already doubted 
the explanandum.  Yet it is part of the pragmatics of explanation that we usually only seek 
an explanation of something,  p , if we already know or at least have good reason to believe 
that  p.  So there would not usually be a problem of evidence for the explanans in any 
would-be explanation that is circular.  Moreover, it so happens that in  a --> a  we know that 
the explanandum is true, so there is obviously no need for any additional or independent 
evidence for the explanans in this case (even if  per impossible there were independent 
evidence for such an explanans).  In this regard, however, all that Popper says of  a --> a  is 
that "the only evidence for the explicans is the explicandum itself", and even this is not 
correct.  Rather, the only evidence for the explanans is (or can be) the evidence for the 
explanandum.  It is presumably Popper's belief that the only evidence for Neptune's anger is 
the rough sea that is the origin of this error. 
 
Is there nothing, however, to choose between Popper's requirement that an explanans  
should be independently testable of its explanandum and the traditional requirement that a 
would-be explanation should not be circular?  There are at least three reasons for preferring 
the latter requirement. 
 
Firstly, non-circularity is a more comprehensive criterion than non-ad hoc nessp, and not 
only because it applies to other kinds of arguments such as proofs and definitions.  The 
hypothesis, 'The sea is rough and was liked by Homer', for example, provides a circular 
'explanation' of why the sea is not smooth.  But it is independently testable of this 
explanandum for all that.  'The sea was not liked by Homer', for example, is a potential 
falsifier of the explanans but not the explanandum  in this case.98 
 
Secondly, the independently testable explanans, 'The sea is rough and was liked by Homer', 
provides no better an explanation of why the sea is not smooth than does an explanans that 
is not independently testable, for example, 'The sea is rough.'  The point of testing any 
proposition is to gather evidence (or counter-evidence) for that proposition to help determine 
one's cognitive attitude to it.  But there need not be, and usually there is not, a problem of 
belief or acceptance with the explanans in a circular explanation, as we have seen.  So a 
testability criterion misses the point as to why such an explanans is defective. 
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Thirdly, if the alleged explanation some hypothesis provides is circular, then it is the alleged 
explanation that is unacceptable.  The hypothesis which provides that explanation may be 
otherwise perfectly acceptable. So Popper's criterion is misleading whereas the criterion of 
non-circularity is not, for only arguments can be circular.  Since every  proposition, and 
hence every piece of scientific knowledge, can provide a circular 'explanation' of some 
explanandum (itself, for example), it is important to draw this distinction. 
 
Consider the following case.  Immediately following the definition of 'ad hoc  hypotheses' 
he supplies above, Miller suggests that the "supposedly explanatory" hypothesis, 
 It is the dormitive virtue of opium that induces sleep,  
is ad hoc.99  Miller thus conflates an explanans with an explanation, almost certainly 
because he has been misled by Popper.  The "supposedly explanatory" hypothesis or 
explanans in this case is,  
Opium has a dormitive virtue. 
The explanandum is,  
Opium induces sleep.  
We should reject the would-be explanation that it is the dormitive virtue of opium that 
induces sleep because it is circular, though Miller does not point this out.  The proposition 
which constitutes the explanans, however, should not be rejected (as false), since it is known 
to be true.  We may want to express this proposition somewhat differently these days as, for 
example, 
Opium has the property of being sleep inducing, 
or simply,  
Opium is a sedative. 
But truths about the dormitive virtue or sedative property of such substances can of course 
provide, or assist in providing, any number of sound explanations, for example, of why 
people fall asleep, why they miss their buses, get the sack, keep such substances where 
children cannot easily get at them, and so on.  Such propositions are thus not ad hoc in 
Miller's sense. 
 
In addition, however, to rejecting Popper's requirement that a hypothesis should not be ad 
hocp, in favour of a requirement that no would-be explanation should be circular, it is 
important to notice that ad hocp hypotheses have no plausible role in the practice of rejecting 
the antecedent, though this is where Popper believes such hypotheses do their main damage.  
(This is a further reason, if one were needed, for believing that it is not, in general, the class 
of hypotheses that are logically equivalent to their respective explanandums that Popper has 
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in mind when he talks about ad hoc hypotheses.)  It is certainly true that an ad hocp 
hypothesis and its explanandum can be made to fit the logical form of  
R'   -->  ~R 
for example, 
a  -->  ~(~a) 
Thus, one person may remark, 'It is because the sea is rough that it is not smooth,' in the vain 
hope of explaining to another why the sea is not smooth.  But this remark is plausible only if 
both participants in this dialogue or inquiry accept that the sea is not smooth.  In rejecting 
the antecedent, however, whilst one participant does believe that the sea is not smooth, the 
other holds a contrary view. 
 
 
2.5  Ad hocness and Empirical Content 
 
Finally, let us turn to the relations, or the alleged relations, between ad hocnessp and 
empirical content.  In particular, we need to examine Popper's contention that the practice he 
calls avoiding a refutation is rationally acceptable only when   R'  is more falsifiable or 
bolder or has more empirical content than  R , or  T'  is more falsifiable or bolder or has 
more empirical content than  T , as the case may be.  Replacement candidates which do not 
satisfy this requirement are said or hinted to be ad hoc ;100 Chalmers, for example, even 
defines an ad hoc theory in this way.101 
 
But to begin with, what is empirical content?  If the class of potential falsifiers of some 
contingent proposition,  p , includes, but is not exhausted by, the class of potential falsifiers 
of another contingent proposition,  q , that is, if the former class includes the latter as a 
proper sub-class, then  p  is more falsifiable than  q.  There is more chance, other things 
being equal, of falsifying  p  than  q.  The degree of falsifiability of any such proposition, 
Popper claims, is a measure of how much, as it were, that proposition says about the world, 
which is intuitively its empirical content.  Thus on his account  p  has more empirical 
content than  q , and this accords with our intuitions, at least in respect of  p  and  q.102 
 
Popper is, of course, primarily concerned to compare the falsifiability or empirical content 
of universal generalisations, and on the above method it follows that, for example, 
All penguins have light coloured fronts, T1,  
is less falsifiable and has less empirical content than, 
All penguins have light coloured fronts and dark coloured backs, T2. 
Similarly, an observation statement such as, 
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X  is a penguin with a dark coloured front, R1,  
is less falsifiable than, 
X  is a penguin with both a dark coloured front and back, R2. 
But there are some well known problems with comparing classes of potential falsifiers 
to measure either falsifiability or empirical content.  For example, since existential 
generalisations have no potential falsifiers they can have no empirical content on this 
method.  Thus, for example, 
There are penguins, 
apparently says nothing about the world.  Moreover, it would therefore say no less 
about the world than, 
There are penguins, icebergs, and snow storms. 
Also, a theory such as, 
All penguins have dark coloured fronts, T3,  
has potential falsifiers which neither  T1  nor  T2  has, for example, 
X  is a penguin with a light coloured front, R3,  
and vice versa, for example,  R1  is a potential falsifier of both  T1  and  T2  but not T3.  And 
the same goes for falsifiability comparisons of observation statements;  for example,  R3  has 
potential falsifiers which neither  R1  nor  R2  has, and vice versa. 
 
Popper claims that such comparisons can be made using what may be called an erotetic 
method, namely, that if the class of questions which can be answered with either 'yes' or 'no' 
by appealing to  p  includes as a proper sub-class the class of questions which can be 
answered with either 'yes' or 'no' by appealing to  q , then p  is more falsifiable or has more 
empirical content than  q.  This method overcomes the problem that whilst, for example,  R3  
is intuitively less  falsifiable than  R2  it still has potential falsifiers that  R2  lacks, for 
example,  R1.  But an appropriate answer to the question, 
Is  X  a penguin with a dark coloured front? 
is forthcoming not only from  R3  - 'no' - but also from  R2  - 'yes'; and  R2  answers questions 
that  R3  cannot, for example,  
Is  X  a penguin with a dark coloured back? 
 
An objection raised or implied by David Miller to this method,103 however, is that there are 
some questions, such as 
Does X have a light coloured front or a light coloured head? 
which can be appropriately answered by appealing to R3  - 'yes' - but not  to  R2.  R2  denies 
that  X  has a light coloured front so whatever answer it supplies to the second part of this 
question is the answer it supplies to the question as a whole.  But  R2  implies nothing about 
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the colour of  X 's head and so cannot supply either 'yes' or 'no' to the second part of this 
question.  Also, questions such as  
Are there penguins with dark coloured fronts? 
or 
Do all penguins have light coloured fronts? 
would have to be ruled out, even though most people would rightly regard such questions as 
empirical, otherwise Popper would have to concede that existential generalisations do have 
empirical content. 
There are penguins with dark coloured fronts, 
for example, supplies the answers 'yes' and 'no', respectively, to these questions. 
 
The general problem of measuring empirical content is not, however, one that I propose to 
dwell upon.  There is, to say the least, no general agreement that the problem has been 
solved, but, even if it had been, the question would remain:  should we go along with Popper 
in his demand that  R'  and  T'  have more empirical content than  R  and  T , respectively.  It 
is this question I am concerned with here, and for the points I wish to make we can get by 
with clear cut cases of content comparison, or at least with cases that it would be difficult to 
interpret as unfavourable to the points I wish to make. 
 
What, then, is the relation, at least in a clear cut case, between ad hocnessp and empirical 
content?  If a hypothesis or theory is ad hocp , and thus logically equivalent to its 
explanandum, it will have the same empirical content as that explanandum.  Thus, if one 
demands that a theory not be ad hocp, one should demand that it have more empirical 
content than its explanandum.  But how is this relevant to the demand that a replacement 
theory should have more empirical content than the theory it would replace?  The short 
answer is that it is not.  If one equivocates about the referent for 'not independently testable' 
in 'ad hocp', however, one may easily come to believe otherwise.  T'  may thus be held to be 
ad hocp  if it is not independently testable of  T,  or, as in the case of Musgrave's account of 
the Newton-Hall theory, if it is falsely believed to be not independently testable of  T. 104  
Thus Popper would bolster his demand for greater empirical content in replacement theories 
by claiming or suggesting that it is a way of avoiding ad hocnessp.  The equivocation on 
which this suggestion rests is discernible, for example, in the following passage: 
At any time t, the theoretician will be especially interested in finding the best testable of the 
competing theories in order to submit it to new tests.  I have shown that this will at the 
same time be the one with the greatest information content [or empirical  content] and the 
greatest explanatory power.  It will be the theory most worthy of being submitted to new 
tests, in brief 'the best'' of the theories competing at time t. . . .  In what has just been said 
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about 'the best'' theory it is assumed that a good theory is not ad hoc.  The idea of ad 
hocness and its opposite, which may perhaps be termed 'boldness', are very important.  Ad 
hoc explanations are explanations which are not independently testable; independently, that 
is, of the effect to be explained.105 
Clearly  T'  can be less testable or bold than  T  without being logically equivalent to  the 
latter's explanandums. 
 
Since the requirement that an explanation not be circular is obviously not a reason for 
requiring that a novel theory (or observation statement) should have more empirical content 
than that which it replaces, why should we go along with this requirement of Popper's? 
 
Consider, firstly, the practice of rejecting the antecedent, beginning with this simple case.  
Suppose we reject  
X  is a penguin with a dark coloured front, R1, 
for 
X  is a penguin with a light coloured front, R3.   
Intuitively,  R3  does not have more empirical content than  R1 , but an equivalent amount.  
Yet clearly there need be nothing unscientific or irrational about replacing  R1  with  R3.  
Perhaps we simply made a mistake in accepting  R1  in the first place. (We probably did; so 
far as we know, there are no penguins with dark coloured fronts.) 
 
Musgrave has noticed this point too, and promptly makes an ad hoc adjustment to Popper's 
requirement.  In considering the case of Uranus's deviant orbit, he says: 
The revised Newtonian system of Leverrier and Adams, which led to the discovery of 
Neptune, was not more falsifiable than its predecessor (which implies that no new planet 
would be found at the calculated position).  The difference between the two systems lay in 
their degrees or [of] corroboration, not their degrees of testability.  And we certainly do not 
want to exclude the revised system as being ad hoc, so we must adopt the weaker definition 
of ad hocness [that the revised system should not be less testable than its predecessor].106 
The analysis of this case is not quite correct, however, for the original system implies only 
that no new planet which sensibly perturbs Uranus would be found at the calculated 
position.  The calculation of a planetary orbit takes no account of any body which does not, 
or would not, have any sensible effect on the planet concerned.  (The moon, for example, 
has no such effect on Uranus and so was not included in the calculations of Leverrier or 
Adams, but it does not follow that either astronomer was thereby denying the existence of 
the moon.)  For all that, Musgrave would be correct if he were to think that, 
 
 
  
  
 
94 
The sum of the planets sensibly perturbing Uranus is  n ,  A1,  
has an equivalent empirical content to 
The sum of the planets sensibly perturbing Uranus is  n + 1,  A2.  
A2  does not assert more about the causes of Uranus's perturbations than  A1  does, even 
though it does assert that there are more such causes. 
 
What Musgrave does not mention is that Popper provides an account - one that is both 
sketchy and misleading - of why he believes Leverrier's (or Adams's) system does have 
more empirical content than its predecessor.  Popper says: 
A prima facie falsification may be evaded, . . . as in the Uranus/Neptune sort of case, by the 
introduction of testable auxiliary hypotheses, so that the empirical content of the system - 
consisting of the original theory plus the auxiliary hypothesis - is greater than that of the 
original system.  We may regard this as an increase of informative content - as a case of 
growth in our knowledge.107 
This argument involves, as Musgrave would concede, a slide from the idea of increased 
empirical content to the idea of increased empirical knowledge.  It takes advantage of the 
fact that in the case mentioned our empirical knowledge did increase to convince us that so 
too did the empirical content of the relevant system of beliefs or acceptances. Positioned 
between Popper's claims about empirical content and empirical knowledge is the ideal 
banana peel - a claim about increased informative content.  'Informative content' is a Popper-
synonym for 'empirical content' and it is misleadingly suggestive of truth.  Indeed, Popper 
all but identifies informative content with knowledge in the passage quoted above.  If this 
seems an uncharitable reading of his argument, why are we not told what he takes "the 
original system" to consist of?  We can infer that it includes "the original theory" but if there 
is no more to it than that why distinguish system from theory?  Does Popper believe there is 
more?  Since he does not describe the new system as a modification of the old, nor mention 
that one auxiliary proposition,  A1 , had to make way for another,  A2 , are we to believe that 
we have only to conjoin  A2  to the original system to form the new system of Leverrier's?  
At first glance, the empirical content of such a system may seem greater than that of the 
original.  But all that would be achieved by this move would be to produce a system which, 
because it still contained  A1 , had no empirical content at all for  A2  is inconsistent with  
A1 , and a contradiction does not imply anything about the world. 
 
Yet even if one recognizes that  A2  replaced  A1 , one can still overlook the logical 
consequences that the original system has that the new system does not, and so mistakenly 
conclude that the latter has more empirical content than the former.  John Worrall, for 
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example, does so, and implies that such an increase in empirical content is a sine qua non of 
the scientific approach to anomalies, and an object lesson to Marxists.  He says: 
The 1846 Newtonian does not content himself . . . with the claim that the irregularities in 
Uranus's orbit do not refute Newtonian theory, but rather some (unspecified) auxiliary or 
observational assumption.  Nor even with simply specifying the faulty auxiliary assumption 
and replacing it with a new assumption.  Instead he replaces the faulty assumption with a 
new assumption of a special kind - one which makes the new total theory capable of 
receiving genuine support from more facts than the previous total theory.  Here, of course, 
one extra empirical prediction concerned the existence of a hitherto unknown planet.   
 
This prediction was subsequently confirmed.  Thus the Newtonian's shift was from one set 
of assumptions to another set which received support from more facts; whereas the 
Marxist's shift was to a set of assumptions which was incapable of receiving support from 
more facts than its predecessor. (Emphasis mine.)108 
 
Like Popper, Worrall conflates '(logically) capable of receiving more support' with 
'receiving more support' above.  This is, presumably, at least in part why he and Popper 
overlook some of the logical consequences of the original system, though this oversight may 
also be due to the fact that  A1  was a tacit assumption whereas  A2  was a novel and public 
hypothesis, one that was spectacularly confirmed.  The view of science Worrall and Popper 
think that such cases support has the absurd consequence that when an anomaly is due to 
some error in the calculations (as it partly was in this case) then merely to correct this error 
is not sufficient for doing science. 
 
If rejecting the antecedent can be rational when the empirical content of  R'  is equivalent to 
that of  R , is it not possible for it to be rational if  R'  has even less content than  R ?  Is 
Musgrave's ad hoc move to his "weaker definition of ad hocness" reasonable?  Consider the 
following case.  Suppose we are using remote cameras to study a penguin rookery and we 
accept:  
X  is a penguin with both a dark coloured front and back, R2  
which would refute, 
All penguins have light coloured fronts and dark coloured backs, T2. 
We then discover that the film which enabled us to make  R2  was defective.  A search of all 
our reliable photographs yields only 
X  is a penguin with a light coloured front, R3.  
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 Perhaps we even return to the rookery, when we are eventually able to do so, but cannot 
find  X.  What would be irrational in rejecting  R2  for  R3  (especially as, for all we know,  
T2  is true, and it is therefore antecedently probable that  R2  is false)? 
 
Let us turn now to the practice of rejecting the consequent, beginning with some cases where 
the empirical content of  T'  is equivalent to that of  T. 
 
The Newton-Hall theory has an empirical content that is intuitively equivalent to that of the 
law of gravitation.  Both universal generalisations purport to describe the gravitational 
attraction between any two masses.  One does not need to believe that the Newton-Hall 
theory would have been a suitable replacement for Newton's law, however, in order to 
accept the general point that it can be rational to change one's mind about the relation 
between certain variables, even though the empirical content of one's changed belief in this 
regard is no greater, or smaller, than that of one's previous belief.   
 
We can even discover that some variable we previously overlooked, or had no knowledge 
of, is relevant, without  T'  then having or requiring more empirical content than  T.  For 
example, compare:  
All Red Winged Parrots have black backs, T4, 
with  
All male Red Winged Parrots have black backs and all female Red Winged 
Parrots have green backs, T5, 
and 
All mature male Red Winged Parrots have black backs and all immature or 
female Red Winged Parrots have green backs, T6. 
The world would be a simpler place if, other things being equal,  T4  were true rather than  
T5  or  T6 , though for all we know  T6  is true.  T4  is intuitively simpler than T5  and, in 
turn,  T6 , but we should not confuse simplicity with empirical content.  T4  intuitively says 
as much about the world as do either  T5  or  T6.  It is true that, say,  T6  implies that back 
colour in Red Winged Parrots is a function of both sex and age but it does not follow that it 
has more empirical content than, say,  T4 , since  T4  denies that back colour in this species is 
a function of either of these two variables. 
 
To return to the Newton-Hall theory, Musgrave is in a further bind in respect of this theory 
for he describes it as "artificial and ad hoc" in the very paper where he proposes his "weaker 
definition of ad hocness", on which it is not thus ad hoc.109  Musgrave gets into this bind 
purely because he equivocates between a technical sense of 'ad hoc' and the ordinary 
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pejorative sense of that word.  But it is indicative of how deeply embedded this equivocation 
is in his thought that he can fail to notice both that the theory does not have less empirical 
content than Newton's law and that it is independently testable of this law. 
 
What, then, if  T'  has less  empirical content than  T ?  Chalmers considers the old adage, 
'Bread nourishes',  T7 , and says: 
This low-level theory, if spelt out in more detail, amounts to the claim that if wheat is 
grown in the normal way, converted into bread in the normal way and eaten by humans in a 
normal way, then those humans will be nourished.  This apparently innocuous theory ran 
into trouble in a French village on an occasion when wheat was grown in a normal way, 
converted into bread in a normal way and yet most people who ate the bread became 
seriously ill and many died.  The theory, "(All) bread nourishes" was falsified.  The theory 
can be modified to avoid this falsification by adjusting it to read, "(All) bread, with the 
exception of that particular batch of bread produced in the French village in question, 
nourishes."  This is an ad hoc modification.  The modified theory cannot be tested in any 
way that was not also a test of the original theory.  The consuming of any bread by any 
human constitutes a test of the original theory, whereas tests of the modified theory are 
restricted to the consuming of bread other than that batch of bread that led to such 
disastrous results in France.  The modified hypothesis is less falsifiable than the original 
version.  The falsificationist rejects such rearguard actions.110 
Chalmers is right that his "modified theory",  T8 , is less falsifiable than  T7 , but is that a 
fatal or even a significant objection to it?  Is that what is wrong with  T8 ? 
 
A practitioner would accept  T8  only because he or she already accepted, 
The particular batch of bread produced in the French village in question did 
not nourish, R7. 
Now the conjunction of  T8  and  R7  is not less falsifiable than  T7.  Moreover, it is 
intuitively closer to the truth or empirically more adequate than  T7  for in only one case 
does  T8 & R7  entail something different about the nutritional value of a batch of bread than 
does  T7 , and in that case the former entailment is true whilst the latter is false.  Chalmers is 
concerned that if  T7  is replaced by a theory that is less falsifiable than itself, "scientific 
progress" will be thwarted.111  But  T7  would be replaced by  T8 & R7  (or rather the belief 
that  T7  would be replaced by the belief that  T8 & R7)  so how would progress be thwarted?  
The former belief is not less falsifiable than the latter, and it is empirically more adequate to 
boot. 
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On Laudan's analysis of this sort of case, cited earlier (p. 56), he would presumably approve 
of a theory like  T8  provided that the scientists who employed it were also prepared to risk 
some semantic confusion, not to mention people's lives, by saying, 'All bread nourishes,' 
whenever they meant what 'All bread, with the exception of that particular batch of bread 
produced in the French village in question, nourishes' means in ordinary English. 
 
The modest aim of  T8  is to preserve the considerable predictive success of  T7  whilst 
avoiding its one dreadful failure, and in this aim  T8  is successful.  But in the light of the 
events in that French village there is obviously something fishy about any theory, whatever 
its retrodictive adequacy, whose predictive consequences are indistinguishable from 'All 
bread nourishes'. 
 
To grasp what is wrong with  T8 , however, we need to distinguish accidental from law-like 
generalisations.  Causal or physical laws, or law-like generalisations, are universal 
generalisations, but they are not merely universal generalisations.  Chalmers's original 
theory,  T7 , once "spelt out" along the lines he indicates, does purport to describe a causal 
regularity, namely, that if bread is baked and consumed in the traditional manner this is 
causally sufficient to nourish the human beings concerned.  What the French village incident 
teaches us is that this is false.  Anyone who asserts T8 , however, even though it might be 
true, has not learnt this lesson.  The fact that the batch of bread concerned was baked on 
some day in a French village is accidental.  It is no more causally relevant than, say, the fact 
that the bread was baked 5000 kilometres from the nearest mono-lingual Chinese market 
gardener whose name rhymes with the name of that French village.  That is not why this 
bread did not nourish.  An accidental generalisation such as  T8  implies that if bread were 
baked and consumed just as it was in that French village - including the presence of the 
disease, ergot, in the grain, which was the cause of the suffering and death of those villagers 
- it would yet nourish those who consume it.  This implication is both counter-intuitive and, 
should one believe it, potentially lethal. 
 
An instructive example of how reduction in empirical content from  T  to  T' , and in turn to  
T" ,  T"' , and so on, is a feature of some important cases of scientific progress, however, is 
that of Hooke's (so-called) law of elastic behaviour.   
 
As a result of his cogitations on the springiness of certain bodies and, in particular, his 
experiments in loading and unloading helical wire springs and long straight wires, Robert 
Hooke formulated his sweeping generalisation, 'ut tensio sic vis' or 'As the extension, so the 
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force', which he published in 1679.112  This generalisation is still known, simply, as 
'Hooke's law'. 
 
Now even if we assume that Hooke had in mind only elastic materials loaded within their 
breaking stresses, the behaviour of such materials is not always in accordance with Hooke's 
law (or Hookean) in some rather obvious ways.113  Elastic materials can have a simple set of 
forces applied to them such that they behave as a plastic material would in that they do not 
recover their shape when those forces are removed.114  Think, for example, of how a 
teaspoon can be bent, or indeed how one of Hooke's springs would have been made.  
Moreover, complex structures like bridges or trees do not behave in a Hookean manner, 
though Hooke apparently believed otherwise.115  And even in the case of a simple structure 
like a spring which, in general, does, Hooke was relying on an unstated analogy between a 
spring and a wire - for in the case of a spring it is the structure which is stretched whereas in 
the case of a wire it is the material itself.   
 
But even if Hooke's law is modified to take account of such objections, there are important 
limits to the behaviour of elastic materials loaded in just the way Hooke envisaged.  I 
mention two:  elastic limit and fatigue limit. 
 
Early in the nineteenth century it was discovered that various elastic materials have a 
limiting stress beyond which those materials behave plastically, and so Hooke's linear 
relation between force and extension no longer holds.116  This limiting stress of an elastic 
material is called its elastic limit.  Secondly, at about the same time, according to J.E. 
Gordon,  
It began to be noticed that the moving parts of machinery would sometimes break at loads 
and stresses which would have been perfectly safe in a stationary component [and were 
safe earlier in the life of those same parts].  This was especially dangerous in railway trains 
whose axles would sometimes break off suddenly and for no apparent reason after they had 
been in service for a time.  The effect soon became known as 'fatigue'.117 
Presumably, the Ancients had been acquainted with the effects of fatigue in soft metals, but 
as a topic of scientific interest the study of fatigue dates from only the middle of last century.  
What we now know is that the breaking stress of an elastic material reduces with the number 
of stress reversals the material undergoes, that is, with the number of times the material is 
stressed and unstressed.  The curve of the breaking stress of an elastic material against the 
number of stress reversals that material has undergone describes its fatigue limit.  In some 
materials, such as steel, this curve flattens out after a time but in others, such as aluminium, 
it does not - as the Comet aircraft disasters of the early 1950s tragically demonstrated.118 
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In the case of Hooke's law, then, scientific progress has come about, contra Popper, by 
continual reductions, over a long period, in the empirical content of the scientific 
community's belief in the Hookean behaviour of materials.  Similarly, in the case of the 
poisoned bread, whereas it was once believed that bread had only to be baked in the 
traditional manner for it to nourish, we now think that a means of preventing grain from 
becoming ergot infected, or similarly diseased, is also needed.  So the class of potential 
falsifiers for what we now believe are causally sufficient conditions for nourishing bread is 
smaller than the class of potential falsifiers for the corresponding belief of those French 
villagers.  Their belief can be falsified whether a means of preventing ergot infection is part 
of the process by which a batch of bread is made or not;  our belief can be falsified only if 
such a means is a part of that process. 
 
Such cases are not isolated and they are a consequence of our behaving, in part, just as 
Popper would have us do - formulating bold conjectures, well beyond the available 
evidence, as in Hooke's case.  To suppose that it is a backward step to assert T'  rather than  
T , because in so doing we are asserting less about the world, is to devalue truth and to 
overlook that our knowledge has advanced on other fronts.  We know a good deal more 
about the non-Hookean behaviour of materials than Hooke ever did, or about the dangers of 
traditional bread making practices that those French villagers were unfortunately blind to.   
 
None of this, however, is to deny that if, say, two fields of inquiry, such as celestial 
mechanics and terrestrial mechanics, are unified, then some unified theory will not have 
more empirical content than any theory in either of the original fields.  Even so, it does not 
follow, assuming the sums can be done, that the bodies of accepted theory in those fields 
have together less empirical content than the new body of unified theory. 
 
In her review of the Popperian approach to theory appraisal, Noretta Koertge asks the 
pertinent question: 
What's so wonderful about theories with high content?  Why, other things such as truth 
status being equal, should scientists give a higher mark to stronger theories? 
Koertge immediately replies, giving Popper's primary reason for valuing such theories: 
One answer is trivial - such theories, if true, are more informative.119 
But this answer cannot be trivial, that is, trivially correct, because Koertge has reneged on 
her ceteris paribus commitment.  She fails to keep the very thing equal, namely, truth status, 
she chose to illustrate what does need to be kept equal.  The advantage that Koertge, and 
Popper, would secure from not doing so is that if  T'  is true and has more empirical content 
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than  T  then, other things being equal,  T'  is  a better theory than  T.  This is so either 
because  T  is false, or in case T  is true because in asserting  T'  we are asserting more about 
the world that is true than if we were to assert  T.  Popper glosses over this flaw when, for 
example, he falsely implies above (p. 93) that greater empirical content implies greater 
explanatory power or that the best testable theory is the best theory.  Truth or more truth, not 
more empirical content, is what makes  T'  better than  T  here.  The fact that  T'  has more 
empirical content than  T  is not even part of the reason why  T'  is better than  T.  p  need 
not be a reason, much less a good reason, for something just because  q  is a good reason for 
that thing and  p  is a logical consequence of  q.  For example, if I return some empty soft 
drink bottles to a shop for the deposit on them I no longer own those bottles.  But whilst it 
may be a good thing from the point of view of my household finances or storage space, or 
my desire to preserve the ecology of some distant sand island, that I return those bottles, it 
does not follow that it is a good thing, either from my point of view or from anybody else's, 
that I no longer own those bottles. 
 
Koertge remarks elsewhere, in an analysis of how to deal with the Duhem-Quine problem, 
that "by always replacing bits of a system with new parts which are at least as testable as the 
old we insure that we don't lose ground in our search for comprehensive explanatory 
theories".120  The point is, however, that if we need to replace such bits then the ground 
cannot already have been won.  Moreover, Koertge does not point out that the more 
empirical content we demand from a replacement candidate the more chance there is that, 
other things being equal, it will be false.  Popper does do so, however, and tries to make a 
virtue out of this necessity, claiming there is thus more chance of our making a discovery - 
the discovery that the replacement candidate is false.121  This is true;  but it is of little, if 
any, comfort, for our aim is not to find theories which do not explain what we want 
explained.  Moreover, the fact that the replacement candidate with the most empirical 
content will have the most testable consequences need not dispose us, even if other things 
are equal, to select it for testing, notwithstanding Popper's extravagant claims to the 
contrary.  Suppose that  T'  has more empirical content than  T".  If  T'  entails  T"   (and is 
not logically equivalent to it) there are two kinds of tests we can perform on these two 
theories:  those which test both  T'  and  T" , and those which test  T'  alone.  Why should we 
always prefer to conduct the latter tests?  Furthermore, other things may not be equal.  Both  
T'  and  T"  may be inconsistent with some other theory we hold, or many people may hold  
T"  whilst few even entertain  T' , or the latter tests may be less convenient to conduct than 
the former. 
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The basic fact that scientific knowledge has been continually growing for a long time lends 
Popper's view a superficial attractiveness or plausibility for it follows from this fact that the 
empirical content of what is known to science has been continually growing for a long time.  
But this is consistent, as I have attempted to show, with some, indeed many, replacement 
theories or observation statements having less or no more empirical content than their 
predecessors. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The Problem of Uranus's Orbit: A Case Study of the 
So-Called Practice of Avoidance of Refutation 
 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The discovery of Neptune in September 1846 from a prediction based on the belief that there 
were residual or unexplained perturbations in the orbit of Uranus is a case that is often raised 
in the discussion of Popper's methodology.  At the very least, it would seem to be an 
unfavourable one for him.  The manifest failure of successive attempts to predict the motion 
of Uranus did not lead to the refutation of the law of gravitation, yet significant scientific 
progress obviously did result.  How is Popper to account for this? 
 
I shall begin by examining how Popper avoids this issue (3.2).  He retreats from  SPF  to  
WPF  in this as in other such cases, claiming here that the counter-argument from Uranus's 
residuals (that is, the discrepancies between the planet's predicted and observed positions) 
constituted a "prima facie falsification" of the law of gravitation, or that the motion of 
Uranus was "prima facie non-Newtonian".1  Many have unthinkingly accepted this pseudo-
scientific claim of Popper's.2  This claim is pseudo-scientific because it is not based on any 
consideration of the support, or lack of it, for some of the premises in the above counter-
argument.  I shall therefore discuss the history of the problem of Uranus's orbit and the 
probable cause of its residuals (3.3).  I try to show that if one does consider the support for at 
least one of the said premises (3.4), it is such that one should conclude that Newton's law 
was not prima facie or apparently refuted and, in general, this has been the view of 
astronomers (3.5).  I conclude with some general remarks about how anomalies are 
rationally dealt with in science, as in everyday life (3.6).  
 
 
3.2  Popper's Rhetoric 
 
Popper says that he has discussed this case "many times" in his lectures.3  It is mentioned or 
briefly discussed on only a few occasions in his published work, however, with the 
following passage from "Replies" being his most detailed account: 
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There is one important method of avoiding or evading refutations:  it is the method of 
auxiliary hypotheses or ad hoc hypotheses.   
 
If any of our conjectures goes wrong - if, for example, the planet Uranus does not move 
exactly as Newton's theory demands - then we have to change the theory.  But there are in 
the main two kinds of changes;  conservative and revolutionary.  And among the more 
conservative changes there are again two: ad hoc hypotheses and auxiliary hypotheses. 
 
In the case of the disturbances in the motion of Uranus the adopted hypothesis was partly 
revolutionary:  what was conjectured was the existence of a new planet, something which 
did not affect Newton's laws of motion, but which did affect the much older "system of the 
world".  The new conjecture was auxiliary rather than ad hoc:  for although there was only 
this one ad hoc reason for introducing it, it was independently testable:  the position of the 
new planet (Neptune) was calculated, the planet was discovered optically, and it was found 
that it fully explained the anomalies  of Uranus.  Thus the auxiliary hypothesis stayed 
within the Newtonian theoretical framework, and the threatened refutation was transformed 
into a resounding success.4 
 
Popper also remarks that "because a number of . . . critics appear not to have understood" his 
position, he has tried "very carefully" above to restate it.5  One can only agree that he does 
just that.  Popper would have us believe that the refutation of major theories is easy, and 
Strong Popperian Falsificationism (SPF), if it were true, would make that so.  Since this case 
is an obvious counter-example to SPF, however, Popper has to settle for the next best thing - 
Weak Popperian Falsificationism (WPF).  But he does not do so easily.  In the first sentence 
of the second paragraph above, he reaffirms  SPF  even though he is about to attempt to 
explain how astronomers were not forced to change Newton's theory, but rather an 
assumption about a set of forces - on a body unknown to Newton.  Shortly after the passage 
cited above, Popper even spells out Newton's theory as "his laws of motion plus his law of 
gravitation" - propositions which all concerned know were not changed. 
 
But one fallacy can obscure another and Popper equivocates in the second paragraph above 
between 'theory' and 'theoretical framework' or 'theoretical system', that is, between  T  and  
(T & A).  His suggestion that changes can be either conservative or revolutionary is the 
means by which this equivocation is concealed.  He begins by alluding to changes to 
theories in these terms and ends by describing changes to auxiliary propositions, via ad hocp 
or auxiliary hypotheses, as "among the more conservative".  The distinction between 
'conservative' and 'revolutionary' is left vague and this helps to obscure the equivocation by 
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enabling him to describe the auxiliary hypothesis in question as "partly revolutionary", 
which in another sense perhaps it was. 
 
On  WPF, the counter-argument for Newton's theory from Uranus's residuals would be a 
prima facie falsification, as Popper himself describes it elsewhere.  Popper's talk above of 
this counter-argument as a "threatened refutation" amounts to the same thing, for a weak 
counter-argument does not pose any threat of refutation.  Whenever 
 R  -->  ~T 
is a prima facie refutation or a strong counter-argument, however, then the grounds for 
believing that  R  is true must be strong, and any case in which  R  did turn out to be false 
would be untypical.  Thus WPF goes a long way towards explaining why Popper is 
untroubled by this case, or ones like it.  For we do not typically avoid accepting the 
conclusions of strong arguments, setting out instead to overturn them.  It would clearly be 
irrational to do so.  If we did succeed in overturning 
 R  -->  ~T 
with 
 R'  -->  ~R 
are we then to turn around and try to overturn this would-be refutation with 
 R"  -->  ~R' 
and so on?  Furthermore, if one insists upon associating a hypothesis such as the trans-
Uranian planet hypothesis with ad hocp hypotheses, this association only reinforces the 
impression that inventing such a hypothesis is a barely rational activity, untypical of science.  
It does not matter that Popper agrees that in this case the hypothesis was a "resounding 
success", for we can always be lucky. 
 
In addition to the doctrine of  WPF , there are two rhetorical devices Popper commonly 
employs in such cases, and both are in evidence above. Both focus attention on the possible 
counter-argument for  T  from  ~(T & A)  so that the possible counter-argument for  A  is 
thereby ignored. 
 
The first device is Popper's habitual use of expressions such as 'avoiding or evading 
refutations' when he means 'avoiding or evading refutations of  T'.  The effect of this ellipsis 
or meaning shift is to obscure the fact that in the cases he describes something is refuted, 
namely, A.  Popper is simply not interested in counter-arguments or refutations of the sort, 
 R'  -->  ~R 
but only in those of the sort, 
 R  -->  ~T 
  
  
 
113 
The discovery of Neptune, however, refuted the proposition that the residuals of Uranus 
were caused only by previously known bodies, a point which is often not understood.6 
 
Popper's second device, which reinforces the first, is his habit of employing euphemisms for 
'refute' and its cognates whenever  A  is refuted.  With some notable exceptions, Popper has 
no qualms about saying of a refuted prediction, theoretical system, or theory, that it has been 
refuted, because his falsificationism depends for its plausibility upon his doing so.  Equally, 
however, it depends upon his denying or glossing over the refutation of auxiliary 
propositions.  Were he to say that  A  was refuted this would only jog the reader to ask, 
'Why, then, was  T  threatened with refutation?'  So Popper shifts or resorts to euphemisms 
such as 'affected', 'held responsible', 'blamed', 'called into question', and the like, whenever 
an auxiliary proposition is refuted.7  He further distances himself from admitting that this 
was so above by describing a consequence of  A  as 'affected', rather than  A  itself.  What 
concerned astronomers in this case, however, was that they were wrong about the number of 
planets sensibly perturbing Uranus, not that they were wrong about a consequence of this 
proposition, namely, the number of planets in the solar system.8  Popper's suggestion that the 
hypothesis of a planet exterior to Uranus merely "stayed within the Newtonian theoretical 
framework" falls short of implying that this hypothesis replaced an existing belief or 
assumption in that framework, an implication which, if it were made obvious, would only 
draw attention to the fact that this belief was replaced because it was refuted. 
 
 
3.3  The Problem of Uranus's Orbit and its Probable Cause 
 
I have claimed that Popper, and others, believe that the counter-argument for the law of 
gravitation from the residuals in the orbit of Uranus constituted a prima-facie refutation of 
this law only because they presuppose  WPF.  But perhaps this argument, unbeknownst to 
them, was a prima facie refutation.  Was there even at least more reason to suppose that the 
law of gravitation was false rather than some auxiliary proposition?  Musgrave claims that, 
at the time, it had "seemed a defeat" for the law.9  Is that true?  Did it seem that way to 
either Leverrier or Adams?  Were these two astronomers trying to rescue one of their 
fundamental beliefs, to show that an apparent defeat of the law of gravitation was nothing 
more than that?  I shall try to provide, in this section and the next two, reasons for believing 
that these claims are false, that the answer to these questions - epistemic or historical - is 
'no'.  I begin with an examination of the problem of Uranus's orbit.  
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On March 13, 1781, William Herschel observed what he recorded in his journal of 
observations as "a curious either nebulous star [planetary nebula] or perhaps a comet".10  It 
was in fact the seventh planet, Uranus. 
 
Various attempts over the next twenty years or so to construct satisfactory tables for the 
planet met with some success, but it was transient.11  Alexis Bouvard took up this problem 
in 1820 and published his tables in the following year.12  By then, at least seventeen pre-
discovery or so-called ancient observations of the planet had been recovered in searches of 
astronomers' records.13  With the post-discovery or so-called modern observations, 
Bouvard's data covered one and a half revolutions of the planet.  He could find no orbit that 
was remotely satisfactory, however, and he took the simple expedient of rejecting all the 
ancient observations (though, as was later shown, they were not inaccurate).14  Even so, 
Bouvard's tables could accommodate the modern observations only "moderately well", the 
largest discrepancy being nine seconds of arc.15  Moreover, it was implausible to suppose 
that each of the four astronomers responsible for the ancient observations should have been 
prone to quite uncharacteristic errors whenever they happened to observe Uranus.16  In any 
event, before the end of the decade, observations of the planet showed significant disparities 
with Bouvard's tables.17  In 1832, George Airy, later Astronomer Royal, reported that 
Uranus was half a minute behind its tabular position.18  The planet continued to fall steadily 
further behind and by 1844 the discrepancy was two minutes.19  The standard of accuracy 
for planetary theory at the time approached the limits of observational error, which itself was 
of the order of just a few seconds of arc.20  So clearly there was something wrong 
somewhere. 
 
Urbain J.J. Leverrier took up this pressing problem in the summer of 1845.  He had by then 
"earned a reputation as a gifted analyst", one well suited to such a task;21 and by all accounts 
his analysis of this problem was meticulous.22  Before the end of that year, Leverrier 
published his first paper on Uranus in which he overhauled Bouvard's tables and succeeded 
in reducing the above discrepancy considerably.23  Even so, the revised tables were still in 
error by "more than forty seconds of arc" for the opposition of 1845.  Moreover, since these 
tables took no account of the ancient observations, Leverrier was convinced that, amongst 
other things, there were residual perturbations in the orbit of Uranus, since the law of 
gravitation was manifestly well supported.24 
 
John Couch Adams had formed the same conviction much earlier and arrived at his first 
solution to the problem of Uranus's orbit, based on the hypothesis of an exterior planet, in 
1843, soon after he graduated from Cambridge at the age of twenty-three.25  Adams later 
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acquired the reputation of a consummate theoretical astronomer.26  Before the discovery of 
Neptune, however, or rather before the controversy this discovery precipitated, he was 
relatively unknown, though evidently extraordinarily talented.27  It was a missed 
opportunity that his calculations did not lead to the discovery of Neptune before Leverrier's 
first paper on Uranus was published.28 
 
In June 1846, Leverrier published his second paper on the problem in which he concluded 
that, amongst other things, for the entire range of observations, ancient and modern, once the 
perturbations due to Jupiter and Saturn had been removed - the other known planets have no 
sensible effect on Uranus - there was no ellipse that would satisfy these observations, even 
on the most favourable distribution of errors in them.29  As Leverrier put it: 
I have demonstrated . . . a formal incompatibility between the observations of Uranus and 
the hypothesis that this planet is subject only to the action of the sun and of other [known] 
planets acting in accordance with the principle of universal gravitation.30 
 
Thus, we can agree with Popper that at least with the publication of Leverrier's second paper 
an instance of  (T & A)  has been refuted.  But Leverrier was not then obliged to argue: 
 (~(T & A) & A)  -- >  ~T 
If there was no good reason to believe that  A  is true then, notwithstanding Leverrier's 
demonstration, there was no good reason to believe, as Putnam in general recognizes, that  T  
is false.31  And it so happens that in this instance  A  was not well supported or corroborated, 
as there was very little support for the proposition that Uranus's sensible perturbations were 
caused solely by known bodies. (If one does not know or assume that the set of forces on a 
planet is complete one cannot predict its position.) It had been convenient in the first 
instance to assume that this set of forces was complete.  Moreover, there was no good reason 
at the time to believe or assume otherwise.  But that is all.  Why, then, had it been merely a 
convenient assumption rather than a reasonable belief that the known sensible influences on 
the motion of Uranus were the only such influences? 
 
Let us concede that astronomers did have good reason to believe that there were no such 
non-gravitational influences on Uranus.  Some had suggested, for example, that the residuals 
of Uranus would be explained if the planet had collided with a suitable comet around the 
time of its discovery.32  Such a collision would have dislodged the planet from its original 
orbit and so two ellipses would be needed to account for its motion.  But Leverrier had 
finally put paid to this suggestion by showing that no ellipse would satisfy even the modern 
observations.  Others had revived Descartes' speculation about a cosmic fluid, claiming that 
such a fluid would offer some measure of resistance to the planet's motion.33  But there were 
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no discernible effects of such a fluid, as W.M. Smart notes, under "much more favourable 
circumstances" elsewhere in the solar system.34 
 
There were also good theoretical or empirical reasons for disbelieving in the existence of 
many such possible gravitational influences.  For example, a planet of an appropriate mass 
in the region of Saturn would also produce significant perturbations in Saturn's orbit which 
had not been detected.  Moreover, it was very probable that any such planet would already 
have been noticed.  A planet in the region of Uranus itself, or a satellite of it, would not 
produce perturbations such as those detected, and a satellite would need to be so massive it 
could scarcely have escaped detection since 1781.  Finally, a planet far beyond Uranus 
would likewise need to be so massive it would produce sensible perturbations once again in 
the orbit of Saturn, for its distance from Saturn would be comparable with its distance from 
Uranus.35 
 
There was no theoretical objection to a planet, or planets, located at some intermediate 
distance beyond Uranus, however, and the proposition that no such planet existed was then 
untested.  No search for a trans-Uranian planet was planned or begun until at least 1845, and 
only then by those entertaining the possibility that Uranus had residual perturbations caused 
by this unknown planet.36  The important remaining question, then, is what was the 
probability that a suitable trans-Uranian planet - that is, one capable of producing the 
Uranian residuals Leverrier had precisely described - would already have been discovered 
by chance?  
 
 
3.4  The Low Probability of a Chance Discovery of a Trans-Uranian 
Planet Prior to 1846 
 
Whilst it is impossible to be definitive about this probability, for our purposes we do not 
need to be.  I shall argue only that the probability of such a discovery was then, if not 
remote, at least sufficiently low that there was no good reason to believe that Jupiter and 
Saturn were the only sensible forces on Uranus, apart from the Sun.  Some people outside 
the scientific community, however, were obviously bemused by the fact that Neptune had 
not been discovered much earlier, as Figure 1 illustrates. 
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 Figure  1.  The Discovery of Neptune. 
Cartoon by Cham (Le Charivari, January 1, 1847).  Reprinted from Camille Flammarion, 
The Flammarion Book of Astronomy, trans. Annabel and Bernard Pagel (London:  George 
Allen and Unwin, 1964), p. 321. 
 
I can find no astronomer or historian of science, including those who did not at the time 
support the hypothesis of a trans-Uranian planet, however, who has expressed any doubt or 
reservation that such a planet should hitherto have escaped detection.  This stands in marked 
contrast, for example, to the hypothesis of a large Uranian satellite. 
 
Before setting out to explain why this probability was so low, however, it is worth noting 
that the question we need to address here is not how probable it was that Neptune would 
already have been discovered by chance but how probable it was that, as I have put it above, 
a suitable trans-Uranian planet would.  There is a family of possible planets, or combinations 
of possible planets, any member of which could have caused the known residuals in the orbit 
of Uranus.  Some members of this family would have been easier to discover than Neptune 
while others would have been so dark, dense, and distant as to have been practically 
impossible to detect.  As it happens Neptune provides, if anything, a conservative example 
of the difficulties confronting such a discovery for it is not, as a member of this family, an 
inconspicuous planet. Neptune's albedo and density compare favourably with those of 
Uranus and the other Jovian planets,37 and its mean distance from the Sun of about 30 
Astronomical Units (AU) is appreciably less than that of any of the planets postulated by 
Leverrier or Adams.  Their mean distances range from more than 33 AU to almost 39 AU.38  
For our purpose, then, it is safe to employ Neptune as an example of a suitable trans-Uranian 
planet. 
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A good way of coming to understand the probability of such a discovery is to consider the 
circumstances surrounding the discovery of Uranus.  Uranus is a considerably less 
prominent or eye-catching planet than its interior neighbours, as Table 1 illustrates. 
 
Table  1 
The Relative Prominence of the Superior Planets to Uranus 
 
 Mean Opposition Magnitudea 
(Uranus = 1) 
Angular Diameter at 
Mean Distanceb  
(Uranus = 1) 
Mean Daily Apparent 
Motion (1970)c 
(Uranus = 1) 
    
Mars 1100 2 20 
Jupiter 1500 10 4 
Saturn 90 – 230 5 2 
Uranus 1 1 1 
 
Sources: Arthur P. Norton and J. Gall Inglis, A Star Atlas and  Reference Handbook for Students and 
Amateurs, 15th ed., ed. R.M.G. Inglis (Edinburgh:  Gall and Inglis, 1966), pp. 17a and 32b.  Ruth J. 
Northcott, ed., Observer's Handbook 1970, The Royal Astronomical Society of Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 28-30.c 
Note:  The apparent motion of a planet varies from one year to the next, and more so for a planet close 
to the Earth like Mars, but this variation is of no consequence here. 
 
But Uranus is by no means an inconspicuous object.  It is sufficiently bright as to be just 
visible to the naked eye in good conditions; yet it was not discovered for more than a 
century and a half after telescopes were in common use by astronomers.  The planet had 
been observed and recorded on a number of occasions before its discovery, as we have seen, 
but each time it was thought to have been a fixed star.  A.F.O'D. Alexander lists twenty-two 
such observations, by four good observers, and there may have even been more.39  Given 
the beliefs, aims, and instruments of such astronomers, or most of Herschel's 
contemporaries, however, it is not surprising that Uranus was not discovered earlier. 
 
In general, astronomers had believed or assumed that the solar system contained only those 
planets known to the Ancients.  For two months or so after its discovery, Uranus "received 
the attention of all the leading observers of Europe" but was widely accepted as a comet, 
even though that was not the most probable interpretation of its appearance.40  Herschel's 
belief that Uranus was a comet was in no small way the product of wishful thinking on his 
part, and he took longer than most to come around to the view that it was after all a planet.41 
In general, astronomers were more interested at the time in the foreground of the solar 
system, at least as it was then conceived, than in the background of the (so-called) fixed stars 
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from which Uranus would have to be prised.42  The further a planet is from an Earth bound 
observer the more it looks and behaves like a fixed star, and Uranus is, relatively speaking, a 
long way away.  Such interest as there was in this background lay principally in determining 
the positions of a limited number of stars to serve as a reference frame for planetary theory 
and observation, and for the practical purpose of navigation.43  The instruments and 
practices which developed to satisfy this aim were not conducive to the making of chance 
discoveries of planets, especially distant planets. 
 
A planet can be distinguished from a star either by its appearance or by its apparent motion 
relative to some neighbouring star, or to the celestial sphere.  (The celestial sphere is an 
imaginary sphere of infinite radius, centred on the Earth, onto which the stars and the 
apparent paths of the Sun and the other planets are projected.)  Planets characteristically 
have well defined discs and a steady light, although so too do some planetary nebulae and 
both Uranus and Neptune can be confused with such stars.44  (J.L.E. Dreyer remarks that 
had Herschel previously seen one of these stars he might well have missed discovering 
Uranus.)45  Furthermore, stars can readily give rise in the telescope to disc-like images 
(called spurious discs) and at the time of discovery of either Uranus or Neptune only a good 
telescope, employing a much higher power of magnification than was used for positional 
work, could have distinguished the two images in the case of either planet. The instruments 
of those astronomers who observed Uranus prior to its discovery were of poor optical 
quality, with objectives too small to magnify and resolve the planet's disc.46  
 
When Herschel discovered Uranus he was probably better placed than anyone else at the 
time to have done so.  He was a musician, doing astronomy in his spare time, and did not 
have the narrow interests of his professional counterparts.  As J.A. Bennett points out: 
Herschel approached the heavens in quite a different way.  His concern for sidereal 
astronomy as such led him to make telescopes suited to observing faint and distant objects, 
and his goals were light grasp and quality of definition. . . . Only with a fine telescope was 
Uranus noticeably nonstellar, and so likely to be sought out again for further 
investigation.47 
Whilst the optical quality of telescopes in general use improved considerably by the time 
Neptune was discovered, it requires a better telescope again to detect its disc for  Neptune is 
about six times duller than Uranus and a third its optical size.48  Many instruments in use in 
the first half of the nineteenth century could not have done so.49 
 
To illustrate his claim that scientific revolutions involve "transformations of vision", 
however, Kuhn remarks of the discovery of Uranus: 
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A celestial body that had been observed off and on for almost a century was seen 
differently after 1781 because, like an anomalous playing card [a black four of hearts, for 
example], it could no longer be fitted to the perceptual categories (star or comet) provided 
by the paradigm that had previously prevailed.50  
But the fact is that to these earlier astronomers Uranus would have been visually 
indistinguishable from a star.  Kuhn describes these astronomers as "eminent observers", and 
Pierre Lemonnier as "one of the best observers in this group".  He recounts Lemonnier's 
missed opportunity to discover Uranus saying that he had "actually seen the star on four 
successive nights . . . without noting the motion that could have suggested another 
identification".51  But if Lemonnier had discovered Uranus it would not have been by 
noticing a difference in the configuration of certain stars in his telescope from one day to 
another, but by noticing a difference in the configuration of certain numbers in his journal of 
observations for those days. 
 
Turning to the second means by which a planet could have been discovered - its apparent 
motion - positional astronomers were unlikely to notice any such motion.  The instruments 
that were the stock in trade of positional astronomy, such as the quadrants or transit 
instruments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the meridian circle of the 
nineteenth, are held fixed at some point on the meridian and the star field drifts across the 
field of view.  Lower powers of magnification are better suited to this work for they widen 
the field of view, slowing down the movement of stars across it.  The right ascension of a 
star, the celestial equivalent of longitude, is then measured by the time of transit of the star 
and its declination, the celestial equivalent of latitude, from a graduated arc or circle.  Under 
such conditions, no astronomer could detect the apparent motion of any body (nor, of 
course, the disc of a distant planet).  On the evening in 1756 when Tobias Mayer measured 
the position of Uranus, for example, he did the same for a hundred or so stars, in less than 
three and a half hours.52 
 
This is not to say that such a discovery was impossible for these astronomers.  Mayer 
returned more than once to the area where he had observed Uranus and remeasured "all stars 
of comparable magnitude in the same vicinity".53  So if he ever noticed that the body we call 
Uranus was missing he probably thought his only observation of the planet had been a 
mistake, or perhaps that he had observed a variable star.  But even in the unlikely event that  
he had thought otherwise, the search area for any such body would have soon become 
impossibly large.  Lemonnier observed Uranus, as Kuhn notes, four nights in succession in 
1769, but with no reason to examine his records it was only when Bouvard was searching 
for ancient sightings of the planet, in 1820 well after Lemonnier's death, that these 
observations came to light.54  One astronomer, however, did make a discovery of the sort 
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that Lemonnier at least had missed.  In 1801, Giovanni Piazzi discovered the first of the 
minor planets or asteroids, Ceres.55  Piazzi apparently took three evenings to convince 
himself of its motion.56  If that is so then had Ceres been Neptune it is doubtful that he 
would have formed this conviction for the mean apparent motion of Neptune is less than one 
quarter of the apparent motion of Ceres when it was noticed by Piazzi.57   
 
Finally, in the years to the discovery of Neptune there are no reports of astronomers puzzling 
over any potential ancient observations of some new planet. 
 
Anyone entertaining the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis was therefore entitled to conclude 
that there was no better than a slim chance that such a planet would already have been 
discovered by any positional astronomer.  This conclusion is supported not only by the 
above considerations of the practice of astronomy and the 'ancient history' of Uranus, and by 
the fact that there would presumably have been some, perhaps many, ancient observations of 
one or other of the several minor planets discovered early in the nineteenth century.  But it 
was also likely that there would have been significantly fewer ancient observations of any 
such trans-Uranian planet, from which it might have been discovered, than had been the case 
with Uranus - even allowing for the fact that by the time Neptune was discovered a further 
sixty-five years had elapsed for such observations to be made.  This is principally because 
there were bound to be very many more stars down to the magnitude of a planet such as 
Neptune compared with Uranus, as Table 2 below indicates. 
 
Table 2 
Number of Stars Brighter Than Visual Magnitudes 5.0 to 10.0 in the Sky 
 
Visual Magnitude Star Numbers 
5.0                        1, 620 
6.0    4, 850 
7.0  14, 300 
8.0  41, 000 
9.0 117, 000 
10.0 324, 000 
 
Source:  Arthur S. Eddington and Harold S. Jones, s.v. "Star", in Encyclopedia Britannica, 1951 ed. 
Note: Uranus is a 6th magnitude body (mag. 5.5-6.5); Neptune is an 8th magnitude body (mag. 7.5-8.5). 
 
Apart from Galileo, whose notebooks reveal that he observed Neptune over a period of a 
month when it was near Jupiter, and noted that this 'star' appeared to move,58 only the 
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French astronomer, Joseph Lalande, is known to have accidentally sighted the planet before 
it was discovered.  And he did so at a time when astronomers had reason to be more open 
minded about the outer limit of the solar system.  On May 8 and 10, 1795, Lalande observed 
Neptune whilst recording faint stars for a catalogue.59  He was using a mural quadrant which 
would have given no hint of Neptune's nonstellar character.60  But the apparent motion of 
the planet was then relatively fast as it was only a fortnight or so from opposition.61  
Moreover, its motion is (very nearly) along the ecliptic, as one would expect of a planet.  
Lalande discarded his first observation, however, which was rare, and entered the second in 
his catalogue as 'doubtful'.62  This indicates that he believed he had observed the same body 
on those two evenings but (falsely) concluded that the difference in the positions he 
measured was due to some error on his part. 
 
A good idea of the difficulties attendant upon a chance discovery of Neptune can be had 
from the circumstances of its actual discovery, by Johann Galle and Heinrich D'Arrest.  
Galle located a likely candidate for Leverrier's planet - it was a suitably faint body, not 
marked on the star chart they were using, and within a degree of the position predicted.  
They were able to observe this body for at least a few hours with a telescope that was "the 
pride of the Berlin Observatory", but the disc was "difficult to resolve" and they remained 
unconvinced of the body's motion.63  The conviction that they had found the eighth planet 
had to wait until the following evening when the weather improved and they could observe 
its disc.  By then, too, the planet's apparent motion, which was a little less than its mean, was 
easily discernible.64  Neptune was an easy prize for astronomers looking for such a planet, 
and in the right place, otherwise it was like any one of tens of thousands of equally faint and 
unremarkable stars in the sky. 
 
The discovery of a new planet in the solar system might not have been as unconnected with 
the aims of some astronomers, however, as it would have been for the positional 
astronomers principally considered thus far.  Apart from Herschel who might have 
discovered Neptune as he did Uranus, though it was appreciably less likely to have attracted 
even his attention, some astronomers had been actively  looking for new members of the 
solar system.  There were comet hunters, for example, like Charles Messier.  But the comets 
then discovered were large showy objects; and comets are best looked for with lower powers 
of magnification.65 Moreover, the slow apparent motion of a distant planet would easily 
have escaped their notice.  Messier, nicknamed 'the ferret of comets', was astonished to learn 
of Herschel's discovery of the slow-moving Uranus, for he naturally assumed that such an 
undistinguished object would have been discovered by its apparent motion.66 
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In 1800, however, six German astronomers met in Lilienthal and formed a society - the 
'Lilienthal Detectives' - the founding aim of which was to organise and conduct a systematic 
search for a new planet in the same band of the celestial sphere where Neptune is located.67  
They hoped to find a planet between Mars and Jupiter, one corresponding to the only gap in 
what has become known as Bode's law.68  This so-called law is an arbitrary formula for the 
mean distance of a planet from the Sun, first put forward (though not by Bode) in the early 
1770s - see Table  3. 
 
Table  3 
Bode's law (So-Called) Of Planetary Distances 
 
  Mean Distance from Sun in 
AU (Earth = 1AU) 
Mean Distance from Sun by 
Bode’s Law: 
(a = 0.4 + 0.3[2n]) 
 n a  
Mercury -∞ 0.39 0.4 
Venus 0 0.72 0.7 
Earth 1 1.00 1.0 
Mars 2 1.52 1.6 
???? 3  2.8 
Jupiter 4 5.20 5.2 
Saturn 5 9.54 10.0 
Uranus 6 19.18 19.6 
 
Source: Ake Wallenquist, The Penguin Dictionary of Astronomy, trans. Sune Engelbrektson, 
(Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin Books, 1966) s.v. ‘Bode’s law’. 
 
Clearly, a planet so close to the Earth as one corresponding to  n = 3  would need to be 
relatively small and dull, otherwise how would it hitherto have escaped discovery?  Since 
Kepler, however, German astronomers had been given to looking for some such 
mathematical relation, and the discovery of Uranus strikingly confirmed the above formula, 
or so many believed.69 
 
The Lilienthal Detectives hatched an ambitious plan to search for this would-be planet, one 
which called for twenty-four astronomers to cooperate in searching a different portion of the 
zodiac each.  But their plan was never put into practice as Ceres was discovered before they 
might have done so.70  The detectives were convinced Ceres was the missing planet in 
Bode's series when its mean distance was calculated at 2.767 AU,71 very close to the value 
given by Bode's law (as Table 3 above indicates).  They were forced to think again, 
however, when one of the detectives, Heinrich Olbers, discovered a second minor planet, 
Pallas, in 1802.72  The mean distance of Pallas is almost identical to that of Ceres.  
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Moreover, it was soon clear that these two bodies were tiny, probably of the order of only a 
few hundred kilometres each in diameter.73   
 
Nonetheless, what had been intended as a search for one major planet then became a search 
for more minor planets, with Olbers predicting that such bodies would be numerous.74  
Another of the detectives, Karl Harding, picked up the third minor planet, Juno, in 1804, and 
Olbers found the fourth, Vesta, in 1807.75  Within a couple of years, however, there was a 
"distinct lessening of interest" in the search.76  By 1815, the society had disbanded and after 
another year or two the only remaining searcher, Olbers, had given up, with no further 
discovery having been made.77  A German postmaster, Karl Hencke, revived the search in 
1830, and others may have done so too around this time.  Hencke made his first discovery, 
the fifth minor planet, Astrea, in 1845, shortly after Leverrier's first paper on Uranus was 
published, and he found the sixth, Hebe, less than two years later.78 
 
How probable, then, was it that these early asteroid hunters would have discovered a trans-
Uranian planet such as Neptune?  How adequate were their searches as a de facto search for 
such a planet? 
 
Had Neptune been observed under favourable conditions by, say, Olbers or Hencke, he 
would have had a reasonable chance of picking it up.  These two probably missed at least a 
few ninth magnitude asteroids in their search areas and several a magnitude duller, and 
perhaps one or two a magnitude brighter.79  Also, they were looking for, and found, bodies 
whose apparent motions were very much faster than that of any distant planet.  When Pallas 
and Astrea were discovered, for example, they were moving several times faster than Ceres 
had been when it was discovered by Piazzi.80  On the other hand, a distant planet would 
spend very much longer in any search area because of its slow progress around the celestial 
sphere.  Also, most of the first five minor planets were either as dull as, or duller than, 
Neptune when they were discovered, and all are optically very much smaller.81  Still, there 
is or was no good reason to believe that a suitable trans-Uranian planet would have been 
observed, much less discovered, by them.  
 
Before the use of photography in the early 1890s, the only reliable way to conduct a 
systematic search for a faint object over a wide area was with a good star chart.  If a chart is 
accurate it is relatively easy to isolate, within the limiting magnitude of the chart, any body 
in the corresponding area of the heavens that is not marked on the chart, and vice versa.  
Barring such things as variable stars, any find will thus be either a body which has moved 
into this area or a trace of one that has left, respectively, since the chart was constructed.  
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There were no charts in existence in the early part of the nineteenth century, however, that 
would do this job for objects as faint as Neptune, as Figure 2 illustrates, nor even adequate 
catalogues of stars from which to construct a set of such charts.  
 
 
 Figure  2.  Portion of a Typical Early Nineteenth Century Star Chart. 
From Bode's Uranography 1801. Reprinted from Flammarion, Flammarion Astronomy, p. 
401.  Cf. number of stars mapped above with the number in the portion of the star chart 
from the 1840s shown in Fig. 3, p. 126 below, which covers an area of the sky less than a 
quarter of the size of that covered by Bode's chart above. 
 
In 1824, the German astronomer Friedrich Bessel wrote to the Berlin Academy pointing out 
these impediments to further discoveries of planets, major or minor, and work began on a 
series of charts the following year under the auspices of the academy.82  Such work was 
then slow and laborious,83 and the first of these charts did not appear until 1830, presumably 
encouraging Hencke to begin his search. The last was published only in 1859.84  The 
academy charts (Akademische Sternkarten) aimed to map all stars down to the ninth 
magnitude and some, perhaps many, fainter ones in an area extending fifteen degrees either 
side of the celestial equator.85  There are in the order of 150,000 such stars in this band of 
the heavens.86  Figure 3 shows the portion of the academy chart with which Neptune was 
found. 
 
  
  
 
126 
 
Figure 3.  Portion of the Berlin Academy Star Chart (for the 21st Hour of 
Right Ascension) used to find Neptune. 
Reproduced from F.A. Bellamy, "Johann Gottfried Galle", Knowledge 34 (September 1910): 
374. Morton Grosser, in The Discovery of Neptune (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 
1962), p. 117, says that Galle was reluctant to use a star chart for the search as he had 
"recently used Harding's chart of the same area and knew how inadequate it was".  Harding's 
atlas contains "above 40,000 stars down to mag. 9" for the northern hemisphere and clearly 
to at least 15o south, so it cannot be anywhere near complete - see George Chambers, "A 
Handbook of Descriptive Astronomy", 3d ed. (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1877), p.863.   
 
Now it was probable that the orbit of any unknown planet would be inclined at no more than 
a few degrees to the ecliptic, and would very probably be contained within the zodiac.  (The 
ecliptic is the apparent path of the sun around the celestial sphere, and the zodiac extends 
eight or nine degrees either side of this path.)  The orbits of all the planets then known lay 
within the zodiac, and those of the known Jovians lay within three degrees of the ecliptic.87  
Moreover, the residuals of Uranus were very largely confined to the plane of its orbit, which 
is almost coplanar with the ecliptic, so if an unknown planet were the cause of those 
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residuals the plane of its orbit would probably lie close to the ecliptic as well.88  Neptune's 
orbit is inclined at less than two degrees to the ecliptic.89 
 
The ecliptic is itself inclined at about twenty three and a half degrees to the celestial equator, 
however, corresponding to the tilt of the earth's axis, so a complete set of the Berlin 
Academy charts cover less than half the ecliptic, and obviously the same proportion of the 
zodiac, as Figure 4 indicates. 
 
Figure  4. The Coverage of the Ecliptic by the Berlin Academy Star Charts 
(Akademische Sternkartern). 
 
This partial coverage of the ecliptic would not matter for the chance of finding a planet with 
a very short sidereal period as any such planet, if it were moving along the ecliptic outside 
the area covered by these charts, would soon enter that area.  But since a distant planet has a 
very long sidereal period, as we know from Kepler's third law, it would be confined to a 
small portion of the celestial sphere for the duration of even a protracted search, such as 
those conducted by Olbers or Hencke.  Neptune's sidereal period is almost 165 years;90 and 
during a search that lasted, say, fifteen years, the planet would trudge back and forth along 
less than one ninth of the ecliptic (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Neptune's Slow Angular Progress.  
Based on star chart in Roy L. Bishop, ed., Observer's Handbook 1985, The Royal Astronomical 
Society of Canada (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1985), p. 107. Stars are shown to the 9th 
magnitude. 
 
This slow angular progress of Neptune is faster, however, than that which any of the planets 
postulated by Leverrier or Adams would make, for their periods would range from roughly 
190 to 240 years.91  Moreover, as I have pointed out, the academy charts were incomplete at 
the time of Neptune's discovery.  (As it happens, the chart which Neptune was found with 
had recently been completed, though it had not yet been distributed to any other 
observatory.)92 
 
The lack of good charts for faint objects would have obliged the early asteroid hunters to 
confine their searches to relatively small portions of the celestial sphere.93  Moreover, these 
searches were not coordinated.  An asteroid hunter would be likely to favour a search area 
with which he was very familiar, or for which there happened to be a good chart.  
Conversely, he would be likely to avoid any area which presented special difficulties, such 
as the portion of Sagittarius shown in Figure 5 above, which lies in the centre of the Milky 
Way and is not well placed in the sky for observers in northern Europe. 
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Furthermore, since the orbits of Ceres and Pallas, and later those of Juno and Vesta, were 
found to be sharply inclined to the ecliptic (see Table 4), the prospect of finding an asteroid 
away from the ecliptic was much brighter than would be the case for a planet, even though 
the ecliptic remains the most likely place to find either.94  
 
 
Table  4 
Inclinations of the Orbits of the First Four Minor Planets to the Ecliptic 
 
Ceres  10o.6 
Pallas   34o.7 
Juno 13o.0 
Vesta 7o.1 
 Source:  Chambers, Handbook, p. 900. 
 
 
Most of the discoveries of these early asteroid hunters were made away from the ecliptic.  In 
the case of Olbers, for example, we know that his main or only search areas were just two 
patches of the celestial sphere, each to one side of the ecliptic.  When the mean solar 
distance of Pallas was found to be almost identical to that of Ceres, Olbers hit upon a would-
be saving hypothesis for Bode's law: he argued that these "cosmical potsherds" were but two 
remnants of the planet the detectives had originally hoped to find.  Olbers concluded that all 
other such remnants would pass through the two areas in space where the orbits of Ceres and 
Pallas almost intersected, and he nominated two search areas - directly opposite one another 
on the celestial sphere - which he described as the north-western portion of Virgo and the 
western end of Cetus (see Figure 6 below).95 
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Figure 6. Olbers's Search Areas.  
Based on Arthur Cottam's star charts (1891) in T.E.R. Phillips and W.H. Steavenson, 
Hutchinson's Splendour of the Heavens: A Popular Authoritative Astronomy  
(London:  Hutchinson and Co., 1923), pp. 935 (Cetus) and 939 (Virgo). North-western 
Virgo is the upper right hand portion of the constellation.  The western end of Cetus is 
the right hand end of the constellation, and since Olbers's search areas were opposite 
one another on the celestial sphere he was presumably not searching the bottom 
portion of this area.  (The boundaries of the constellations were not fixed until the 
twentieth century, so a description such as 'north-western Virgo' is even somewhat 
vaguer than it may at first seem). 
 
When Ceres is visible in or near either of these search areas it is beyond the zodiac, as an 
inspection of its orbital data reveals and as Figure 7 below illustrates for the search area in 
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Virgo.96  We can therefore safely conclude that at least the centres of Olbers's areas were 
well removed from the ecliptic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Ceres in Northern Virgo in 1977.   
Based on the star chart in John R. Percy, ed., Observers Handbook 1977, The Royal 
Astronomical Society of Canada (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1977), p. 76. 
 
 
Olbers found both Pallas and Vesta in this search area.  Pallas was close to the path of Ceres, 
and therefore well removed from the ecliptic too.97 Vesta was no closer than roughly  the 
edge of the zodiac, as an inspection of its orbital data also reveals.98 
 
Harding probably found Juno near the ecliptic for he came upon it in Pisces, near the search 
area Olbers had designated in Cetus (see Fig. 6 above).99  Harding was engaged at the time, 
however, in constructing a series of charts to aid the general search which would show "all 
the small stars near the paths of Ceres and Pallas", an exercise that would have taken him 
well away from the ecliptic much of the time (see Table 4, p. 129 above).100 
 
The discovery of Astrea by Hencke was made or shortly afterwards verified with the 
academy chart for the fourth hour of right ascension, and Hencke found Hebe using the 
academy chart for the seventeenth hour.101  As Figure 8 below illustrates, however, the 
ecliptic is well removed from both of these charts. 
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Figure 8. The Ecliptic in Relation to the Berlin Academy Charts for the 4th 
and 17th Hours of Right Ascension. 
The 7th and 8th asteroids, Iris and Flora, were discovered in the same year as Hebe, by 
John Hind.  He was using the academy charts for the 19th and 5th hours of right 
ascension, respectively.  The ecliptic is as  distant from the former chart as it is from the 
chart for the 4th hour, and as distant from the latter as it is from the chart for the 17th 
hour.  (Robert Grant, History of Physical Astronomy (n.p., 1852); reprint ed., The Sources 
of Science, no. 38 (New York:  Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1966), p. 243. 
   
To sum up, there is no good reason to believe that the efforts of these early asteroid hunters 
collectively amounted to a systematic or reliable search for a distant planet. 
 
Once again, Kuhn believes that the discovery of these minor planets was probably due 
("though the evidence is equivocal") to the "shift of vision", the change in "scientific 
perception", that had originally "enabled astronomers to see Uranus, the planet". (Emphasis 
mine.)102  But no Kuhnian shift of vision was involved in their discovery.  Unlike a black 
four of hearts which one can mistake for a (conventional) four of hearts before noticing the 
difference between the two, asteroids were visually indistinguishable from stars for those 
who discovered them.  What such astronomers saw was a different pattern of stars, or star-
like bodies, at different times, and they inferred that this difference was due to the apparent 
motion of one (or more) of these bodies. 
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Kuhn concedes that an asteroid, unlike a planet, is not visually distinguishable from a star 
but he claims that, "nevertheless, astronomers prepared to find additional planets were able, 
with standard instruments, to identify twenty [thirteen] of them in the first fifty years of the 
nineteenth century".103 (Emphasis mine.)  In the context of a discussion about "changes in 
scientific perception", this claim is highly misleading.  It suggests that a significant, and 
perhaps the major or only, impediment to their discovery had been merely that earlier 
astronomers were not primed to notice them.  What was principally required, however, was 
a practice that was designed for, or that was at least conducive to, finding such objects, and 
which I have described above.  As Herschel himself remarked in 1802: 
From the appearance of Ceres and Pallas it is evident that the discovery of asteroids 
requires a particular method of examining the heavens which hitherto astronomers have not 
been in the habit of using.  I have already made five reviews of the heavens without 
detecting any of these concealed objects.  Had they been less resembling the small stars of 
the heavens I  might have discovered them.104 
Anyone impressed by Kuhn's interpretation of these events, however, would be inclined to 
think it very much more probable that a planet such as Neptune would have been discovered 
earlier.   
 
I conclude that when Adams and Leverrier took up the problem of Uranus's orbit in the 
1840s astronomical knowledge of the contents of the trans-Uranian region was so slight that 
the working assumption that the known planets of Jupiter and Saturn were the only sensible 
perturbing forces on Uranus was poorly supported. 
 
 
3.5  The Strength of the Counter-Arguments from Uranus's Residuals 
and the Opinions of Astronomers 
 
If the above conclusion is correct then there was no prima facie refutation of, or strong 
counter-argument for, the law of gravitation based on the proof of Uranus's residuals.  On 
the other hand, the prior corroboration or support for the law of gravitation was good - a 
point on which both Popper and his critics can (and do) agree - so the stronger counter-
argument from  ~(T & A)  was 
  (~(T & A)  & T)  -->  ~ A 
What is the point of corroborating theories if we then shy away from using them in the 
premises of such arguments?105  It is a testimony to the strength of Popper's falsificationism 
that this point is so successfully obscured. 
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Since the presupposition of  WPF  cultivates indifference to the question of evidence for the 
auxiliary propositions, support for the assumption that Jupiter and Saturn alone sensibly 
perturb Uranus could have been even weaker still, and there is no reason to believe that the 
relevant opinions of Popper, or those who follow him, would change.  There are many 
possibilities, any one of which, had it been the case, would have significantly reduced the 
already small probability that a suitable exterior planet would have been discovered by 
chance.  For example, if there were two or three times as many stars to the eighth or ninth 
magnitude sprinkled about the ecliptic such a planet would be correspondingly less likely to 
have been previously observed.  Or if Uranus were less massive and farther out, and 
therefore less conspicuous, the planet perturbing it would probably have been likewise.  
Further, if Ceres had been a known major planet whose mean distance was, say, 4 AU, or if 
no asteroid were ever brighter than, say, the tenth magnitude, it is unlikely that any asteroid 
search would have got underway during this period or the Berlin Academy charts been 
produced.  And so on. 
 
By the same token, Popper might have been lucky in believing the law of gravitation was 
prima facie refuted prior to the discovery of Neptune for history might have been such as to 
favour his belief.  For example, it so happens that Uranus and Neptune were in heliocentric 
conjunction at about the time Bouvard prepared his tables for Uranus (see Figure 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. The Relative Positions of Uranus from 1780 to 1840. 
Based on Fig. 475 in Flammarion, Flammarion Astronomy, p. 323. 
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So Bouvard's modern data was from a period when Uranus was being strongly accelerated 
by Neptune, whilst his immediate predictions were for a period when it was being strongly 
decelerated by the unknown planet.  W.M. Smart points out that had Uranus been half a 
revolution behind its actual position at the time of its discovery - and, it should be added, 
some of the ancient observations of this planet not been made or recovered - the problem 
with its orbit would have been delayed until much later in the nineteenth century.  This is 
because the two planets would have been widely separated in their orbits until the 1870s.106  
Had that been the case, the counter-argument from Uranus's residuals for the law would by 
then have been much stronger, perhaps amounting to a prima facie refutation by, say, the 
turn of the century.  Amongst other reasons, this is because the search for minor planets in 
the second half of the nineteenth century would still have been conducted much as it was - 
by numerous observers, equipped with increasingly accurate and comprehensive charts.107  
Not a year went by after the discovery of Hebe in 1847 in which another minor planet was 
not added to the list.  By 1875, the total was more than 150; by 1890, it was around 300.108  
The minor planets then being discovered were typically several magnitudes fainter than 
Neptune, and there was a sharp increase in the rate of discovery of these bodies in the 1890s 
with the use of photography.109 
 
Let us now return to the historical questions I raised earlier.  Firstly, what did the 
astronomical community believe was the explanation for Uranus's residuals?  It is clear that 
no proposed explanation was ever generally preferred to that of the hypothesis of an exterior 
planet.  In introducing his tables for Uranus, Bouvard had raised the general possibility of 
some "extraneous influence" on the planet when he could not accommodate the ancient 
observations.110  Bessel suggested an exterior planet as this influence in private 
correspondence early in the 1820s,111 and by the late 1830s this hypothesis was publicly 
generally preferred.112  Few astronomers ever advanced the claim that it was more probable 
that the law of gravitation was false.113 
 
Adams and Leverrier would seem to have been the only astronomers to get further than 
holding some such general opinion about how this problem would be solved to formulate a 
testable solution candidate for it, and their position was clear.  In a letter to Airy shortly after 
Neptune was discovered, Adams wrote, "I entertained from the first the strongest conviction 
that the observed anomalies were due to the action of an exterior planet; no other hypothesis 
appeared to me to possess the slightest claims to attention".114  And there is no reason to 
believe that Adams was being wise after the event in making this remark.  Elsewhere, he 
said, "the law of gravitation was too firmly established" to be doubted "till every other 
hypothesis had failed".115  Leverrier was of a like mind.116  The historian Morton Grosser, 
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however, in his otherwise characteristically astute account of this episode, remarks that  
"there was plenty of precedent for such a doubt".  As he puts it, "since the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, alteration of the Newtonian law had provided a dependable escape hatch 
for theoreticians trapped by their own hypotheses".117  But it is doubtful Grosser means 
what he says here:  there was plenty of precedent of such doubts, but as Adams himself 
emphasised this would-be escape hatch had proved entirely undependable.118  "There can be 
no doubt of their clarity of mind and scientific correctness," R.A. Lyttleton remarks in his 
detailed analysis of this episode, "in perceiving that the hypothesis of another planet was the 
one to be examined to the utmost limits before considering a change in the law of 
gravitation, or such like."119 
 
There is, in short, no evidence that it has ever seemed to the astronomical community in 
general, much less that it seemed to Adams and Leverrier in particular, that the law of 
gravitation was refuted.  Musgrave implies, however, that these two young theorists were 
trying to explain away an apparent refutation of the law.  I have claimed that there was no 
such argument; but even if there had been, neither of these astronomers can have been trying 
to explain away something they did not believe existed.  Just as they were not,  contra 
Popper, avoiding accepting the conclusion that the law was false if they thought the case 
against it was a weak one.  I do not have to avoid accepting the proposition that, say, the 
moon is made of green cheese if there is nothing that would rationally induce me to do so in 
the first place. 
 
 
3.6  Some General Remarks on the Rationality of Scientific Practice 
where Anomalies are Concerned 
 
Some further methodological remarks are also in order here for to understand scientific 
practice, or how it can be rational, it is not sufficient merely that we know which beliefs are 
formed by scientists in such circumstances, nor even which of these beliefs are warranted or 
rational. 
 
Whether or not a practitioner has evidence against either conjunct of (T & A) aside, he or she 
can have other reasons for supposing, that is, for entertaining the possibility, that one of 
these conjuncts is false.  Some such reasons can also be (broadly) described as epistemic, 
even though they are non-evidential.  And there are typically good pragmatic reasons for 
making some such suppositions as well, since choosing a course of action is at stake here.  
These two distinctions - between a reason for believing and a reason for (merely) supposing 
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that a proposition is true, or false, and the additional epistemic and pragmatic reasons that 
one can have for suppositions - are easily and often overlooked in this debate.  This is 
especially so when the terms 'accept', 'reject', and their respective cognates are used, as they 
often are of course by both Popperians and their critics.  'Accept', for example, can mean 
'suppose', but it can also mean or act as a surrogate for 'believe'. 
 
Consider a practical case to illustrate the above distinctions, and some of their implications.  
It can be rational to begin by checking the wiring in a piece of faulty electrical equipment 
even though I may have more reason to believe that the fault lies elsewhere in that 
equipment.  There is, we may suppose, a reliable check for wiring faults in such equipment  
(epistemic reason), and this check is one that can be carried out in a matter of seconds 
(pragmatic reason).  But I would check the wiring only because I entertained the possibility, 
however slight, that it was faulty.  If I were certain that it was not I would not do so, or at 
least if I did I would need some other reason for doing so in order to be acting rationally.  
For example, I may want to allay the suspicions of a friend who is helping me with the 
repairs and is unacquainted with this piece of equipment. 
 
Thus, if a practitioner supposes that  A  is false in  (T & A), and formulates a would-be 
replacement,  A',  for  A , it does not follow either that this person does or ought to believe 
that there is more reason to believe that  A  is false rather than T.  Nor does it follow that 
such a person is acting less than rationally in formulating A' even if he or she knew that there 
was more reason to believe that  T  was false. 
 
The prospect of both a strong and a convenient independent test of a trans-Uranian planet 
hypothesis were two good additional non-evidential reasons - the first epistemic, the second 
pragmatic - for the course adopted by Leverrier and Adams.  The independent test I have in 
mind is of course that of telescopic observation. A planet which would cause such residuals 
in a planet of Uranus's mass would itself require a large mass, and so resemble its interior 
neighbours, the known Jovian planets, in this regard.  Since their density is low it was 
therefore probable that, like them, the planet would have a large volume.  Moreover, the 
albedos of these Jovians are relatively high.120  Thus, this planet would probably not be 
difficult to find, if one had a tolerably accurate prediction of its position.  Both Leverrier and 
Adams concluded that the planet would be recognizable by its disc, and Adams at least 
believed that it would be no fainter than a star of the ninth magnitude.121  Thus, a strong and 
convenient test for such a planet was very probable. 
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Those who doubted the law of gravitation, on the other hand, were themselves sufficiently 
pragmatic not to propose a revolution in celestial mechanics.  Hoping that Uranus would 
turn out to be a special case, Airy, for example, plumped for a variation in the gravitational 
force, from that given by Newton's law, at the large distances which separated Uranus from 
the Sun.122  However, if an unknown planet were the cause of Uranus's residuals the state of 
planetary theory was then such that no modified law would have any purchase once that 
planet was found, as proved to be the case.  On the other hand, even if some modified law 
had seemingly removed this anomaly, and to my knowledge no one has shown how this 
could be done, that would not rule out the possibility that an unknown planet was the cause 
of Uranus's residuals.   
 
To rule out this possibility and strengthen the counter-argument for Newton's law the 
proponents of any new or modified law would have had to show that there was no such 
planet.  And to do that, of course, they too would have had to entertain the possibility that 
there was such a planet and set out to determine whether or not it existed, albeit in the 
expectation that it did not.  Thus, if practitioners had attempted to make use of Uranus's 
residuals to refute the law of gravitation they would have been best advised, given their aim, 
to adopt in part the same general course of action as that of Adams and Leverrier.  
Furthermore, unless those who believed or suggested that the law of gravitation was false 
could discover some such body as another trans-Saturnian planet, there was no independent 
test for their option.  Notice also that Popper would be obliged to describe such practitioners 
as avoiding a refutation (of Newton's law), though that is just what they would have been 
trying to achieve.  Popper has often talked of the desirability of practitioners setting out to 
refute their theories; but anyone with this aim in mind here would have regarded the 
discovery of Neptune as merely a consolation prize, a sentiment for which I can find no 
evidence. 
 
Once any such anomaly has been successfully removed, practitioners have both an epistemic 
reason and a pragmatic reason for tackling a second anomaly of the same kind in the same 
way.  The epistemic reason arises from the fact that the second anomaly is of the same kind 
as the first, which of course is an inductive reason;  the pragmatic reason arises from the fact 
that a method for tackling this second anomaly is already at hand.  This is the ideal case, of 
course, for the second anomaly may be only analogous to the first, or the method used to 
remove that first anomaly may have been cumbersome or its success fortuitous.  
Nonetheless, this way of tackling anomalies is common in science, as it is in human affairs 
generally.  Kuhn and Lakatos in particular have drawn our attention to it with their notions 
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of the exemplar in the practice of normal science and the positive heuristic in a scientific 
research programme, respectively.123   
 
The success of Adams and Leverrier induced some later astronomers to engage in wishful 
thinking about small residuals in the orbits of Uranus or Neptune, in the hope of predicting 
the position of a trans-Neptunian planet, so such patterns are not always rational.124  But 
suppose that the relevant properties of the planets exterior to, say, Jupiter were such that 
Saturn had been accidentally discovered as Uranus was. And suppose that Uranus, Neptune, 
and Pluto were then each discovered, in no less rational a manner than was done in the case 
of Neptune, in one continuous research programme of solving such perturbation 
problems.125  By the time Pluto's turn had come in this programme, any talk of the law of 
gravitation being apparently refuted by some unexplained residuals in Neptune's or Uranus's 
orbit would be obviously empty.  Astronomers would have had good reason to believe that 
the solar system contained yet another distant planet, and good reason to proceed along the 
same lines as they had previously and successfully done. 
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Chapter  Four 
 
Uranus's Orbit and Other Anomalies: 
The Popperian Legacy 
 
 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
Popper's commentators offer a variety of accounts of the general practice, so-called, of 
avoiding a refutation, and of the problem of Uranus's orbit in particular.  In this chapter I 
shall discuss a sample of these accounts.  My principal aims are, firstly, to show how 
common is the acceptance of Popper's mistakes, even amongst some philosophers who claim 
to reject his falsificationism.  Secondly, I shall analyse the consequences for their accounts 
of this unthinking acceptance of elements of his falsificationism.  In the process, I shall have 
occasion to further criticise Popper, as well as some aspects of the positions taken up by 
these other philosophers, for the light it sheds on rationality in scientific practice where a 
problem like that of Uranus's orbit is concerned. 
 
As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the law of gravitation would have been prima facie 
refuted by the argument from Uranus's residuals only if there had been good reason to 
believe as false what is true, namely, that some unknown body was responsible for those 
residuals.  Had there been this reason then the course adopted by Leverrier and Adams 
would have been unlikely to succeed, and this case would be, as Popper believes it is, 
untypical of science.  Many of Popper's commentators correctly reject this belief of his.  It is 
not untypical, they point out, for anomalies to be resolved by such changes in the auxiliary 
propositions or in the presuppositions upon which the inquiry is based.  Where many of 
these commentators still go wrong, however, is in retaining the presupposition of  WPF  
which encouraged Popper to hold this belief about anomalies in the first place.  So although 
these commentators have a better grasp of history (at least in this respect) than Popper does, 
he has a better grasp of his epistemology than they do.   
 
The methodology of scientific research programmes which Lakatos devised is a pertinent 
case in point, and I begin by critically examining the relevant aspects of this methodology.  
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A belief that major theories have or need to be protected from the supposedly continual 
threat of refutation is one of the irrational conclusions that Lakatos and others are driven to 
by this problem of how to reconcile Popper with the history of science.  Kuhn arrives at 
effectively the same conclusion about the need for such dogmatism, even if by a rather 
different route, and I examine his account too (4.2).  On the other hand, some philosophers 
do not see that Popper has this problem in the first place, or they find some creative 
alternative to the Lakatosian protection racket that would allegedly solve it.  I analyse two 
such accounts and pick up the points I made in 3.6 on how practitioners rationally deal with 
anomalies, to further show how these points are obscured or not understood in this debate 
(4.3).  Finally, I return to that other strand in Popper's thought on 'avoidance' of refutation, 
namely, the alleged dangers of ad hoc hypotheses.  I examine the accounts of three 
philosophers of science who have been misled by one or other of these strands in his thought 
and imply or assert that there is something fishy about the hypothesis of a trans-Uranian 
planet devised by Leverrier and Adams.  I provide a further defence of the rationality of 
entertaining this hypothesis at the time, and detail how the historical interpretations such 
philosophers are driven to prefer are badly mistaken (4.4). 
 
 
4.2  The Negative Heuristic, Paradigm Commitment, and 
the Belief in Dogmatism 
 
As we saw in 1.5, Lakatos rejects SPF - it is part of what he calls "dogmatic 
falsificationism".1  But he retains  WPF, and in no small way Lakatos's project should be 
understood as a doomed attempt to rationalise the history of science for the irrationality this 
false doctrine injects.  He says: 
All scientific research programmes may be characterized by their 'hard core'. The negative 
heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct the modus tollens at this 'hard core'.  
Instead, we must use our ingenuity to articulate or even invent 'auxiliary hypotheses', which 
form a protective belt around this core, and we must redirect the modus tollens to these.  It 
is this protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses which has to bear the brunt of tests and get 
adjusted and re-adjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend the thus-hardened core.2 
 
And of Newtonian mechanics in particular, which Lakatos regards as the paradigm of a 
scientific research programme, he adds: 
In Newton's programme the negative heuristic bids us to divert the modus tollens from 
Newton's three laws of dynamics and his law of gravitation.  This 'core' is 'irrefutable' by 
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the methodological decision of its protagonists:  anomalies must lead to changes only in the 
'protective' belt of auxiliary, 'observational' hypotheses and initial conditions.3 
So for Lakatos every anomaly would 'falsify' the core.  Yet core beliefs remain intact.  Thus 
he came to believe that only obedience to some rule or convention of method explains why 
these (supposedly) beleaguered cores are not in some sense refuted, and why scientists retain 
them.  But Adams and Leverrier had no need of Lakatos's rule.  Nor is there any reason, as 
we have seen, to believe that they were following it, even if in querying and then replacing 
an auxiliary proposition they were acting as they would have done had they been following 
this rule.  Moreover, take into account the good non-evidential reasons that practitioners can 
have for first exhausting such options, especially when the core in question is something like 
Newtonian mechanics, and there is even less reason to believe in the existence of 'minders' 
for core beliefs.4 
 
This is not to say, of course, that there were no dogmatic Newtonians; simply that Lakatos is 
mistaken in believing or implying that Newtonians needed to be part of some protection 
racket to practice their craft.  And whether or not every anomaly prior to that of Uranus's 
residuals also failed to provide a prima facie refutation of the core is a question we can leave 
to the historians, except to say that it would be surprising if any such anomaly did so, for in 
the area in which it was then applied the law is a good approximation to the truth.  Consider 
one further example, for future reference.  Early in the eighteenth century some French 
physicists had grave doubts about the law of gravitation, citing the increase in gravitational 
acceleration that had been detected away from the equator.5  These doubts likewise rested on 
some hitherto convenient assumptions, in particular, that the Earth was a sphere.  Newton 
pointed out, however, that the increase in gravity would be accounted for if the Earth were 
an oblate spheroid (a sphere with an equatorial bulge), which it is.6 
 
To return to Lakatos, the firmness of his commitment to  WPF  is revealed in his elementary 
logical blunder above that modus tollens is redirected or diverted from the core, a mistake 
that has been repeated by more than one of his commentators.7  Leaving aside the fact that 
the logical relations in modus tollens are not subject to the will of any scientist, to be 
directed or redirected as he or she sees fit, modus tollens is not directed at the core.  It is 
directed, to continue the metaphor, at the conjunction of the core and Lakatos's would-be 
protective belt, like so: 
 (T & A)  -->  P     
 ~P 
 therefore  ~(T & A) 
If scientists do not continually mount arguments of the form: 
 (T & A)  -->  P 
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 ~P 
 therefore  ~T   
it is not because they are practitioners of that special activity we call science, in possession 
of some fraternal heuristic principle.  It is just that, like many non-scientists, scientists can 
generally be relied upon when they see an argument of the latter sort to recognize that it is 
invalid. 
 
Some of those who would defend the methodology of scientific research programmes, like 
John Worrall, have abandoned the negative heuristic altogether, even though it is one of the 
most distinctive features of that methodology.  But not only does Worrall fail to 
acknowledge this departure, he even says in response to a critic of the methodology, who 
defines this rule as Lakatos does above, that one would be "mad" to advise anyone to follow 
it (which is true).8  According to Worrall, the methodology places "no restrictions" on any 
scientist who attempts to modify or replace the core, though he does comment that the 
business of replacing the core is such an "enormous undertaking" it is "no wonder . . . that 
some theories (those which form integral parts of powerful research programmes) have had 
such long lives, surviving many clashes with experiment".9  Since a research programme 
would not be powerful, however, if it did not survive there is no cause for such wonderment.  
And Worrall's comment is a good example of the mistake of conflating the lack of sufficient 
evidential reason for believing or accepting that a proposition is false with having a good 
pragmatic reason for (provisionally) not entertaining the possibility that it is so.  If the 
reason for the longevity of core beliefs like Newtonian mechanics were that it was too much 
trouble to replace them, science would not be a rational enterprise.  It was certainly easier, 
for example, to come up with the suggestion that the Earth was an oblate spheroid than to 
look for a replacement for the law of gravitation.  But it was evidence obtained from 
expeditions to Lapland and Peru, which measured the length of a degree of latitude in each 
location, that convinced scientists to accept Newton's suggestion and removed the associated 
doubts about the law.10 
 
In contrast to Worrall, Anthony O'Hear articulates a firm Lakatosian line in Karl Popper.  
He says that Popper's "way of looking at saving hypotheses obscures the fact that their role 
is precisely to deflect criticism from the original 'core' theory, so as to treat it as virtually 
unfalsifiable".11 (Emphasis mine.)  Furthermore, he says, "The demarcation criterion 
overlooks the importance of the metaphysical or unfalsifiable status of research programmes 
to the growth of science, for growth would actually be hindered were theories not allowed to 
stand despite 'falsifications'."12 
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O'Hear also describes the strategy of employing saving hypotheses as one of "directing 
attention away from the theory under test onto criticism of the assumption that other things 
are not equal in the test situation".13  Now apart from the fact that the assumption O'Hear is 
referring to here is the assumption that other things are equal, this description makes 
Lakatos's position out to be innocuous, for there is obviously nothing to object to in the 
suggestion that we can or do switch our attention from one counter-argument to another.  
But this is not Lakatos's position.  If the redirection or deflection metaphor is taken 
seriously, Lakatos and O'Hear are urging us to treat a counter-argument for the core as if it 
were a counter-argument for the "protective belt".  But if we were to treat counter-arguments 
for the core in this fashion we would sink into self-contradiction.  For example, if the 
criticism of the law of gravitation from the evidence of Uranus's residuals had been 
deflected by Newtonians onto the assumption that other things were equal in the test 
situation, they would have contradicted themselves for this criticism presupposes that these 
other things were equal.  In particular, it presupposes that there were no sensible influences 
on Uranus other than those that had already been taken into account. 
 
The case of Uranus's residuals also does not provide O'Hear with any reason to doubt the 
demarcation criterion.  This case is simply one in which it so happened that an auxiliary 
proposition was refuted rather than a core proposition.  O'Hear comes to believe otherwise 
because he embraces the deflection metaphor.  He thinks that the core of a research 
programme is the target for a swarm of anomaly based counter-arguments, all of which are 
in some incoherent sense refutations of the core but which are "deflected" from it.  This 
target is thus virtually unhittable by such arguments, hence O'Hear's skepticism that we can 
distinguish hittable targets from unhittable ones, at least where core propositions are 
concerned. 
 
Popper does not employ the deflection metaphor but his evasion and immunisation 
metaphors amount to the same thing, and a shadow of a doubt about the demarcation 
criterion even falls across his thinking.  This case, he says, shows that "falsifiability or 
testability cannot be regarded as a very sharp criterion".14  For Popper to make such a 
concession, much less where none is required, emphasises the strength of his commitment to  
SPF cum WPF. 
 
If one were to try to engender doubts about the demarcation criterion, however, by doubting 
the refutability of core propositions, one plausible line of attack would be to choose a case in 
which it was generally believed that a core proposition was refuted and then attempt to 
undermine that belief.  But why pick a case in which all concerned, O'Hear included, believe 
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that no core proposition was refuted?  The fact that a counter-argument for  p  does not 
refute  p  because it contains a premise that turns out to be false is not a reason to believe 
that  p  should have been treated as "virtually unfalsifiable" or that the demarcation criterion 
is defective, even if the counter-argument in question did once seem to be a refutation of  p. 
 
I can only think that the reason O'Hear does not see this point is his flirtation with 
skepticism, a flirtation which does much to make the deflection metaphor seem plausible to 
him. If skepticism about contingent knowledge were true then no contingent proposition 
could be refuted and the demarcation criterion would collapse. It would not matter that we 
could still distinguish those contingent propositions whose contraries included descriptions 
of logically possible states of affairs (Popper's potential falsifiers) from those contingent 
propositions whose contraries did not, if we could never know that any such description was 
true. A genuine skeptic would simply make these points and be done with Popper's criterion.   
 
But O'Hear takes a more circuitous route for he is, like Popper, an inconsistent skeptic.  
Whilst holding that no refutation is "conclusive", O'Hear has no compunction in describing 
those contingent propositions as refutable, or as refuted, that many or all non-skeptics 
characteristically do, or would do.  For example, he says that the Adams-Leverrier 
hypothesis could have been refuted,15 and that the law of gravitation was eventually 
refuted.16  But if any alleged refutation is inconclusive it does not establish that the 
proposition allegedly refuted is false, and so it is not a refutation.  Hence the inconsistency.  
And someone who believes that refutations are inconclusive, as O'Hear does, would be 
inclined to doubt the value of a logical distinction between that which can be refuted and 
that which cannot when whatever is refuted today, so that person is obliged to believe, may 
be unrefuted tomorrow.  O'Hear says: 
The demarcation criterion loses any practical value it might have in enabling us to know 
when we are being truly scientific in rejecting a theory that could be saved from 
falsification, as opposed to being unscientific in attempting to save it from falsification.  
The point is that if falsification can never be conclusive, it is hard to see how apparent 
falsification can be absolute grounds for rejection.17 
But the point is that if falsification can never be conclusive, falsification cannot be "absolute 
grounds for rejection". It is because O'Hear cannot surrender the belief that there are 
falsifications, properly so called, that he resorts to 'apparent falsification' in trying to make 
his point above. He does not notice that he thereby shows himself to be an inconsistent 
skeptic, part of the reason being that it is true that apparent falsifications do not provide 
absolute grounds for rejection. That is a point on which skeptics and non-skeptics alike can 
agree. 
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O'Hear insists that to protect core propositions from counter-arguments "is not, of course, to 
deny that counter-evidence is and should be taken seriously".18  But what else can it be?  
For all that, O'Hear does recognize, as Lakatos did, that he is advocating that "dogmatism 
has an essential role to play in science".19  Dogmatism, O'Hear emphasises, is one of the 
"essential elements of the scientific attitude".20  This view is not uncommon.  It is implicit, 
for example, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, whilst in a relatively neglected 
paper, "The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research", published soon after, Kuhn spells it 
out.21  The case of Uranus's residuals, he says on that occasion, is one of those anomalies 
which "calls established techniques and beliefs in doubt", and shows the need for such 
techniques and beliefs to be dogmas if they are to survive.22  Newton-Smith is often sharply 
critical of Lakatos and Kuhn; nonetheless, he believes that Lakatos discerned one of the 
"important facets of scientific procedure" in recognizing that "scientists properly have a 
sufficient degree of faith in their basic theoretical postulates . . . that anomalies are explained 
away".23 (Emphasis mine.)  Feyerabend thinks that "scientists must develop methods which 
permit them to retain their theories in the face of plain and unambiguously refuting facts, 
even if testable explanations for the clash are not immediately forthcoming". He calls this 
alleged requirement "the principle of tenacity".24  Popper agrees with these commentators 
on the need for such an attitude or such a principle.  The case of Uranus's residuals, he says, 
shows that "some dogmatism is fruitful in science". (Emphasis mine.)25  Thus, the only 
significant difference between Popper's position and that of his commentators here is that he 
thinks there is less need for dogmatism because he thinks the practice, so-called, of avoiding 
a refutation is less common in science. 
 
If these philosophers, Feyerabend aside, did not falsely believe that dogmatism was 
necessary they would presumably reject this cognitive attitude as inimical to any rational 
activity, which they all suppose science at least ought to be.  'Dogmatism' is so 
unambiguously a derogatory term that for such people to advocate dogmatism is a sure sign 
of the grip on their thinking of some false belief or presupposition, and which I claim is 
typically  SPF  or  WPF. Holding either of these presuppositions forces one to mistake weak 
arguments for strong or compelling ones.  Once it then becomes apparent that it is as well 
scientists have not been moved to accept the conclusions of those arguments, one option is 
to conclude, as all of the above philosophers do, that it is also as well not to be moved by 
strong or compelling arguments, at least in such cases.  This irrational attitude they correctly 
describe as dogmatism or faith.  The failure to distinguish supposition from belief or 
acceptance makes it harder to resist the allure of dogmatism here.  This is because the 
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possibility of rationally supposing that  p  is true even when there is a strong counter-
argument for  p  is not a possibility that is countenanced. 
 
But there is more, for the attempt to justify such (all?) dogmatism is self-defeating.  To show 
that practitioners ought sometimes or often hold core propositions dogmatically, Popper and 
others are obliged to proffer some cognitive benefit that stands to be gained from adopting 
this attitude.  In the case of the law of gravitation, for example, that benefit would consist of 
such things as the discovery that the Earth is an oblate spheroid or that the solar system does 
not end at Uranus, together with the removal of the associated anomalies.  But if there is the 
prospect of such a benefit practitioners have only to be made aware that this is so in order to 
remove the alleged need for them to hold core beliefs dogmatically, as they would then have 
a good reason for not doing so, namely, the prospect of that cognitive benefit.  This prospect 
is good, of course, only when the counter-argument for those core beliefs is weak, which is 
the real reason practitioners do not need to relinquish those beliefs. 
 
In short, to get the argument for dogmatism off the ground here an epistemic reason for not 
relinquishing core beliefs is required.  But if such a reason exists there is no need for 
dogmatism.  Watkins, for example, echoes Popper when he says, "It is desirable that a 
theory should be defended with a certain dogmatism, so that it is not knocked out too 
quickly before its resources have been explored".26  But if untapped resources were a reason 
for continuing to accept (or perhaps entertain) a theory where would the dogmatism be in 
continuing to accept (or entertain) that theory for that reason?  It is Popper, of course, who 
would have us knock theories off too quickly, and if Watkins were to give up the belief that 
refutation is easy he would presumably recognise that dogmatism is unnecessary. 
 
Let us turn now to Kuhn.  Dogma is more basic or pervasive in science for Kuhn than 
Popper or even Lakatos and O'Hear allow.  Scientists, Kuhn tells us, are converted to the 
paradigms that form the basis of their practice of normal science,27 and so paradigms are 
dogmas or "quasi-dogmatic commitments" before (most) anomalies arise.28 
 
It is sometimes a moot point in Kuhn's later writings, however, whether or not a community 
(or sub-community) of scientists is so converted or committed.  For example, to underscore 
this supposedly unswerving commitment on their part, Kuhn says, "In the arts, in particular, 
the work of men who do not succeed in innovation is described as 'derivative', a term of 
derogation significantly absent from scientific discourse which does, on the other hand, 
repeatedly refer to 'fads'."29  There would be no fads, however, if those responsible for them 
had in fact had an unswerving commitment to their paradigms.  Nonetheless, Kuhn 
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continues to believe that dogmatic commitment is necessary not just to tough out and resolve 
anomalies, as Popper and Lakatos believe, but to produce anomalies in the first place.  In his 
"Reflections on My Critics", from which the above remark is drawn, Kuhn goes on to say 
that "because they can ordinarily take current theory for granted, exploiting rather than 
criticising it, the practitioners of mature sciences are freed to explore nature to an esoteric 
depth and detail otherwise unimaginable."30  Anomalies are a by-product of this exploration, 
and most are resolved by further paradigm-based research.  Kuhn adds that "because that 
exploration will ultimately isolate severe trouble spots", practitioners "can be confident that 
the pursuit of normal science will inform them when and where they can most usefully 
become Popperian critics", which is "the strategy appropriate to those occasions when 
something goes wrong with normal science."31 
 
Kuhn's distinction between exploiting a theory and criticising a theory, however, cannot be 
sustained.  The critic, or potential critic, of a theory is obliged to entertain the possibility that 
that theory is true if he or she is to derive any consequence from it for the purpose of testing 
or criticism.  Moreover, the critic is not obstructed in this exercise because he or she does 
not also identify with, or have some quasi-dogmatic commitment to, that theory.  The critic 
can do the same research, perform the same experiment, as the convert does.  When the 
French Academy of Sciences dispatched expeditions to Lapland and Peru, for example, to 
measure a degree of latitude in each of those distant locations, their manifest desire to 
"explore nature to an esoteric depth" was fuelled, in part, by opposition to the Newtonian 
theory of universal gravitation. 
 
Thus Kuhn overlooks the possibility, as Popper does, that in formulating a hypothesis such 
as the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis a practitioner could have been trying to refute, or at 
least to provide good reason to doubt, the law of gravitation.  The critic of the law who 
formulated this hypothesis would have been trying to show, as I have pointed out, that no 
planet capable of removing Uranus's residuals existed.  And what is Kuhn to make of any 
crucial, or potentially crucial, experiment?  Dogma aside, no one can be rationally 
committed to two rival theories - such theories are inconsistent.  Moreover, any Kuhnian 
who was committed to either of two such theories would, in performing any such 
experiment, still collect evidence (or counter-evidence) for the other. 
 
On Kuhn's account, Leverrier and Adams were trying to solve a puzzle, namely,  'What is the 
cause of Uranus's residual perturbations?'  This is certainly closer to the truth than Popper's 
view, but it is still false.  As a heuristic device, it may be useful to treat such research as if it 
were a puzzle-solving exercise, but that is all.  Neither Leverrier nor Adams thought that the 
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problem of Uranus's motion was a mere puzzle for both recognized that it might necessitate 
at least a change in the law of gravitation.  Uranus might have had no residual perturbations.  
('What is the cause of Uranus's residuals?' does not describe a Kuhnian puzzle, since the 
answer to this question might be, 'Newtonian mechanics is false.')  A Kuhnian puzzle is, I 
take it, a problem for which there is a 'correct' paradigm based solution, as a crossword 
puzzle is a problem for which there is a correct clues-and-diagram based solution.  If, say, '4 
across' is a seven letter word meaning 'deduct', then 'magical' (wrong meaning) or 'take-
away' (too long) will not do; what fits the framework of the crossword puzzle is (say) 
'subtract'. 
 
Kuhn's attempted distinction between exploiting and criticising a theory follows from his 
distinction between puzzle-solving and testing, practices which he thinks are confined to 
"normal science" and "extraordinary science", respectively.32  Leaving aside what purpose 
testing the allegedly incommensurable theories of extraordinary science would serve, testing 
takes place quite as much in the practice he calls normal science as in that which he calls 
extraordinary science.   
 
Kuhn would count Bouvard's preparation of tables for Uranus, for example, as one of the 
tasks of normal science, a task he would classify as the "matching of facts with theory" or 
perhaps "the determination of significant fact".33  But this exercise was a test of Newton's 
theory, whatever Bouvard's attitude to that theory may have been.  Indeed, the exercise of 
accounting for the motion of Uranus was a significant test of the theory, if then a relatively 
weak one, for Uranus is a good deal farther from the Sun than the farthest of the other 
planets then known (see Table 3, p. 123 above). 
 
Nevil Maskelyne's attempt in 1774 to estimate the mean density of the Earth using the law 
of gravitation is a classic case of what is, supposedly, puzzle-solving normal science.  But it 
too was a significant test of the law.  Maskelyne measured the faint gravitational pull on a 
plumb line exerted by a suitable Scottish mountain, Schehallien.34  By comparing the pull of 
this mountain (5".8) with that of the Earth, and estimating the mass of Schehallien, 
Maskelyne obtained a value for the mass of the Earth.  This was a novel application of the 
law for the mass of a mountain is small compared with that of a planet or a satellite; so too 
was the distance between the centres of mass of Maskelyne's plumb line and Schehallien 
compared with, say, the radius of the Earth or the distance of the Moon from the Earth.  It is 
clear from Maskelyne's conclusions that he knew this experiment was a test of the law.  He 
said: 
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1. It appears from this experiment, that the mountain Schehallien exerts a sensible 
attraction; therefore, from the rules of philosophizing, we are to conclude, that 
every mountain, and indeed every particle of the earth, is endued with the same 
property, in proportion to its quantity of matter. 
 
2. The law of the variation of this force, in the inverse ratio of the squares of the 
distances, as laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, is also confirmed by this 
experiment.  For, if the force of attraction of the hill has been only to that of the 
earth, as the matter in the hill to that of the earth, and had not been greatly 
increased by the near approach to its centre, the attraction must have been wholly 
insensible.  But now, by only supposing the mean density of the earth to be 
double that of the hill, which seems very probable from other considerations, the 
attraction of the hill will be reconciled to the general law of the variation of 
attraction in the inverse duplicate ratio of the distances, as deduced by Sir Isaac 
Newton from the comparison of the motion of the heavenly bodies with the force 
of gravity at the surface of the earth; and the analogy of nature will be preserved. 
 
3. We may now, therefore, be allowed to admit this law; and to acknowledge, that 
the mean density of the earth is at least double of that at the surface, and 
consequently, that the density of the internal parts of the earth is much greater 
than near the surface.  Hence also, the whole quantity of matter in the earth will 
be at least as great again as if it had been all composed of matter of the same 
density with that at the surface; or will be about 4 or 5 times as great as if it were 
all composed of water.35 
 
In 1798, Henry Cavendish measured the very much fainter gravitational pull of a large lead 
sphere on a small lead ball, in the comfort of his laboratory.  By comparing the pull of the 
sphere with that of the Earth, Cavendish estimated the mean density of the Earth at 5.488 
times that of the density of water, which is close to modern estimates.36  Kuhn cites this 
experiment as a classic of normal science.37  Once again, however, it is a significant test of 
the law of gravitation.  Apart from the greater accuracy of Cavendish's measurements, the 
mass of his lead sphere was obviously small compared with the mass of Schehallien; so too 
was the distance between the centres of mass of the sphere and the lead ball compared with 
the distance between the centre of Schehallien's mass and Maskelyne's plumb-line.  
Cavendish's experiment was thus a novel application of the law. 
 
Now if the gravitational force between such masses as Cavendish employed were, say, ten 
times greater than it is - a phenomenon that would still have gone hitherto undetected - 
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Cavendish's experiment would have produced strong counter-evidence for the law of 
gravitation.  This is because his estimate for the mean density of the Earth would then have 
been about half that of water.  A Newtonian would have been quite correct, of course, to 
scrutinise Cavendish's equipment or his experimental method, or to scour his laboratory for 
hidden forces, had this result been obtained.  But the important point here is that if one were 
a non-believer or a critic of the notion of universal gravitation, or of the inverse square law 
in particular, then the experiments of Maskelyne or Cavendish were a good means of trying 
to obtain evidence to support such a position. 
 
Thus, so-called normal scientific practice is or can be independent of the mental states Kuhn 
and others who follow him, like Putnam, think are necessary or desirable for its practitioners 
to have.  Kuhn and Putnam are wrong:  Maskelyne or Cavendish could have been trying to 
falsify or to find counter-evidence for 'the Newtonian paradigm' in performing the above 
experiments.38  On the other hand, Popper is also wrong in thinking it necessary or desirable 
for them to have been trying or intending to do so, for they were not doing so, yet science 
did not suffer. 
 
Let us return to Popper and conclude with some remarks on his use of 'dogmatism'.  As with 
his use of the term 'ad hoc',  Popper deploys 'dogmatism' for the rhetorical advantage it 
would secure for the practice of conjecture and refutation over the practice, so called, of 
avoiding a refutation.  He says, for example: 
Clearly, one can say that if you avoid falsification at any price, you give up empirical 
science in my sense.  But I found that, in addition, supersensitivity with respect to refuting 
criticism was just as dangerous:  there is a legitimate place for dogmatism, though a very 
limited place.  He who gives up his theory too easily in the face of apparent refutations will 
never discover the possibilities inherent in his theory.  There is room in science for debate: 
for attack and therefore also for defence. 
Popper continues: 
I did not propose the simple rule:  "Look out for refutations, and never dogmatically defend 
your theory."  Still, it was much better advice than dogmatic defence at any price.  The 
truth is that we must be constantly critical; self-critical with respect to our own theories, 
and self-critical with respect to our own criticism.39 
 
Are we seriously expected to believe that if we are self-critical of our criticism of some 
theory then we are dogmatically defending that theory? There is no substance to this use of 
'dogmatism'; it is purely rhetorical. Influenced by Popper and Lakatos here, however, Chris 
Mortensen and Tim Burgess, for example, believe that a "healthily dogmatic defence of a 
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thesis is a cautiously sceptical attitude to its criticism".40 No one is a dogmatist merely for 
defending a theory from counter-argument, an act that can equally be described as an attack 
(on that counter-argument) and which may itself be a refutation.  Whether or not one is a 
dogmatist does not depend on what one chooses to attack - 'X is a black swan' rather than 
'All swans are white' - but on how one goes about the task. Thus, any alleged refutation of a 
theory may be the work of a dogmatic opponent of that theory, someone who merely siezes 
upon an anomaly with no thought for the strength or otherwise of the counter-argument it 
provides. Such a person can also be reasonably described as an uncritical thinker. 
 
In Unended Quest, Popper takes his rhetorical use of 'dogmatism' and its cognates one step 
further, contrasting what he calls "dogmatic thinking" with what he calls "critical thinking".  
He says: 
Most (or perhaps all) learning processes consist in theory formation; that is, in the 
formation of expectations.  The formation of a theory or conjecture has always a 
"dogmatic", and often a "critical", phase . . . . The critical phase consists in giving up the 
dogmatic theory under the pressure of disappointed expectations or refutations, and in 
trying out other dogmas . . . . 
 
I looked on this method of theory formation as a method of learning by trial and error.41 
This passage raises more questions than it would settle.  For example, how can someone like 
Popper, who continually urges us to treat all theories as tentative or provisional, describe all 
theories as dogmas?  If someone's dogma-fuelled expectations are disappointed would that 
person have other dogmas to try out, as Popper claims?  Someone can be a dogmatic 
Newtonian, for example, or a dogmatic Einsteinian, but is anyone both?  Is anyone a 
dogmatic atheist and a dogmatic Christian?   Would a belief even be a dogma if one were 
moved by a disappointed expectation to give it up?  And in what conceivable sense is a 
dogma something one puts on trial? 
 
Moreover, Popper cannot sustain the distinction he refers to above between dogmatic 
thinking and critical thinking.  Since theories or hypotheses or conjectures figure in the 
antecedents of all the arguments he calls refutations, so-called critical thinking is merely 
arraying one dogma against another if all theories or conjectures are dogmas.  If Popper can 
succeed in having us identify dogmatic thinking with forming or holding or defending 
theories, however, whilst critical thinking is identified with attacking or surrendering them, 
then the so-called practice of avoiding a refutation will appear less than rational by 
comparison with refutation. 
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4.3 An Excess of Apparent Refutations, the Alleged Need for Wise Men, 
and More on the Rejection of a Trivially True Account of 
Rationality in Science 
 
Of Popper's commentators who presuppose  WPF,  some reject or at least do not always turn 
to dogmatism or faith in an effort to explain or justify the retention of core beliefs in the face 
of anomalies.  Two such commentators - one sympathetic, the other not - are Alan Musgrave 
and Harold Brown, respectively.  I shall begin with Musgrave. 
 
Musgrave is in two minds on this problem.  Sometimes he simply wears the consequences of  
WPF.  Thus, in concluding an analysis of Lakatos's account and its relation to the history of 
Newtonian mechanics, he says, "We surely do find this: some hypotheses have persisted 
over long periods despite many apparent refutations of them," a conclusion which others 
have been driven to as well.42  Almost in the next breath, however, forced to explain "the 
'continuity' of Newton's theory", Musgrave says, "It survived simply because it was a very 
good theory, it was not made unfalsifiable by fiat, but was difficult to falsify in fact."43  This 
is a good point, but it is striking that Musgrave does not notice the problem of how it can  
supposedly have been easy to produce prima facie or apparent refutations of a theory that 
was difficult to refute?  It is breathtaking that so many people should ever feel the need to 
explain the survival of a "very good theory" in what is supposed to be a paradigm discipline.  
As to Musgrave's first claim above, we surely do not find that hypotheses are apparently 
refuted as often as he would have us believe is the case.  The world would be a queer place 
if we did, as the following analogy illustrates. 
 
In the genre of the detective story, one of the stock devices writers employ is to construct the 
narrative in such a way that it first appears as though the crime was committed by some 
character other than the criminal.  But what if life were to imitate art in this respect as often 
as Musgrave believes that theories which appear to be responsible for false predictions turn 
out to be innocent of them?  In this bizarre world detectives would quickly develop a healthy 
skepticism concerning any fact they would otherwise have counted as good evidence of a 
criminal act except that it happened to come to light early in the investigation.  Thus, 
experienced detectives would be disinclined to take someone into custody, for example, 
whom they surprised at the scene of the crime shortly after it was committed, in possession 
of the necessary implements and with a prima facie good reason for committing it.  Some 
other suspect, however, who had, say, a reasonable alibi and little apparent motive for 
committing the crime would not receive such favourable treatment. 
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Turning to Brown, in Perception, Theory and Commitment, he claims that an outstanding 
feature of what he calls the "new philosophy of science" is the "rejection of formal logic as 
the primary tool for the analysis of science" in favour of the "detailed study of the history of 
science".44  According to Brown, rationality in science is no longer characterised by 
algorithmic decision making, which in principle machines can do, but by decision making of 
the sort for which there is no algorithm or rule but where decisions require the informed and 
deliberative judgement of the skilled practitioners themselves.  "I offer the making of these 
decisions", he says, "as a model of rational thought", and those who make such decisions are 
"men of practical wisdom" in Aristotle's sense.45  For Brown, Leverrier and Adams are 
paradigm cases of such decision makers, two of his favourites.  Brown's view of these two 
scientists stands in marked contrast to that of Popper and others we have examined for 
whom they were Newtonian dogmatists (though none of these philosophers is ever moved to 
describe them as such). 
 
To develop his model of rational thought in science, Brown appeals to cases where informed 
and deliberative judgements in the application of social rules are called for.  He says:  
Aristotle gives the following description of equity:  "A correction of the law where it is 
defective owing to its universality."  The problem Aristotle is concerned with is that we 
sometimes encounter a situation that falls under existing laws, so that justice requires that 
we act in accordance with the law, but in which it seems unfair to apply the letter of the 
law.  This may occur because in the formulation of universal laws it is impossible to 
foresee and make provision for every circumstance.  The man of practical wisdom must be 
able to recognize this and correct the universal law in accordance with the demands of a 
particular situation. 
 
An analogous point holds in the scientific case.  Suppose, for example, we adopt a 
methodology which requires us to reject any theory inconsistent with a well confirmed 
falsifying hypothesis, and regard the postulation of Uranus [a trans-Uranian planet] . . . in 
this light.  We can now view Leverrier and Adams . . . as scientists who applied the general 
rule to the particular case and judged that although the rule applied, the case in question 
required special consideration and thus the rule was suspended. 
 
It is the ability to decide how an exceptional case should be handled that is characteristic of 
rationality.46 
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The first thing to be said about Brown's argument is:  where is the concern for history that is 
supposed to characterise the new philosophy of science?  Brown merely assumes that the 
counter-argument from Uranus's residuals was a well confirmed falsifying hypothesis. And 
he makes no attempt to support his notion that Leverrier and Adams were mavericks who 
refused to apply a certain rule because they saw the case in question as an exception to that 
rule.  Did they even know of this rule, much less refrain from applying it?  What was the 
"special consideration" they supposedly realised this case called for?  Brown does not say. 
 
There is no evidence that either scientist regarded this case as exceptional in the way Brown 
suggests, and each of them recognized that his approach was in line with how  all previous 
such anomalies had been successfully removed.  Brown comes to believe this case is 
exceptional because Popper induces him to believe that the argument from Uranus's 
residuals was "well confirmed", and therefore unlikely to fail.  
 
Brown also thinks, however, that the so-called new philosophy of science starts (roughly) 
with Kuhn.  So it is not surprising that he elsewhere implies that this case was not 
exceptional, by selecting it to illustrate Kuhn's normal science - a notion he essentially 
approves.  When Brown is following Kuhn he thinks of the increase in gravitational 
acceleration away from the equator or of the irregularities in the orbit of Uranus as 
"observational discoveries which, logically speaking, could have been taken as counter-
instances [but which] became, instead, research problems to be solved by the proper 
application or further development of the theory".47  That is to say, they are cases to be 
handled in the normal way, not in any exceptional way. 
 
Furthermore, a major influence on Brown's thinking that logic should take second place to 
history in the analysis of science is clearly faulty logic, something else he shares with Kuhn.  
An observation statement,  O , is (or perhaps describes) a counter-instance of a theory,  T , 
if, and only if,  O  is true and  O  and  T  are contraries.  If 'Artichoke is a vegetarian dog' is 
true then it is a counter-instance of 'All dogs are carnivorous'.  But the observation that 
freely falling bodies accelerate at different rates across the surface of the Earth, for example, 
is not a counter-instance of the law of gravitation.  These two propositions are not contraries 
for both can be true, a point that is emphasised by the fact that Newton showed that an 
explanans which retained the law but which included a different assumption about the shape 
of the Earth could explain the observed variation in gravitational acceleration.  And no 
satisfactory explanans can be the contrary of its explanandum.  The fallacy that if a true 
observation statement is inconsistent with a prediction then it is a counter-instance of the 
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theory from which that prediction was derived is, as we have seen, the fallacy which 
underpins  SPF  and  WPF. 
 
But what of Brown's analysis of the "practical wisdom" which, let us allow, Leverrier and 
Adams did display?  Does his analogy with inequities in the application of social rules cut 
any ice?  Consider the rule that a competitor in a breast stroke race finishes such a race just 
when that competitor, having swum the required distance, touches the end of the pool with 
both hands simultaneously.  Let us call this rule the finishing rule.  It is an unintended 
consequence of the finishing rule that no one handed swimmer can finish such a race.  In one 
Australian competition recently this fact was brought to the attention of race officials by the 
coach of a beaten two handed swimmer.  The rule was invoked, and a one handed swimmer 
was stripped of the third place he had just been awarded.  Taking this to be the sort of case 
Brown has in mind, what should be done about it or about cases like it?  If we merely 
suspend the finishing rule, as Brown believes Leverrier did in allegedly analogous 
circumstances, how is any swimmer, one handed or two handed, to finish such a race?  Since 
it would not be fair to let anyone begin a race which cannot officially be completed, Brown's 
suggestion is not one that would lead to an equitable result.  We should ammend the 
finishing rule, or invent a new one, not merely suspend it. 
 
On the other hand, I do not deny that an informed and deliberative judgement may need to 
be made by race officials in this case to remove the inequity.  But the informed and 
deliberative judgement Brown has in mind is one that would prevent inequities of this sort 
from occurring, for he is concerned with how laws or rules should be, as he puts it, 
corrected.  We would still have to decide whether or not it was equitable to apply any 
amended rule to the case which led us to make that amendment.  And it would be a mistake 
to think that in amending one rule we may not be following another.  In amending the two 
hands rule, for example, we may well be following, albeit amongst doing other things, the 
general rule that equality of opportunity should not be denied people with disabilities. 
 
So even if Brown's analogy with inequitable social rules were to hold good it would show 
little more than that some old philosophers of science needed to change the rules they 
thought scientists ought to follow, not that they needed to change their belief in the 
importance of rule following to rationality in science. 
 
But there is, in any case, an important disanalogy between a case such as the two hands rule 
and the Popperian rule, 'Reject any theory for which there is a well confirmed falsifying 
hypothesis'.  In the former case, we need to encounter or imagine a situation such as that of 
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the one handed swimmer to see what is wrong with the rule in question.  But you don't need 
to know an aphelion from a perihelion to advise any astronomer not to follow the latter rule.  
There is no consideration that is special to any case such as that of Uranus's residuals which 
supplies the reason for rejecting this rule, a fact which goes a long way to explaining 
Brown's silence on just what was the special consideration he believes Leverrier and Adams 
exercised.  This Popperian rule is open to the logical objection that it is not rational to reject 
a falsifiedp theory as a truth candidate, for such a theory may be true. 
 
In a review of Brown's analysis, Harvey Siegel remarks that it is "fine as far as it goes".  He 
says that "Brown is on firm ground in holding that it was rational for scientists like Leverrier 
. . . to ignore methodological rules in certain instances".  Where Brown falls short, Siegel 
thinks, is in failing to see that "we need to know when it is justifiable to hold on to 
hypotheses in the face of contradictory evidence, and when not".48  If by 'hold on to' is 
meant 'believe' or 'accept', then the short answer to Siegel is that it is never justifiable to hold 
on to such hypotheses, if one accepts that evidence.  However, Siegel does then say that 
"Brown's account offers no criteria by which we can assess the justifiability of [such] 
decisions", which suggests that he does recognize that Brown has failed to explain how 
Leverrier's decision was rational.49 Brown does not see this failure for when Siegel points 
out that "informed human judgement may well be a necessary condition of rationality, [but] 
it is surely not a sufficient condition",50 Brown replies, "What more does Siegel want?"51 
 
Since Leverrier's judgement was correct - Uranus was sensibly perturbed by an exterior 
planet - Brown is not prodded to consider whether or not it was also rational.  However, 
suppose that Leverrier had shown that all Uranus's residuals were merely errors in Bouvard's 
tables, yet still insisted on rejecting the assumption that only Jupiter and Saturn sensibly 
perturb the planet.  What would Brown say in this case?  He could say, "Well, that's an 
informed judgement too, so that's rational", from which it follows that anything goes.  Or he 
could say, "Leverrier was misinformed, so his judgement was not rational".  But what would 
Leverrier have been misinformed about?  Not about the relevant astronomical facts.  And if 
Brown were to suggest that Leverrier did not understand that a successful prediction is not a 
reason for rejecting any of the propositions on which that prediction is based, he would be 
implying that there is a condition or criterion of rationality against which Leverrier had been 
measured, and (correctly) found wanting.  On the other hand, if an informed judgement that  
p  is for Brown only one in which the person making that judgement has good reason to 
believe or entertain  p , then his proposal is empty.  It is merely a stipulation that 'informed' 
means, in part, 'rational'. 
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I have suggested that scientific practice is rational only if the approaches its practitioners 
adopt to the removal of anomalies are guided by the epistemic and pragmatic reasons 
available for such courses of action.  Unless one doubts that there are reasons for courses of 
action this is an innocuous suggestion, and one that would be almost trivial were it not for 
the fact that many people have come to believe otherwise.  Many fail to see this point, even 
if they reject the negative heuristic or do not follow Popper in holding every course of action 
other than attempting to replace the major theory concerned, assuming there is one, to be a 
form of avoidance behaviour.  I consider a sample of such cases below, to add to that of 
Brown and others above, beginning again with Musgrave. 
 
At first, Musgrave considers the approach I have suggested.  But he passes over it in favour 
of a suggestion of the later Kuhn that a "diversity of response" is desirable.52  Musgrave 
favours diversity so that "no promising line of research gets neglected", but he also agrees 
with Kuhn that it is "the community's way of distributing risk".53  Now I do not deny that 
one can often find such diversity or that it is often rationally desirable, just as one can often 
find that practitioners replace propositions in the so-called protective belt and that this is 
often rationally desirable.  But Musgrave misses the point here much as Lakatos did. 
 
I have several points about Musgrave's blanket recommendation of diversity.  Firstly, if 
there is no diversity of promising lines of research in a particular case why recommend a 
diversity of response in that case?  The anomaly of Uranus's orbit, which Musgrave often 
discusses, might have alerted him to this point.  Of the possible lines of inquiry that were 
suggested in this case only the hypothesis of a trans-Uranian planet was ever promising.  (It 
might be thought that the possibility that the anomaly was an artifact was also promising, 
since Uranus's residuals were in part errors in Bouvard's analysis, as Leverrier demonstrated 
in his first paper on the subject.  Grosser remarks, however, that "one of the least expected 
consequences" of this paper was "the complete discrediting of Alexis Bouvard".)54 
 
Secondly, if Musgrave does believe that Newton's theory was apparently refuted as often as 
he implies, he should also believe that there was at most only ever one promising line of 
inquiry in any such case.  Checking or repeating calculations or tests, investigating 
presuppositions, or trying out novel auxiliary propositions would all have been unpromising 
activities had Newton's theory ever in fact appeared to be responsible for a predictive failure.  
Modifications to this theory were sometimes tried, it is true, but as Hanson remarked - with 
obvious exaggeration to mark the point - to have done away with Newtonian mechanics in 
nineteenth century astronomy would have been "to refuse to think about the planets at all".55 
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Thirdly, no promising line of inquiry need be neglected if there is no diversity of response, 
for lines of inquiry can be worked seriatim.  Suppose there are two promising lines but only 
three scientists available to work them, and that it requires at least two scientists per line to 
produce reliable results.  Diversity of response would not be a rational policy in this case.  It 
would be rational to work these lines, if need be, one after the other.  Activities like 
managing an investment fund or gambling on a horse race are activities in which success 
depends upon foregoing some, usually many, possible lucrative courses of action, and hence 
there is a risk of failure to be distributed in such cases.  But activities like repairing the 
tables of Uranus, or trying to find which key, if any, of a bundle of keys is the one to the 
garden shed, need not involve foregoing any such courses of action.  Costs may attach to 
choosing unsuccessful courses of action in such activities, of course, but they need not, and 
often do not, jeopardise the primary goal of that activity.  We can find the right key to the 
garden shed even if it is the last one we try. 
 
Finally, if we take into account only how promising is a line of inquiry in deciding whether 
or not to follow it, the pragmatic reasons for (or against) any such course of action are not 
counted. 
 
On a later occasion, Musgrave makes a similar recommendation of diversity, this time in 
relation to research programmes.  Again he offers the justifications of wanting no promising 
line of inquiry to be neglected and to distribute the risk of failure.56  Once again, however, it 
needs to be pointed out that there may be no good reason to have rival research programmes.  
The history of celestial mechanics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, 
might have alerted Musgrave to the point that a research programme with a monopoly need 
not be a bad thing in science. 
 
While Musgrave can at least see some merit in the suggestion that it can be more rational to 
first tackle an anomaly one way rather than another, John Worrall, for example, in a 
criticism of Noretta Koertge, gives the impression of being thoroughly skeptical of it.  
Worrall's criticism of Koertge, however, rests on conflating attempting to solve a problem 
with solving a problem - a conflation he does not notice in Koertge, who would otherwise be 
on the right track.  Let us begin with Koertge to see how this confusion arises. 
 
In "Towards a New Theory of Scientific Inquiry", Koertge claims to have solved the Duhem 
(or Duhem-Quine) problem, which she simplifies as, "In the case of a prediction failure, 
when is the theory itself (as opposed to auxiliary hypotheses) refuted?"57  To illustrate her 
solution, Koertge considers two kinds of anomalies which confronted Mendeleev in the 
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construction of the Periodic Table.  One of these was the "problem of reversed pairs".58  An 
instance of this problem, Koertge says, is that iodine should have been located after 
tellurium in the table "because of its valence and other chemical and physical properties".  
However, "this order did not correspond to that given by the best available atomic weight 
data".59  As Koertge describes Mendeleev's problem, then, he could reject the Periodic Law 
of chemical elements,  T , (option #1).  Or he could reject the assumption that in the 
experimental determination of the atomic weight of iodine, the gaseous iodine was impure,  
A , (option #2).  Of these two options, Koertge says: 
Option #1 is undesirable because it would necessitate the very laborious task of trying to 
invent a replacement for T.  It would be a shame to go through that process if there's any 
decent chance that T might in fact be true and in fact T has had a large number of empirical 
successes. 
 
Option #2 is more desirable because it is generally a fairly easy and routine matter to check 
on the purity of materials.  Furthermore, although we have as yet no direct evidence that 
the iodine is contaminated, this conjecture does have a certain prior plausibility, given our 
past experience concerning the difficulty of purifying chemicals, especially gases.  On 
balance, option 2 [sic] is definitely indicated.60 
But indicated for what?  For belief or acceptance instead of option #1?  Or for investigation 
ahead of option #1?  Clearly, an epistemic reason such as that there is a "certain prior 
plausibility" though "as yet no direct evidence" that the iodine gas was impure would be a 
poor reason for believing (or accepting) option #2, and the pragmatic reason that it was "a 
fairly easy and routine matter to check on the purity of materials" would be a bizarre reason 
for believing that some material was impure.  The fact that it is easy to check whether or not 
there is any sugar in my tea, for example, is not a reason for believing that there is.  Equally 
clearly, however, both the epistemic and pragmatic reasons Koertge evinces for option #2 
would be good reasons for investigating that option first.  But that is not the Duhem 
problem.  The Duhem problem is which option should we believe or accept. 
 
Koertge concludes: 
It is probably fairly obvious by now that the underlying structure of my rather informal 
analysis of Mendeleev's two problem situations is a decision-theoretic one.  What we have 
done is to lay out the possible options and then try to estimate the expected scientific utility 
of each.  Thus for each option, we have asked two questions: 
(i) How scientifically desirable would its outcome be if it were 
successful? 
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 (ii) How likely is this option to be successful? 
Put more precisely, the two basic appraisals we have tried to make are these: 
(i)  How interesting or informative or explanatory would  X  be if 
it were true? 
and 
 (ii) What is the probability that  X  is true? 
I believe that most theories of scientific inquiry proposed by philosophers of science so far 
have either conflated these two appraisals or ignored one of them.61 
Clearly, however, if one's concern were the Duhem problem, the question to be faced would 
be, 'Which option is the successful one?' or 'Is  X  true?'  So the fact that, for example, it 
would indeed be more interesting or informative to learn that there was a planet beyond 
Uranus rather than merely that some telescope was incorrectly mounted has no bearing on 
whether or not one should believe or accept the former possibility rather than the latter, 
though it may induce some to investigate the former ahead of the latter. 
 
Even once we recognize what problem Koertge would solve, however, there are at least a 
couple of things wrong with her questionnaire.  Firstly, the question, 
 What is the probability that  X  is true?  
is not, as she asserts, a more precise formulation of 
 How likely is this option ['X  is true'] to be successful? 
The probability of cognitive success in respect of 'X  is true' is a function of more  than the 
probability of 'X  is true'.  For example, suppose that in explaining some event,  E , historian  
A  presupposes that two commodities,  X  and  Y , were in long supply at the time.  Historian  
B  points out that if either  X  or  Y , were in short supply then some other explanation of  E  
is called for.  Now it may be equiprobable, for all anyone knows, that  X  and  Y  were both 
in long supply at that time but there may be a much more reliable means of determining 
whether or not  X  was than  Y, for example, by checking shipping office records rather than 
by garnering chance remarks from letters or diaries.  Secondly, Koertge's questionnaire does 
not elicit any of the pragmatic reasons for courses of action, though reasons of this sort do 
figure prominently in her case study, as we have seen. 
 
Turning now to Worrall, he begins his criticism of Koertge, under the sub-heading "The 
Duhem Problem", thus: 
Noretta Koertge hopes to find a methodology which will demarcate those situations in 
which the better or more promising or more rational solution of the inconsistency [between 
prediction and observation] is for scientists to look for replacements for  T , from those 
situations in which the better solution is for scientists to look for replacements for  A.  I 
wish her luck, but I do not think she will succeed.62 
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Worrall conflates 'the better solution' here with 'the better way of looking for the better 
solution', which in all probability explains his skepticism, for the most promising line of 
inquiry need not be the one that will succeed in removing the anomaly.  But this fact is no 
objection to anyone who supposes that some lines of inquiry are more promising than others 
or that, other things being equal, it is better or more rational to pursue those lines first. 
 
 
4.4  Ad Hoc Hypotheses, Circularity, and Avoidance: A Further Defence of the 
Rationality of the Trans-Uranian Planet Conjecture 
 
The climate of suspicion or hostility which in certain quarters surrounds the introduction of 
auxiliary hypotheses, such as those that we examined in 2.3, also extends to hypotheses such 
as the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis.  Popper is responsible for much of this unhealthy 
climate.  As we have seen, although he asserts that the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis was 
not ad hocp, his account of it is characterised by a strong suggestion of guilt by association.  
The hypothesis is branded like so-called ad hoc hypotheses as a means of avoiding a 
refutation and is discussed side-by-side with such hypotheses.  It is variously spoken of as 
one of those "ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses", as having been introduced ad hoc, as having had 
"only . . . one ad hoc reason" going for it, and as having been (if not untestable) at least 
"difficult to test", and so on.63  If one were to believe Popper, the only saving grace of this 
hypothesis at the time it was introduced would seem to have been that it was independently 
testable - a logical property it shared with each of the other putative explanations for 
Uranus's residuals. 
 
It is thus perhaps not altogether surprising to find that several of Popper's commentators 
assert or imply, if sometimes unintentionally, that there is something fishy about this 
hypothesis, or about the reasoning of Adams or Leverrier in formulating one or other version 
of it.  It will be clear from what I have said earlier on these matters that I reject these claims.  
But let us inspect the arguments of three such commentators.  Firstly, I consider Newton-
Smith, who approves of this hypothesis, but does not rule out the possibility that it is ad 
hocp.  His concern is, apparently, with whether or not the hypothesis was open only to a 
circular defence and, if so, does this matter.  Secondly, I consider Adolf Grünbaum and 
Jarrett Leplin, both of whom disapprove of this hypothesis, though to varying degrees, but 
who disagree about whether or not it was in some sense ad hoc. 
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Newton-Smith says: 
One of Popper's strategies . . . involves forbidding us to make ad hoc moves in the face of 
an anomaly.  If we can only preserve our theory by making an ad hoc move, out it goes . . . 
. When is a move ad hoc?  It is clear from his examples that the intuitive content of saying 
that a move is ad hoc is that it involves a justification which runs in a circle.  To explain 
the storm at sea by appeal to Neptune's anger is ad hoc if the justification for the claim that 
Neptune is angry is that there is a storm at sea.  Take my simple theory that all swans are 
white.  Suppose the scientific elite is inclined to assent to the basic sentence that there is a 
black swan on the Cherwell.  If I defend my theory by claiming that some things that look 
like swans (identical up to colour) are not in fact swans my move is ad hoc if my only 
justification is the theory that all swans are white.  While this seems reasonable in the 
abstract, attention to actual scientific practice shows that it is not.  For instance, consider 
the apparent anomaly for Newtonian mechanics due to the observed motion of Uranus.  
The scientific community did not give up Newtonian mechanics.  Instead they posited the 
existence of Neptune.  The only justification for making this move at the time was the fact 
that the theory was pretty good.64 
 
I have argued in relation to Popper's case of the storm at sea that someone who asserts that  p  
is an explanation, or a probable explanation, of  q  is not embroiled in any "justification 
which runs in a circle" if that person has no justification for  p  other than  q.  If I return 
home to find our front door wide open and our video recorder missing, I would conclude 
that we had been burgled.  There is no circularity in my asserting or believing this 
explanation even if I have as yet no independent evidence that we have been burgled.  My 
reason for believing that our front door is wide open and that our video recorder is missing is 
not that we have been burgled. 
 
There may be, however, a circular argument in the second case Newton-Smith considers - 
that of the black swan on the Cherwell - which he models, if unsuccessfully, on Popper's 
case of the storm at sea.  I shall set this case out as a dialogue, which is the form Newton-
Smith presumably intends: 
(1) Newton-Smith:   All swans are white. 
(2) Scientific elite:   There is a black swan on the Cherwell. 
(3) Newton-Smith:   Some things that look like swans (identical 
up to colour) are not in fact swans [and this 
is one of them]. 
(4) Scientific elite:   What justification can you give for this? 
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(5) Newton-Smith:   All swans are white [and those who claim to 
have seen a black swan are good observers, 
so what they saw must have been a 
simulacrum]. 
 
If this dialogue is what Newton-Smith intends, then he commits the fallacy of begging the 
question or petitio principii at (5) for 'All swans are white' is still under challenge.  The basis 
of his defence of 'All swans are white' is, in part, that all swans are white.  So his argument 
is circular.  But is it a "justification which runs in a circle"?  If by this expression Newton-
Smith has in mind an argument of the sort in which, put simply,  p  is used to justify  q  
when  q  has already been used to justify  p  then this is not such an argument.  Newton-
Smith uses 'All swans are white' as a (partial) justification of the simulacrum hypothesis 
which in turn justifies his rejection of the alleged sighting of a black swan.  But there is no 
suggestion that he uses this rejection to try to justify the theory that all swans are white.  (He 
could do so, however, for 'There is no black swan on the Cherwell' is entailed by this 
theory.) 
 
Newton-Smith's talk of an ad hoc move above is inspired, as with Musgrave for example (p. 
71 above), by the fact that the simulacrum hypothesis is designed to protect the belief that all 
swans are white, and that its designer resists the call at (4) for some independent reason to 
believe this hypothesis.  The simulacrum hypothesis is not of course ad hoc in Popper's 
sense, that is, ad hocp, though this point eludes Newton-Smith. 
 
Although Newton-Smith seems set to reject the pattern of reasoning he does or would 
illustrate in this case (even if he is unclear or does not know why he should do so), he then 
convinces himself that this pattern is the same as that which the scientific community 
displayed in dealing with Uranus's residuals, and thus that it is perfectly acceptable.  A 
fallacy, it would seem, is to receive the imprimatur of science.  This is a familiar ploy.  The 
irrational is held to be rational because of how science is thought to work.  We have 
previously been invited to believe that certain theories require minders, that dogmatism is 
good, and that men of practical wisdom are licensed to ignore contradictions.  Are we now 
being invited to add circular reasoning to this list?  That is certainly the impression one gets 
from this passage. 
 
I have constructed the dialogue above to bring out the fallacy of begging the question 
because it seems clear that it is this fallacy Newton-Smith is alluding to with his imprecise 
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remark about a justification running in a circle.  There is some room for doubt here, 
however, as to whether or not he does commit this fallacy. 
 
Firstly, Newton-Smith seems to describe a dialogue which goes only as far as (3).  He does 
assert that the only justification he has for the simulacrum hypothesis is that all swans are 
white, but he does not say either that he has offered this justification to the scientific elite, or 
even that they have requested any justification for this hypothesis.  On the first point, if 
Newton-Smith understands begging the question he would refrain from the would-be 
justification he is held to offer at (5).  A rational response to: 
(4) Scientific elite:    What justification do you have for this [the 
simulacrum hypothes]? 
would be 
(5)' Newton-Smith :   Well, none that will satisfy you (or me), so 
I'm off to the Cherwell to try to get some. 
As to the second point, the scientific elite may not even bother with the justification request 
I have them making at (4).  If they have a low tolerance of eccentric philosophers they may 
simply stop talking to Newton-Smith once they have heard his response to their claim that a 
black swan had been sighted. 
 
Secondly, what Newton-Smith has in mind to justify is, in any case, not a belief but a move.  
He is confused about this point because he conflates propositions, which one may wish to 
justify believing, with moves, which one can only justify making.  A striking instance of this 
conflation is the following remark by him, made shortly after the above passage: "The 
criterion Popper employs to distinguish between good and bad auxiliary hypotheses is that 
of independent testability.  A move is not ad hoc if it is independently testable."65  Moves 
are such things, however, as 'accepting  p ' and 'justifying  q '.  They are acts; it does not 
make sense to ask whether or not 'accepting  p ' is independently testable.  Since the sort of 
moves Newton-Smith principally has in mind, so I will argue, are those of entertaining 
propositions, his conflation of justifying believing a proposition with justifying making a 
move cashes out as the familiar conflation of justifying beliefs with justifying suppositions. 
 
Now there is no rational objection to a move of the sort which results in (3) above, and 
which Newton-Smith singles out as ad hoc.  This is a corollary of the point I reiterated 
above in the case of the storm at sea.  There is no fallacy that Newton-Smith commits in 
formulating or entertaining the simulacrum hypothesis though his only justification for 
doing so is that 'All swans are white' has been (let us allow) hitherto well supported - and 
that certain members of the scientific elite are good observers.  (He denies that any reason 
  
  
 
176 
other than the former is involved; but if he did not think that those observers were good he 
would not suggest they had seen a simulacrum, but perhaps a duck, or that the light had 
played tricks on them.)  If we deny all moves like (3) we stifle inquiry.  What if the alleged 
swan is a simulacrum?  What if our house has been burgled?  By all means point out to 
Newton-Smith that he is probably clutching at straws, and that if he wants anyone to believe 
his hypothesis he will need to do better than merely the reasons he so far has for entertaining 
it.  Moreover, as with the case of Popper's biologist that we examined in 2.2 above (p. 57), 
we need to be assured that it is not a tautology that Newton-Smith is asserting when he utters 
the sentence 'All swans are white' in the dialogue above. 
 
When Newton-Smith finally arrives at the case of Uranus's residuals, it is clear that what he 
thinks needs to be justified is, as he puts it, the positing of a suitable exterior planet, not the 
belief that such a planet exists.  Moreover, he is quite correct in thinking that the fact that 
Newton's theory was "pretty good" is a reason for entertaining that conjecture, for making 
that move.  But he is quite wrong in supposing that, as we have seen, it was the only reason 
for doing so.  Unlike the case of the 'theory' that all swans are white, the counter-argument 
for Newton's theory in the case of Uranus's residuals was not strong, and there were good 
epistemic and pragmatic reasons for preferring the exterior planet hypothesis to the other 
possibilities suggested. 
 
By overlooking such reasons and comparing this case with others that are unscientific or 
merely bizarre curiousities, Newton-Smith does little for our understanding of the rationality 
of entertaining novel auxiliary hypotheses in science.  Similarly, there is nothing remotely 
resembling a circular justification, or any other kind of circular reasoning, in the rational 
conclusion of the scientific community that the exterior planet hypothesis was the one to 
explore.  And if Adams or Leverrier would justify some measure of belief in this hypothesis, 
he can do so by pointing to the fact that it would remove the anomaly of Uranus's residuals 
from a hitherto well supported theory and that this hypothesis is consistent with existing 
knowledge of the trans-Uranian region.  He need not then justify his belief in that theory by 
pointing to the repairs he has just made with this hypothesis to the prediction of the motion 
of Uranus; it is highly implausible to imagine or suggest that either would have done so.  
 
Turning now to Grünbaum and Leplin, I shall first examine their opinions about the logical 
status of the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis - was it in some sense ad hoc? - before 
considering their objections, real or imagined, to this hypothesis. 
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Grünbaum distinguishes three senses of 'ad hoc hypothesis'.  Put simply, a hypothesis is "ad 
hoca" at time  t  for Grünbaum only if it has no independently testable consequence for 
which there is either "empirical sanction or disapprobation" at  t.  More strongly, a 
hypothesis is "ah hocb" for him only if no such consequence is known at  t.  More strongly 
still, it is "ad hocc" only if there is no such consequence at all.66  An ad hocc hypothesis is 
thus the same, in this important respect, as what I have called an ad hocp hypothesis.  By 
constructing a hierarchy of types of hypothesis in this manner, however, all gathered under 
the general classification 'ad hoc', Grünbaum gives a gloss of logical respectability to 
Popper's purely rhetorical attack on reasonable auxiliary hypotheses as 'ad hoc'. 
 
Now according to Grünbaum, the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis was ad hoca.  This is 
false. It is a consequence of any of the hypotheses of trans-Uranian planets that Leverrier or 
Adams formulated, for example, that none of these planets would cause any significant 
perturbations in Saturn's orbit, a consequence which had the "empirical sanction" of the fact 
that the tables for Saturn were in good agreement with observation at the time.67  This same 
fact of course constituted an "empirical . . . disapprobation" of the hypothesis of an intra-
Uranian planet, because of the perturbations that such a planet would cause in Saturn.  The 
trans-Uranian planet hypothesis was of course designed not only to remove one anomaly, 
but to avoid generating others.  Another, if perhaps weaker, empirical sanction of this 
hypothesis, and one that it was not designed to secure, was the fact that such a distant planet 
would likely be so inconspicuous as to have gone thus far undetected, which of course was 
the case.  Had someone suggested, however implausibly, a planet with an angular diameter 
equal to that of, say, Saturn, one of the first questions that person would have faced would 
have been:  why have we not noticed this planet before? 
 
Grünbaum contends that his notion of an ad hoca hypothesis explicates Popper's remark that 
the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis was "introduced ad hoc".68  On syntactical grounds 
alone, however, this is implausible.  It is much more plausible to suppose that 'ad hoc' is 
being used by Popper here simply in its ordinary English sense. 
 
Leplin sensibly rejects Grünbaum's classification of the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis as 
even weakly ad hoc, and he thinks that Grünbaum is on the wrong track in regarding ad 
hocness as an "epistemic concept" rather than a "methodological concept".69  Ad hocness, 
Leplin claims, is "used not to assess the extant or prospective empirical support of a 
hypothesis, but to assail the type of response the hypothesis represents" to some problem.70  
But ad hocness is an epistemic or a purely logical concept.  Leplin fails to distinguish the 
logical or epistemic basis or criterion for classifying a hypothesis as ad hoc from the 
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methodological rule proscribing or tut-tutting any hypothesis so classified.  To illustrate this 
point, take 'analyticity', which is clearly a logical notion.  Suppose I point out to someone 
whose advice about tomorrow's weather is that it may or may not rain that it is no business 
of any such adviser to dispense analyticities.  This does not make analyticity a 
methodological concept.  The concept of drag, for example, is a fluid mechanical concept; 
the concept of cross-infection is a medical concept.  Neither is a methodological concept 
because we advise aircraft designers and nurses to take steps to minimize the incidence of 
drag and cross-infection, respectively. 
 
Leplin would be at least less likely to make this mistake if he and Grünbaum were arguing in 
a similar vein about analyticity rather than adhocness.  This would be so, I conjecture, 
largely because 'analyticity' and its cognates are not used in ordinary English, and only 
occasionally or rarely in philosophical and scientific discourse, to qualify methodological 
terms.  Not so, of course, 'ad hoc'.  We speak of a move, or a procedure, or a strategy as ad 
hoc.  In the unlikely event that it was equally common or natural in all of the above 
discourses to speak of analyticity moves (or analytic moves) when assailing the response of, 
say, my would-be adviser on the weather, Leplin would probably repeat his mistake with ad 
hocness and describe analyticity as a methodological concept. 
 
Leplin's conditions for a hypothesis to be ad hoc are many, though all of them are, as one 
would expect, either logical or epistemic.  The key condition he now thinks is this:  a 
hypothesis,  h , is ad hoc relative to some theory,  T , and some "empirical result",  e , only if 
"there are problems for  T  other than  e  which there is reason to require that a solution to  e  
solve or help to solve as well."71  Clearly, this is an epistemic condition;  it is a condition 
that  h  explain certain empirical results besides  e.  Since there were few, if any, such results 
confronting Newtonian mechanics at the time, apart from Uranus's residuals, Leplin does not 
count the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis as ad hoc.  Even so, he is no friend of this 
hypothesis, as we shall see. 
 
Leplin does seem to be closer here than Popper ever comes, however, to giving an account 
of what scientists characteristically or often mean when they describe a hypothesis as ad 
hoc.  But we need to bear in mind that any judgement about whether or not the various 
anomalies he refers to are so related may itself be mistaken.  For example, had there been 
problems with residuals in several other planets of the same order as those in Uranus, 
perhaps amongst other anomalies in Newtonian mechanics, I take it Leplin would think the 
above condition of ad hocness satisfied.  Nonetheless, Uranus's residuals could still have 
been caused by Neptune, and other novel auxiliary hypotheses found to explain the other 
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anomalies.  I agree that there would have been considerably less reason for believing or 
supposing that the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis would succeed in this case, which is a 
function of the fact that the support for Newtonian mechanics would have been 
correspondingly weaker.  But this only shows that we can distil talk of ad hocness from such 
analyses, leaving the familiar concern of asking for the reasons or evidence for a 
proposition. 
 
Grünbaum and Leplin both presuppose  WPF.  Both assert that the function of hypotheses 
like the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis is to protect or rescue theories like the law of 
gravitation from refutation.  Leplin regards such hypotheses as a "threat to a falsificationist 
methodology".72  This is false.  They are a threat to Popper's falsificationist methodology, 
or to one like it, but that is all.  Anyone who believes that Neptune has been discovered 
should believe that the assumption that the solar system ends at Uranus has been falsified.  
Leplin says, forcefully, that there were "substantive bases for impugning" the trans-Uranian 
planet hypothesis.73  Grünbaum, however, is equivocal.  At first, he lumps this hypothesis 
together with other so-called ad hoc hypotheses describing them all as "cognitively a deus ex 
machina and hence methodologically somewhat suspect or even quite illegitimate".74  He 
then claims, however, that this hypothesis is amongst those ad hoc hypotheses that are "not . 
. . even peccadilloes";75 next that it "may call [only] for . . . a non-pejorative caveat";76 but 
finally, stiffening his resolve, he says that it "twice evoked an attitude of epistemic caveat 
from no less a nineteenth century astronomer than the Astronomer Royal [Airy]",77 who 
was "rightly uneasy" about it.78  Leplin also relies heavily on certain of Airy's alleged 
beliefs or reasons, and I shall begin my criticism of their attack on this hypothesis by 
examining aspects of Airy's role in events prior to the discovery of Neptune. 
 
Let us begin with the two 'epistemic caveats' Grünbaum refers to above.  In 1834, Airy (who 
was not then Astronomer Royal) wrote to the Reverend T.J. Hussey: 
I have often thought of the irregularity of Uranus, and since the receipt of your letter have 
looked more carefully to it.  It is a puzzling subject, but I give it as my opinion, without 
hesitation, that it is not yet in such a state as to give the smallest hope [emphasis mine] of 
making out the nature of any external action on the planet.79 
And in 1837, writing to Bouvard's nephew, Eugene Bouvard, Airy said: 
I cannot conjecture what is the cause of these errors [in Bouvard's tables], but I am 
inclined, in the first instance, to ascribe them to some error in the perturbations. . .  If it be 
the effect of any unseen body, it will be nearly impossible to ever find out its place. 
(Emphasis mine.)80 
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Since the evidence is, firstly, that Airy made these remarks when no one had conducted any 
analysis of this problem;  secondly, that both Adams and Leverrier were able to make out 
the nature of the "external action" on Uranus and to locate Neptune from their respective 
analyses;  and, thirdly, that modern opinion is that this problem was or could then have been 
solved by their methods or by others, the onus is on Grünbaum to defend Airy.81  He makes 
no attempt to do so, however, merely quoting the above opinions.  For Grünbaum, 
apparently, it is sufficient that Airy became Astronomer Royal in 1835. 
 
But there is more.  Firstly, whatever his other or later opinions, Airy does not express any 
uneasiness or misgiving above about the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis, that is, about the 
hypothesis that, as Grünbaum oversimplifies it, "there is an extra-Uranian planet".82  Airy 
indicated to Bouvard's nephew a tentative preference for another explanation, but his 
skepticism above is reserved for the proposition that an exterior planet could be found by 
analytical means.  One could always have attempted, though it would have been laborious, 
to find the would-be planet by sitting at the telescope, as the Lilienthal Detectives had 
planned to do with the alleged planet between Mars and Jupiter. 
 
Secondly, Airy did an about face on the thorough-going conviction he expresses above that 
the problem was virtually insoluble, though Grünbaum does not mention this fact.  The first 
sign of this about face came at the end of 1845 when Airy remarked of Leverrier's first paper 
on Uranus that  "the theory of Uranus was now, for the first time, placed on a satisfactory 
foundation".83  In this paper, Leverrier concluded that the irregularity in Uranus's motion 
was the result of "outside causes".84 (Emphasis mine.)  In his second paper, Leverrier 
assigned a longitude to the exterior planet whose existence he had earlier hinted at, and Airy 
said of this paper soon after sighting it, "I cannot sufficiently express the feeling of delight 
and satisfaction which I received from it."85  What Airy could not have been but struck by 
in this paper was the near coincidence of the longitude Leverrier had assigned the unknown  
planet with that which Adams had done, a difference of little more than one degree.  (Adams 
had left a brief statement of the results of his investigation with the Astronomer Royal 
several months earlier.)86  Less than a week after he received Leverrier's second paper on 
Uranus, Airy announced to a meeting of the Board of Visitors at the Greenwich Observatory 
that there was now an "extreme probability" of "discovering a new planet in a very short 
time".87   
 
So why does Grünbaum prefer Airy's earlier opinion, one which was formed without the 
benefit of his later acquaintance with these two investigations - the only two ever completed 
before the discovery of Neptune?  If Airy had been rightly uneasy about such investigations 
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only a few years earlier, what has changed to make such unease apparently no longer 
justified?  Grünbaum does not venture to say. 
 
Thirdly, there is, in any case, good reason to doubt that Airy is a reliable source, or at the 
very least that he is one to be taken at face value, in this whole affair.  It is  difficult to 
escape the conclusion that Airy's scientific opinions and behaviour in this case were often 
shaped at least as much by political considerations and personal prejudice or other 
idiosyncracies as by the science of the matter.  To illustrate this point, let me flesh out the 
circumstances that surrounded his avowed sea change on the possibility of determining the 
location of an exterior planet, circumstances that might easily have led to the discovery of 
Neptune but that did not. 
 
Adams had been unable to see Airy in October 1845 when he left the statement of his results 
I mentioned above.88  In this statement, Adams set down the mass and orbital elements of 
the hypothetical planet along with the remaining Uranian residuals, the mean of which was 
just a few seconds of arc.89  Although habitually prompt as a correspondent, Airy did not 
reply to Adams for a fortnight, a delay which Grosser puts down to his doubts about not 
only such investigations but also "the abilities of younger scientists".90  In his reply, Airy 
referred to the elements of Adams's planet as "assumed", which suggests that he thought 
Adams had simply made an educated guess at all the relevant properties of the hypothetical 
body, and then calculated the effect of such a body on Uranus.  Airy also asked whether or 
not his solution would remove the discrepancies in the radius vector of Uranus (the distance 
of the planet from the Sun at any instant).91   
 
Adams was put off by this response of the Astronomer Royal, not least because he thought 
the inquiry about the radius vector trivial, as others were to do.92  It is also plain that he 
would have interpreted Airy's remark about 'assumed' orbital elements as indicating that 
Airy either did not understand or would not acknowledge the problem he was trying to 
solve.93  In any event he did not reply to Airy.94  Thereafter, Airy made little mention of 
Adams's investigation or his proposed solution, and even avoided opportunities for doing so, 
in the remaining months before Neptune's discovery.95  When Leverrier's proposed solution 
landed on Airy's desk in June the following year, he shot off the same question about the 
radius vector to him.96  Leverrier, however, replied, speedily and firmly, pointing out that 
this discrepancy was taken care of along with that in the planet's longitude.97  Airy was 
apparently wholly reassured by this reply, saying he had "no longer any doubt upon the 
reality and general exactness of the [exterior] planet's place".98 
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Now according to Airy the radius vector query was a serious one.  More than that, it was 
crucial.  In an account of the circumstances that might have led to the discovery of Neptune, 
which Airy gave to The Royal Astronomical Society shortly after Neptune was discovered, 
he said that he had thought the question, "Whether the error of the radius vector would be 
explained by the same theory which explained the error of longitude, would be truly an 
experimentum crucis."99  Writing to Challis a month later, Airy said, "On this question, 
therefore, turned the continuance or fall of the law of gravitation."100 
 
Taking Airy to be rational in this regard, some modern commentators date his apparent 
commitment to what we may call the Adams-Leverrier solution to the problem of Uranus's 
orbit from his receipt of Leverrier's assurance that the errors in the radius vector of the 
planet had also been removed.101  On the other hand, no other modern commentator, with 
the probable exception of W.M. Smart, seems to have grasped the significance of the dates 
of this correspondence between Airy and Leverrier.102  Airy wrote to Leverrier with the 
radius vector query on June 26, 1846.103  He received Leverrier's reply five days later, on 
July 1.104  The meeting at Greenwich at which Airy announced the "extreme probability" of 
soon finding a new planet, and which was attended by some important astronomers, took 
place two days earlier, on June 29.105 
 
This is by no means the only puzzling or recondite feature of Airy's behaviour.  For 
example, at this stage he had seen only abstracts or conclusions of the investigations of both 
Leverrier and Adams.  The full mathematical treatments did not appear until much later.106  
Yet for someone who could say, "I have always considered the correctness of a distant 
mathematical result to be a subject rather of moral than mathematical evidence", his doubts 
were seemingly easily allayed.107  Furthermore, Leverrier had not yet supplied, unlike 
Adams, the mass or any orbital element of the hypothetical planet save its longitude.108  
But Airy showed no concern to obtain this information before making the above 
pronouncements, and no interest in doing so once he had.109  Thus Smart is led to ask, "If 
there had been wild disagreement between the two sets of elements, would Airy have been 
so confident in the hypothesis of an exterior planet from the remarkable agreement alone in 
the planet's longitude . . . ?"110 
 
Leverrier asked Airy to look for the hypothetical exterior planet in his reply of July 1, and 
offered to send its "exact position" as soon as his calculations were done.111  Airy did not 
take up this offer, on the excuse that he was leaving soon for Europe.  He was not due to 
leave, however, for almost six weeks, on August 10.112  Nor did he inform Leverrier of 
Adams's investigation, notwithstanding the striking agreement in their respective 
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conclusions as to the planet's longitude.113  The day after he received Leverrier's letter of 
July 1, another revealing incident occurred.  Grosser takes up the story: 
Since June 10, Airy had been host to Peter Andreas Hansen, director of the Seeberg 
Observatory.  Hansen was deeply interested in perturbation theory, and . . . had 
corresponded with Alexis Bouvard in the early 1830's [sic] about the problem of Uranus.  It 
is very probable that Airy and Hansen discussed Leverrier's paper, but an encounter that 
sharply delineated Airy's attitude toward Adams indicated that Hansen was not told about 
the coincidence of Adams's and Leverrier's results.  On July 2, 1846, Airy and Hansen 
visited Cambridge University.  Before this time, Airy had met John Adams only once, with 
Challis;  the meeting must have taken place between December 4 and 6, 1845, but Airy 
"totally forgot where".  Now, on St. John's bridge, Airy and Hansen met Adams by chance.  
One might have expected the Astronomer Royal to take advantage of this golden 
opportunity to publicize Adam's work, perhaps to arrange a meeting.  Airy did neither of 
these things [nor presumably did he mention anything of Leverrier to Adams].  He was 
preoccupied and cool; the only thing he later remembered about the interview was that it 
"might [have lasted] two minutes."  His otherwise excellent memory invariably failed him 
in matters involving Adams.114 
Grosser continues: 
It is possible that Airy's close brush with his conscience may have been partly responsible 
for his actions a week later.  On July 6, he went to visit George Peacock, the Lowndean 
professor of geometry and astronomy at Cambridge; Peacock's questions about the problem 
of Uranus, following close on Airy's chance encounter with Adams, overcome the 
Astronomer Royal's last resistance to the step he had been avoiding so determinedly.  On 
July 9, 1846, Airy wrote to Challis, asking him to begin a search for the hypothetical 
planet.  The Astronomer Royal's letter began with a phrase that was flatly unbelievable to 
anyone familiar with his past actions: 
You know that I attach importance to the examination of that part of the 
heavens in which there is . . . reason for suspecting the existence of a planet 
exterior to Uranus.115 
 
Airy went on to say that the situation was now "almost desperate";116 nonetheless, the 
search he proposed to Challis was a decidedly conservative one, belying the confidence he 
professed to have in the Adams-Leverrier solution.  Airy urged Challis to search not, say, 
five, ten, or even fifteen degrees along the ecliptic, and perhaps a few degrees either side, 
but an area thirty degrees long and ten degrees wide (centred on the ecliptic); and Challis 
agreed to do so.117  Even though an unenthusiastic conscript in this exercise, Challis's 
conservatism led him to map stars down to the eleventh magnitude in this area, despite the 
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advice he received from Adams that the planet would be no duller than the ninth.118  Had 
he acted on this advice, Challis would have had in the order of eight times fewer stars to 
bother with, and the head start he had on Galle of almost two months might well have paid 
off.119 
 
It is always possible, of course, that further historical or scientific research will cast Airy's 
actions or judgements in a more favourable light, though it is a remote possibility that any 
such revisions would be sufficient to justify Grünbaum's position (and there is more 
concerning Airy that would need to be explained away than I have revealed above).120  
Even so, such considerations are not to the point.  The point is that it is the job of 
Grünbaum, and as we shall see Leplin, to address that research which has been done. 
 
Leplin in fact chides Grünbaum for failing to do just that, though his criticism is muddled.  
He points out that the very historian from whom Grünbaum draws his evidence for Airy's 
uneasiness, Morton Grosser, holds that Airy's attitude to Adams's hypothesis is 
"psychosociologically explained" - his prejudice against young astronomers.121  Grünbaum, 
however, could reply that Adams was in short pants at the time Airy expressed the 
uneasiness he cites, and that it had nothing to do with the age of the person conducting the 
investigation.122  More importantly, Leplin proceeds to ignore the very point he tries to 
make stick against Grünbaum, as I shall now explain.   
 
Grosser's view that Airy was, amongst other things, ageist is unmistakable.  He says, in part: 
Airy . . . divided the people around him into two groups:  those who had succeeded and 
were worthy of cultivation, and those who had not succeeded and were beneath 
consideration.  Young people fell almost automatically into the latter group.  Airy affected 
no confidence in their abilities, but in fact he determinedly blocked every opportunity for 
his own young assistants to demonstrate their talents.123 
Leplin simply ignores this judgement of Grosser's.  When he turns his attention to Airy's 
requirement that an exterior planet should also remove the radius vector error, Leplin says 
that Airy "made an issue of this requirement because he thought it possible to explain one 
type of error without explaining the other, and thought that Adams had done so".124  So 
much for 'psychosociological' explanations.  What is Grosser's view of this matter?  He 
believes that such an explanation is called for.   He takes the view that Airy was merely 
trying to rationalise his "negative feelings" about Adams's solution.125  Writing of Airy's 
uncharacteristic delay in replying to Adams, Grosser says:   
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Perhaps it took that long for him to find some suitable scientific basis for his rejection.  He 
found one, characteristically, in his own past work.  In 1838 he had reported to the 
Astronomische Nachrichten that the tabular radius vector of Uranus was too small.126 
Whatever the truth of Grosser's conjecture about  Airy's mental goings on, Leplin at least 
cannot afford to ignore or dismiss it.  Both he and Grünbaum make extensive use of Grosser, 
who would seem to be almost their only source of information about this whole episode.  Of 
all the modern commentators on the discovery of Neptune or of Airy's role in it, however, 
none would be more severe on Airy than Grosser.  Yet this fact causes not the slightest 
perturbation in the account that either Leplin or Grünbaum provides.  Why is this? 
 
Grünbaum and Leplin together have a battery of objections to the trans-Uranian planet 
hypothesis, other than the one-time skepticism of the Astronomer Royal about complex or 
extensive mathematical investigations.  I shall consider these other objections briefly, 
beginning with Grünbaum, and we can then return to answer the question I have raised 
above. 
 
Having cited Airy's remark that it would be "nearly impossible to ever find" the place of an 
exterior planet, Grünbaum says: 
In the same vein [emphasis mine], not only Bessel (Newcomb [1911a], p.227) but of course 
Leverrier were all too aware of the fallibility of the assumptions made - e.g. about the 
masses of perturbing intra-Uranian planets - in the calculation of the Uranian orbit which is 
theoretically expected in the absence of any exterior planet.  Indeed, Grant ([1966], 
Appendix, p.609) provides a table, constructed by Benjamin Peirce, which contains 'the 
results of Le Verrier's attempt to account for the irregularities of the planet without 
supposing it to be influenced by any foreign cause of disturbance'.127 
Taking Grünbaum's first point, if one supposes that the calculation of the mass of, say, 
Saturn is significantly in error, how is one to explain the accuracy of the tables for Jupiter, 
and vice versa?128  Increasing the estimate of the mass of Saturn to remove Uranus's 
residuals would generate undetected residuals in the motions of at least Jupiter and Mars.  
Simon Newcomb, Grünbaum's source, points out that when Bessel tried this approach he 
found that he could succeed with Uranus "only by assigning a mass not otherwise 
admissible".129 
 
As to Grünbaum's second point, since he does not report the contents of Peirce's table - both 
Peirce and Grant were astronomers, contemporaries of Leverrier and Adams - what is his 
point?  Is it merely that Leverrier did consider other options?  If so, why is that remarkable?  
Summarising the portion of the table Grünbaum refers to, namely, Leverrier's no-planet 
hypothesis, the mean residual for the modern observations on this hypothesis is 6".1, and for 
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the ancient observations 230".7.130  The table also shows the residuals for the exterior 
planet hypotheses of Leverrier and Adams.  The corresponding mean residuals for these 
hypotheses are a healthier 1".4 and 8".4, and 1".1 and 15".6, respectively.131  Assuming this 
table is correct, what use, if any, would Grünbaum make of this data?  He does not say. 
 
Turning to Leplin, his major objection to the hypotheses of Adams and Leverrier is the idle 
falsehood that "there was a strong conviction that the postulation of a new planet was 
premature".132  Does Leplin really believe this?  A remark he makes soon after would not 
persuade one that he does.  Leplin says, "It is ironic that astronomers were more reluctant to 
accord Uranus planetary status than they were the cause of its perturbations, as they could 
see Uranus".133  For all that, he continues: 
But they [astronomers] might well have considered it illegitimate to introduce a new planet 
as a solution to the problem of Uranus so long as the possibility of solving the problem by 
reference to known planets was not exhausted.  Adams was more subject than Leverrier to 
this criticism, as Leverrier turned to UH [the trans-Uranian planet hypothesis] . . . only 
after attempting solutions based on revisions, within existing margins of error, of estimates 
of the masses of known bodies.  That UH for Adams was a 'mere assumption', 
insufficiently motivated by the evidential situation and unacceptably extreme among the 
options yet open, is probably an accurate description of Airy's opinion.  These options, 
moreover, still included a Uranian encounter with an unknown comet and an unknown 
Uranian satellite, if the most conservative approach via known bodies proved 
untenable.134 
 
But as we have seen (3.3, 3.5, and immediately above), all of the other options Leplin 
canvasses here had been rejected or passed over by astronomers for the hypothesis of an 
exterior planet, and with good reasons.  Secondly, Airy's suggestion that Adams had merely 
assumed the orbital elements of the planet he postulated was itself a mere assumption.  He 
knew nothing of Adams's method.135  And Leplin seems once again unconcerned by the 
very objection he raises to Grünbaum's historiography where Airy's motives or reasons are 
concerned.  In a footnote to the penultimate sentence of the passage quoted above, Leplin 
even invites us to compare Grosser's account with that of N.R. Hanson, to whom he seems to 
look for support.  Hanson says: 
Although Adams knew (in 1843) that no undisturbed orbit would fit the observations of 
Uranus he assumed that the disturbance was due to an unknown body.  Leverrier's first 
move was to establish this by careful analysis of all available observations.136 
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But it is difficult to see what can be Hanson's point about Adams here.  If Adams knew that 
no "undisturbed orbit" would do, then he knew that there was some unknown body that 
disturbed Uranus (or that the law of gravitation was false).  Moreover, how can he believe 
that Leverrier could have established that it was the former possibility from an analysis of 
Uranus's residuals?  In any event, Hanson's principal source for this criticism of Adams 
would appear to be Adams's famous diary note of July 3, 1841,137 which reads: 
Formed a design, in the beginning of this week, of investigating, as soon as possible after 
taking my degree, the irregularities in the motion of Uranus which are yet unaccounted for; 
in order to find whether they may be attributed to the action of an undiscovered planet 
beyond it; and if possible thence to determine the elements of its orbit etc. approximately, 
which would probably lead to its discovery. (Emphasis mine.)138  
In this note (as elsewhere), Adams does not merely assume that an unknown planet is the 
cause of Uranus's irregularities.  He asserts that he intends to determine whether or not this 
is so. 
 
In his History of Physical Astronomy, written shortly after the discovery of Neptune, the 
astronomer cum historian, Robert Grant, discusses the problem-solving aspects of this case 
at length.  Of this aspect of Adams's investigation, he says: 
Mr Adams first proceeded to examine the perturbations produced in the motion of Uranus 
by the other planets, in order to assure himself beyond doubt that the errors of Bouvard's 
tables did not proceed from an erroneous application of the existing theory.  For this 
purpose he recomputed the principal perturbations due to Jupiter and Saturn, and 
introduced some new inequalities which had been first pointed out by Hansen.  He also 
took into account the correction to Jupiter's mass, to which recent researchers had 
conducted Astronomers.  Notwithstanding these improvements, the theory still failed to 
represent the motion of the planet.  Two important advantages were, however, gained by 
these preliminary labours.  In  the first place, it was clearly established that the cause of the 
irregularities must be sought elsewhere than in the development of the actual theory.  In the 
second place the application of the improvements had the effect of exhibiting the errors of 
the tables as residual facts wholly dependent on some extraneous influence, and 
consequently they now assumed a more precise and definite character than they had 
previously done.139 
What other direct, or indirect, evidence there is on how Adams tackled this problem supports 
the view that, whatever mistakes he may have made, he was not negligent or headstrong in 
the way Leplin and Hanson imply, or indeed in any other. 
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Leplin continues: 
A different reason for considering UH premature was the belief that data on Uranus, which 
only fifteen years earlier [c. 1830] had begun to depart markedly from Bouvard's tables, 
were insufficient to determine elements of orbit for a perturbing planet.  Leverrier's 1846 
proof that the perturbations of Uranus could not be explained by influences of known 
bodies pertained to a Uranian orbit which itself was an uncertain projection from the data, 
and definitive tables for Uranus became available only later in the century.  Thus it would 
have been perfectly sensible to 'dismiss' UH or to discourage others from pursuing it even 
for one who did not at all presume that the final solution lay elsewhere.  In fact, Airy was 
not pursuing alternative solutions to the problem of Uranus while discounting Adams's; he 
was keeping careful data on Uranus while working on other problems altogether.  The 
rejection of an hypothesis as speculative is common.  It reflects the capacities of the 
discipline at a certain time, not an intrinsic implausibility of the hypothesis.140 
 
There are several points to be made about the above passage.  Firstly, it is Airy's belief alone 
about the insufficiency of the data on Uranus that Leplin has evidence for above.  In a 
footnote to this passage, he says that Airy thought that "it might require several revolutions 
of Uranus" to provide sufficient data.141  Airy, however, said he was sure of this 
requirement.  Leplin waters down Airy's opinion, which has not been a popular one, for it 
would be sometime next century at the earliest before such data would become available.142  
(Grünbaum chooses not to mention this opinion of Airy's, which was expressed in the letter 
to Hussey from which he quotes.)143  Later in the above passage of Leplin's, it is Airy, once 
again, who supposedly speaks for the discipline as a whole as to its capacity, or lack thereof, 
to locate an exterior planet.  But what of the fact that many disagreed with Airy, or of Airy's 
own about face on this matter shortly after?  Leplin is silent. 
 
Secondly, Leplin's central criticism above shows that he fails to understand the nature of the 
problem Leverrier and Adams tackled, and this failure vitiates his criticism.  Uranus's 
residuals had two components:  the errors in the orbital elements of the planet and the 
perturbations caused by Neptune.144  The former would remain uncertain whilever the latter 
was not taken into account.  Even if someone had hit upon the correct orbital elements for 
Uranus, that person would have had no justification for believing that he or she had done so 
for Uranus would still have been plagued by residuals, those caused by Neptune.  Thus the 
uncertainty that so concerns Leplin would remain, and such efforts as Adams and Leverrier 
expended would therefore always have been premature on his account of the matter.  When 
Leplin adds that definitive tables for Uranus only became available much later in the 
nineteenth century, this confirms his mistake.  There would have been no such tables unless 
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UH had been entertained (apart from the fact that there is no need for UH once such tables 
are available).  Accurate tables for a planet depend upon knowing, or at least having a true 
description of, the relevant properties of all the planets which sensibly perturb the planet for 
which those tables are being constructed.  Leplin falsely implies that astronomers could, and 
presumably should, have simply waited for such tables to become available before 
entertaining UH.  Moreover, one does not need to know what are the elements of a planet's 
orbit in order to show or have good reason to believe that it has residual or unexplained 
perturbations.  If the perturbations due to Jupiter and Saturn are removed from the observed 
longitudes of Uranus, and yet no (elliptical) orbit will satisfy these supposedly unperturbed 
longitudes, there is good reason to believe that the inventory of perturbing forces on Uranus 
is incomplete.  All that Leverrier and Adams needed to do was to satisfy themselves that no 
member of the family of possible (unperturbed) orbits of Uranus would satisfy this data.145  
They did not need to know what was the planet's true orbit. 
 
Leplin has a final objection: 
A third reason for opposition both to UH and MH [the hypothesis of an intra-Mercurial 
planet, later introduced to explain the advance of Mercury's perihelion] concerns the 
observability of postulated planets . . . . That such planets were unobserved, or, in the case 
of Neptune, unrecognised, was only part of the problem.  The other part was that they were 
theoretically observable.  Were they unobservable, had it been possible to argue that their 
properties precluded observation, the legitimacy of UH and MH would thereby have been 
enhanced.  This is particularly clear in the case of MH on behalf of which astronomers 
attempted persistently if unsuccessfully to contrive suitably perturbing matter so positioned 
. . . as systematically to elude detection.  And when a trans-Uranian planet was first 
suggested [in 1835] to provide additional forces on Halley's comet, the assumption that 
Bode's law would prevent the planet from ever being observed made astronomers consider 
the possibility of theoretically inferring it all the more significant an accomplishment, 
attesting to the maturation of their science.146 
 
This is a curious objection, to say the least.  How does someone come to believe that it is 
preferable to postulate unobservable planets?  Leplin later asserts that propositions about 
unobservables are subject to an "epistemic liability" from which propositions about 
observables are free.147  Quite so.  Alleged observables are liable to be shown not to exist by 
observation - a point in favour, one would think, of the postulation of the corresponding 
propositions. And anyone who finds virtue in a falsificationist methodology, as Leplin does, 
should not need reminding of this point.  It is true, as he points out, that scientists do 
postulate unobservables.  But that is not to say that, other things being equal, such postulates 
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are preferable to postulates about observables, or that scientists regard the latter as somehow 
less legitimate.  If Leverrier had surmised that there was little or no prospect of observing 
the planet he thought responsible for Uranus's residual perturbations, would that have 
enhanced his conclusions?  Would that have given him an advantage over Adams? 
 
As to Leplin's two examples, in the case of MH, astronomers generally turned to hypotheses 
involving matter that would be difficult to observe or unobservable, such as a ring of small 
asteroids or mere "planetary dust", only once it was realised that one body of the required 
mass ought already to have been observed or could not be found.148  In the case of Halley's 
comet, the one astronomer, Jean Valz, that Leplin does have evidence for (again he 
generalises wildly) said, "Would it not be admirable . . . to ascertain the existence of a body 
which we cannot even observe?"149  Valz does not say here that it would be more admirable 
than if this body were merely as yet unobserved.  Nor does he say that it would be more 
admirable if this body were such that we could never observe it.  To see that astronomers are 
more impressed by theoretical inferences which then gain observational support one need 
look no further than the discovery of Neptune.  By and large, Newtonian mechanics was 
eulogized, Leverrier and (eventually) Adams showered with praise and honours only after 
the planet was discovered.150  "There were some dignified huzzahs for another analytical 
'triumph'" when Leverrier's prediction was first published, says Grosser, but that was all; and 
the more detailed calculation which appeared in his third paper on Uranus fared no better.151  
Had Leverrier or Adams postulated an unobservable planet as the cause of Uranus's troubles, 
it is difficult to believe that the relative indifference astronomers had shown to their 
theoretical demonstrations would suddenly have given way to enthusiastic talk about a 
"significant accomplishment" and "the maturation of their science". 
 
To sum up Leplin, he has no grounds for his belief either that by the 1840s UH was 
premature or that one reason for opposing this hypothesis was that the planet it postulated 
was observable.  But even if he had such grounds, it would be philosophically small beer.  If 
instead the evidence were that some other hypothesis - a massive Uranian satellite, a dark 
exterior planet, a much heavier Saturn, or merely some errors in Bouvard's original analysis 
- should have been considered before UH, what would that show?  It would show only that 
astronomers were misinformed as to how best to set about protecting their core beliefs, not 
that there was anything untoward in their attempting to do so. 
 
In conclusion, I have analysed the accounts of Grünbaum and Leplin at some length in order 
to show the resilience of Popper's false doctrine that the so-called practice of avoiding 
refutations, with its dark suggestions of ad hoc hypotheses, is a rationally undesirable 
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practice.  No other explanation of Grünbaum's and Leplin's treatment of the historical 
evidence or of the scientific arguments seems to me at all plausible than that both were in 
the grip of this doctrine when they came to consider this case. 
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Some Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Popper is a profoundly inconsistent skeptic. He wants very badly what he cannot have, 
namely an account of science in which theories are refuted; yet he is not prepared to 
relinquish the skepticism which stands in the way of his obtaining it. If one cannot hold a 
position, however, one can always delude oneself that one is able to do so or cultivate the 
impression of doing so by the use of rhetoric. This method of dealing with a genuine problem 
infects Popper’s thinking generally, as is illustrated, for example, by his use of rhetoric to 
convince us that the refutation or attempted refutation of theories is the core of scientific 
practice. Rhetoric aside, however, inconsistent skepticism is a seductive position, and we 
should not be surprised to find so many people occupying it. For this position seemingly 
allows one to cut the ground from under anyone who shows the slightest tendency of 
asserting anything positive that is not consistent with one’s own positive assertions. It also 
plays on our natural tendency to be more charitable to our own views than to the views of 
others who disagree with us.  
 
What, then, of the place of refutation, or attempted refutation, of major theories in science? 
Given the condition that one can have more or less reason for believing or accepting a 
proposition or that one can rationally prefer to believe or accept one proposition rather than 
another, it matters little to science whether or not the law of gravitation is or is not now 
refuted - because of the difficulties involved in, say, knowing all the forces at work in any 
case. There are many propositions none of us can easily refute, but this fact is not one which, 
given the above condition, hinders intellectual progress. I have not refuted the proposition 
that the probability of discovering a trans-Uranian planet prior to 1846 was not low, but I do 
not need to do so for philosophy of science to progress in this (small) area. All that I need to 
do is to provide good reason to believe that this proposition is false. When people believed 
that universal generalizations were knowable and that it was important that they were, it was 
important to point out that this belief was false. The importance of pointing out that such 
propositions are falsifiable is much less now that this false belief is much less common. As to 
the point that we should attempt to refute our theories, if this is taken to mean only that a 
conscious test of a theory ought to be designed such that we stand the best chance of 
obtaining refuring evidence or strong counter-evidence for that theory (if it is false), then I 
agree. This is only the other side of the coin, however, from designing a test to obtain the 
strongest possible confirmation possible (if the theory is true). As to Popper’s objection that 
confirmations can be had for the asking, my reply is that weak confirmations can certainly be 
had for the asking - just like refutationsp. 
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Some Concluding Remarks: Addendum - see *Note, p.i above 
 
 
One final point: it might be thought that a study of Popper's account of scientific method, 
especially one as extended as the above, would be deficient or defective to the extent that it 
did not treat his rejection of inductive reasoning.  A complete analysis of his account would 
certainly require such a treatment, which is not attempted above.  But this analysis, with its 
focus on scientific practice and its concern for the nature and role of refutations and their 
'avoidance', is not compromised by this boundary to the study.  Even if Popper's attitude to 
induction were not atypical, the problems raised for his methodology above would remain.  
His insistence that corroboration is exclusively 'backward looking' and that contingent 
propositions can command no positive support, for example, does nothing to relieve him of 
the task of explaining how it is that theories rather than auxiliary propositions are refuted, or 
prima facie refuted, when predictions fail. 
 
Were he to face the fact that refutationp is mere discorroboration then if  T  is well 
corroborated compared with  A , assuming such comparisons can be made,  A  would be well 
discorroborated compared with  T  by the discovery that  P  is false.  That much a deductivist 
can have, that much a weak falsificationist such as Popper needs.  The fact that such 
discorroborations are themselves also only backward looking is another matter (if another 
problem for Popper).  The point is that no epistemic conclusions about either  T  or  A  
follow from the discovery that  P  is false.  (It does not follow, for example, from the fact 
that  P  is false, and hence that  T & A  is false, even that  T  and  A  are equally doubtful.)  
So there is simply no falsificationist (even if discorroborationist) methodology, which has as 
its object individual theories, but that gives consideration to the strength of the antecedent in 
 (~P & A)  -->  ~T 
whether 'strength' is understood as (involving) inductive support or as corroboration. 
 
 
